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ABSTRACT 
 
Large service systems today are of highly network structures. In this thesis, these large service 
systems are called networked service systems. The network nature of these systems has no doubt 
brought mass customized services but has also created challenges in the management of their 
safety. The safety of service systems is an important issue due to their critical influences on the 
functioning of society. Traditional safety engineering methods focus on maintaining service 
systems in a safe state, in particular aiming to maintain systems to be reliable and robust. 
However, resilience cannot be absent from safety out of many recent disasters that occur in 
society. 
 
The goal of this thesis is to improve the resilience of networked service systems. Four major 
works have been performed to achieve this goal. First, a unified definition of service systems 
was proposed and its relationship to other system concepts was unfolded. Upon the new 
definition, a domain model of service systems was established by a FCBPSS framework, 
followed by developing a computational model. Second, a definition of resilience for service 
systems was proposed, based on which the relationship among three safety properties (i.e., 
reliability, robustness and resilience) was clarified, followed by developing a framework for 
resilience analysis. Third, a methodology of resilience measurement for service systems was 
proposed by four measurement axioms along with corresponding mathematical models. The 
methodology focused on the potential ability of a service system to create optimal rebalancing 
solutions. Two typical service systems, transportation system and enterprise information system, 
were employed to validate the methodology. Fourth, a methodology of enhancing resilience for 
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service systems was proposed by integrating three types of reconfigurations of systems, namely 
design, planning and management, along with the corresponding mathematical model. This 
methodology was validated by an example of transportation system.   
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the work above: (1) a service system has a unique 
characteristic that it meets humans' demand directly, and its safety relies on the balance between 
the supplies and demands; (2) different from reliability and robustness, the resilience of a service 
system focuses on the rebalancing ability from imbalanced situations; (3) it makes sense to 
measure the resilience of a service system only for a particular imbalanced situation and based 
on evaluation of rebalancing solutions; and (4) integration of design, planning and management 
is an effective approach for improvement of the resilience for a service system. 
 
The contributions of this thesis can be summarized. Scientifically, this thesis work has improved 
our understanding of service systems and their resilience property; furthermore, this work has 
advanced the state of knowledge of safety science in particular having successfully responded to 
two questions: is a service system safe and how to make a service system safer? Technologically 
or methodologically, the work has advanced the knowledge for modeling and optimization of 
networked service systems in particular with multiple layer models along with the algorithms for 
integrated decision making on design, planning, and management.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
Modern human society critically relies on different service systems which provide timely 
and sustainable services to our daily lives and social production activities. One of the 
most important features of modern service systems is that they work in a networked 
manner. A generic network includes a set of nodes which are connected to each other in 
some ways. The nodes not only represent humans but also technical systems. The 
networked service systems are thus complex socio-tech systems. 
 
Unfortunately, the safety of networked service systems is still a great concern. A few 
recent service system failures have supported this concern. The successive breakdown of 
the power supply system in the Northern India happened in July 2012, causing one-half 
of the country into serious trouble, and this breakdown further caused failures of other 
critical service systems, such as transportation system, financial system, water supply 
system, and hospital system [India today online 2012]. In 2003, four developed counties 
(United States [CNN 2003], Canada [CNN 2003], United Kingdom [BBC 2003b] and 
Italy [BBC 2003a]) all experienced serious blackout issues. Another example is the 
recent accident of communication system in Calgary, Canada; a communication system 
provided by Shaw, the largest local telecommunication provider, failed due to an 
explosion in July 2012 [Metronews 2012]. 
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Indeed, according to [Zhang 2008], the network structure of service systems makes them 
a higher potential of cascading failures than non-network structures. In the network 
structure, several critical service systems become more interdependent on one another, 
and therefore, the cascading effect more likely takes effect. The blackout in the Northern 
India did cause dysfunctions of transportation and bank systems. The failure of the 
Calgary communication system has shown that the service system is more sensitive to 
internal or external disturbances. It is the motivation of this thesis to study the safety of a 
highly networked service system – in particular how to design and operate a network 
service system so that it can be much safer.  
 
Unfortunately, a preliminary study revealed that two important concepts, (1) service and 
service system and (2) safety and safety engineering have not been clearly defined in the 
current literature. Therefore, there is a need to clarify these two concepts. At the outset of 
this research, seeking the answer to the two aforementioned questions has been attempted. 
 
It is well known that there are three important safety properties of a system, namely 
reliability, robustness and resilience and there are three corresponding research fields, 
reliability engineering, robustness engineering and resilience engineering. Reliability 
engineering and robustness engineering are relatively well developed; reliability focuses 
on different accident models and robustness focuses on how to maintain a system to 
function to meet the requirement. Resilience is a popular concept in material science 
[Nagdi 1993], psychology [Luthar et al. 2000] and ecology [Gunderson 2000]. Recently, 
researchers from system safety engineering have paid attention to the concept of 
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resilience engineering by introducing the resilience concept into safety engineering 
[Hollnagel et al. 2006]. From an engineering perspective, resilience has been viewed as a 
property of a system regarding its ability to recover its basic [or generic] function after 
the system is attacked [or disturbed] to such an extent that either system is physically 
broken or beyond its yield state [adopted from Zhang 2007]. 
 
Indeed, the system failure examples as previously mentioned have indicated that the 
current methodologies of reliability engineering and robustness engineering are not 
adequate to having a safe system with a tolerable disruption. This implies that a new 
effort on resilience engineering is worthwhile to be taken. 
 
The overall objective of the research in this thesis was to improve the understanding of 
resilience of a networked service system and develop technology to improve its resilience. 
A preliminary study by the author led to the view that to achieve this overall objective, 
two issues need to be addressed, namely (1) how to measure the resilience of a networked 
service system and (2) how to design and operate a networked system for a controlled 
resilience. 
 
Regarding the first issue, resilience can be investigated from a perspective of the safety 
performance of systems under abnormal situations. This calls for a deep understanding of 
the service system, which was in fact missing at the time this research was initiated. 
Regarding the second issue, it is necessary to provide a measure for the resilience of a 
service system.  
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1.2 Objectives 
 
To achieve the overall objective of the research, the following specific objectives were 
defined. 
 
Objective 1: to have a clear understanding of the networked service system and to build 
a domain model to lay down a foundation for measure, design and operate a service 
system for high resilience and other performances. 
 
Objective 2: to have a clear understanding of resilience of the service system; in 
particular, to build the intricate relationships among reliability, robustness, resilience, and 
safety. 
 
Objective 3: to develop a methodology to measure the resilience of a networked service 
system. 
 
Objective 4: to develop a methodology for improving the resilience of a networked 
service system. 
 
1.3 Organization of the Thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is laid out into seven chapters as follows. 
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Chapter 2 presents a literature review on the service system and resilience engineering. 
The review will further confirm the validity of the proposed objectives for this research. 
Indeed, this review will come to the conclusions including (1) a unified definition of 
service and service system has been absent and (2) a relationship among reliability, 
robustness, resilience and safety has been absent. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a unified definition of service and service system, which lays down a 
foundation to discuss the relationship among reliability, robustness, resilience and safety. 
The discussion in this chapter has further made it possible to discuss the measure and 
measurement of resilience for a networked service system, design and operation of a 
networked service system for higher resilience with consideration of cost and time. 
 
Chapter 4 provides a domain model and an analysis of service system, with which the 
variables to affect resilience of a service system are derived from the domain model. 
 
Chapter 5 presents a clear understanding of resilience for the service system by (1) 
proposing new definitions of safety and resilience, (2) clarifying the relationships among 
reliability, robustness, and resilience, and (3) developing a framework for resilience 
analysis. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses measurement axioms and corresponding mathematical models for 
resilience of a networked service system. Therefore, given a particular networked service 
system, its resilience can be measured quantitatively. 
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Chapter 7 presents a methodology for the resilience improvement by (1) building an 
integrated strategy of design, planning and management by a framework and a general 
mathematical model, and (2) developing a detailed mathematical model with its 
corresponding algorithms to conduct the integrated strategy in a validation case of 
transportation system.  
 
Chapter 8 gives the conclusions and future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
There are two important concepts and related topics in this thesis: service system and 
resilience engineering. This chapter first gives a literature review on the concept of 
service system as well as a similar concept called service-oriented system and discusses 
the relationship between these two concepts in Section 2.2. There are two important 
perspectives to investigate the resilience concept and resilience engineering, as shown in 
Figure 2.1. The first perspective is to understand the resilience concept through 
examination of its origin and definition in different disciplines. This perspective is 
helpful for understanding of connation of resilience concept and its basic features. The 
second perspective is to understand resilience engineering as a branch of safety 
engineering. The two perspectives are discussed in Section 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. As 
last, a conclusion is given in Section 2.5. 
8 
 
 Resilience 
Engineering 
Material Science
Computer Science 
Ecology
Supply Chain 
Management 
Health
Disaster Management 
Psychology
Strategy 
Management 
Evolution of Safety Engineering Discipline
System-based Safety 
Engineering 
Component-based  
Safety Engineering 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t o
f R
es
ili
en
ce
 C
on
ce
pt
 in
 D
iff
er
en
t D
is
ci
pl
in
es
 
Figure 2.1 Two perspectives for understanding of resilience and resilience engineering 
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2.2 Service System and Related Concept 
 
2.2.1 Service System 
 
2.2.1.1 Origin of service system 
 
The concept of the service system was proposed from the economic or value point of 
view. That is, from a point of view of economy, a system can broadly be classified into 
three categories: agricultural systems [Rigby and Cáceres 2001], manufacturing systems 
[Smith 2003] and service systems [Spohrer et al. 2007], which are further relevant to 
agricultural economy, manufacturing economy and service economy, respectively. Over 
the last two decades, emphasis on manufacturing economy has been shifted to service 
economy [Krishnamurthy 2007]. According to the report by the International Labour 
Organisation in 2007, such a shift was especially true in the developed nations and the 
total number of jobs in the service economy is more than that in the agricultural and 
manufacturing economy [IfM&IBM 2008]. These significant changes in the field of 
economy have greatly raised researcher’s attention to the service system worldwide.   
 
The earliest appearance of the term 'service system' is perhaps in a book entitled 
'stochastic service system' [Riordan 1962]. The emphasis of this book is, however, on use 
of a mathematical approach to study telephone systems, especially the telephone traffic 
congestion problem. Obviously, despite the name 'service' used in this book, there is no 
sense of the service economy at that time. The earliest research on service system (which 
has the same concept as the one herein) was conducted by Levitt [1972] and Mills and 
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Mober [1982]. They attempted to apply the manufacturing concept to service. Their 
motivation and idea can be well understood from a point of view of economy. 
 
2.2.1.2 Concepts: service and service system 
 
(1) Definition of service 
Several important definitions of service proposed in literature are listed in Table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1 Definitions of service 
 Definition Literature 
1 “Service is a time-perishable, intangible experience 
performed for a customer acting in the role of co-producer.” 
Fitzsimmons and 
Fitzsimmons 2004 
2 “Service is the application of competences by one entity for 
the benefit of another.”
Vargo and Lusch 
2004, 2006 
3 “Service is a provider/client interaction that creates and 
captures value.” 
IBM 2011b 
5 “Service refers to economic activities offered by one party to 
another.” 
Lovelock et al. 2009 
6 “Service is a process by which the provider fulfills a mission 
for a client so that value is created for each of the two 
stakeholders.” 
Lau et al. 2011 
 
These definitions of service have captured some important features of service. However, 
they are too general to be useful; in particular there is a difficulty with them to distinguish 
a service from a product, manufacture, and agriculture. In fact, following these 
definitions, agriculture and manufacture, along with products and goods, are both 
services [Lau et al. 2011]. These definitions may further lead to the concept that "all 
economies are service economy", as pointed out by Vargo et al. [2008]. This problem 
(i.e., all inclusive) is inherited to the concept of service system, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter.   
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The shift of economies to service economy, as mentioned above, may have some sense of 
business benefit. For instance, IBM seems to lead the research of service science and 
tends to sell their business solutions to all the firms and sectors. Therefore, a more 
general definition of economy is helpful for their business. This should not however 
compromise the need to give each concept a distinct definition so that research can be 
built upon a common framework. 
 
(2) Definition of service system 
The 'service system' has been given different definitions from different points of view in 
literature. The existing definitions of the service system in literature are listed in Table 
2.2, where the right column ‘category’ is designed by this thesis (i.e., these definitions are 
further put into three categories).  
 
The first category (definition 1 and definition 2) in Table 2.2 has a distinct feature that a 
human-in-the loop is considered as a key feature in service system. In particular, 
definition 1 considers the service as a process driven by the customer. This definition can 
however bring a manufacturing system and a product system into the domain of service 
system. If one fixes on the definition of customer as a human individual, a cell phone 
which is a product system then becomes a service system, as in this case, a user is a 
customer, and the user’s input on the cell phone triggers the work of the phone. 
Moreover, definition 2 cannot distinguish a service system from a manufacturing system. 
Broadly, an organization which has a manufacturing business is considered to be a 
manufacturing system. Therefore, according to definition 2, Boeing appears to be a 
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manufacturing system. However, Boeing also has a service business, and Boeing can then 
be considered to be a service system. In short, bringing humans in the system is not 
enough to give an identity of service system. 
 
Table 2.2 Definitions of service system 
 Definition Literature Category
1 "With a service process, the customer provides significant 
inputs into the production process." 
Sampson 
and Froehle 
2006 
 
I 
2 "A service system is a voluntary and human usable system, 
that is, a usable system which contains a significant level of 
people or organizations as components during operation 
and needs voluntary engagement of an external 
person/organization to produce value."
Pinhanez 
2009 
 
I 
3 "A service system is a work system that produces services." Alter 2003, 
2006, 2008b 
II 
4 "A service system is defined as a value-coproduction 
configuration of people, technology, other internal and 
external service systems, and shared information (such as 
language, processes, metrics, prices, policies, and laws)." 
Spohrer et 
al. 2007, 
2008 
III 
5 "A service system is defined as a dynamic configuration of 
resources (people, technology, organisations and shared 
information) that creates and delivers value between the 
provider and the customer through service." 
IfM & IBM 
2008 
III 
6 "A service system is a composite of agents, technology, 
environment, and/or organization units of agents and/or 
technology, functioning in space-time and cyberspace for a 
given period of time." 
Stanicek 
and Winkler 
2010 
III 
 
 
The second category (definition 3) has a distinct feature that the service system and 
manufacturing system have the same structure but are capable of producing either a 
product or service. The so-called work system follows the definition given by Alter 
[2003], which says: “a work system is a system in which human participants and/or 
machines perform work using information, technology, and other resources to produce 
products and services for internal or external customers.”  
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The third category (definition 4, 5 and 6) has a distinct view that a service system is a 
complementary component of the economic exchange [Demirkan et al. 2011]. There are a 
couple of concerns with definition 4. First, knowledge is not included. It is noted that 
knowledge and information are of distinct concepts; see [Zhang 1994]. Therefore, 
knowledge should be included in the definition of service system alongside with 
information. It is noted that Vargo et al. [2008] has also realized this issue and added 
knowledge into the definition of service. Second, this definition is all-inclusive, as stated 
by the authors, “individuals, families, firms, nations, and economies are all instances of 
the service system.” As pointed out before, the writer considered that the all-inclusive 
approach can hardly differentiate any individual system, which is not workable in 
practice. Third, this definition seems to put emphasis on value and value co-production or 
co-creation as a feature of service system, which is equally impossible to differentiate 
different economies. In fact, following this definition, one can also arrive at the point that 
all economies are service economies [Vargo et al. 2008]. Definition 5 emphasizes the 
exchange between different economic resources and economic values according to [IfM 
& IBM 2008]. However, this definition is also all-inclusive, ranging from individual 
people to businesses, nations and even ecosystems. Definition 6 is an extension of 
definition 4 by including the context and time to give a sense of dynamics.  
 
Besides the definitions above, there are also definitions of service system from a point of 
view of the nature of various services. For instance, Lusch and Vargo [2006] defined 
service as: "service may refer to a kind of action, performance, or promise that is 
exchanged for value." Krishnamurthy [2007] outlined four features of a service as: (1) 
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intangible, (2) consumed at the time it is produced, (3) provision of value-adding in 
different forms, and most importantly, (4) co-production. Regarding the last feature, Tien 
and Berg [2003] explained: “co-production means that the consumer and provider are 
communicating constantly, re-evaluating the need of the customer and the manner in 
which the customer is being satisfied.”  
 
The above definitions have difficulties to distinguish a service system from other 
systems, such as agricultural systems, manufacturing systems, and product systems. For 
instance, in the agricultural system, humans and technologies are also included. Modern 
agricultural systems are highly automated similar to manufacturing systems. Emphasis on 
technology, people, and organization for the manufacturing system can be dated back as 
early as to the 1990s; see [Zhang et al. 1997]. Further, the first and second features of 
service as described by Krishnamurthy [2007] fail to include the transportation system 
which passes goods from place A to place B. The nature of co-production is the customer 
participation in businesses, which is not only for service but also for manufacturing 
according to Li et al. [2004]. It appears that an identity of the service system is still not 
clear from the current literature. 
 
2.2.1.3 Related work  
 
The service system has evolved into a new discipline today and has been studied from 
different perspectives: science, technology, engineering and management; furthermore, 
there are different names or labels which have something to do with service system, e.g., 
service science [Spohrer and Maglio 2008], service engineering [Bullinger et al. 2003 and 
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Mandelbaum 1998], service science, management and engineering (SSME) [Maglio et al. 
2006], and service systems engineering [Tien and Berg 2003]. It is noted that SSME was 
proposed by an IBM research team and further simplified as service science; in particular, 
service science is viewed as a study of service systems from different perspectives, 
including science, engineering and management. Next, a summary of the related work is 
given from these perspectives. 
 
(1) From a science perspective, researchers have investigated the origin of service and 
service system and studied important features of service, service system and service 
science discipline, based on which the definitions of these important concepts are 
proposed. Some related work has already been introduced in Section 2.2.1.1 and Section 
2.2.1.2. One important work is the service-dominant (S-D) logic proposed by Vargo and 
Lusch [2004, 2006], which is considered as an economic foundation of the service 
system, instead of the traditional good-dominant (G-D) logic. The difference between the 
S-D logic and the G-D logic has been summarized in the work of [Constantin and Lusch 
1994, Vargo and Lusch 2004] as: "S-D logic focuses on the action of operant resources 
(those that act upon other resources), such as knowledge and skills, whereas G-D logic 
focuses on the exchange of operand resources (those that an act or operation is performed 
on, such as goods)." It is noted that, similar with the problems in the definitions of service 
and service system discussed in Section 2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2, S-D logic is also an all-
inclusive concept which considers all the economies as service economy. 
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(2) From an engineering perspective, researchers have focused on how to develop and 
improve the performance of a service system, including improving efficiency, 
effectiveness, sustainability and safety [Bullinger et al. 2003, Spohrer et al. 2007]. The 
methodologies of modeling [Stanicek and Winkler 2010], design [Shimomura and Arai 
2004, Karni and Kaner 2006, Glushko and Tabas 2009], measurement [Wang et al. 
2010a, Xie 2011] and control [Mascio 2003] were proposed. It is noted that in the current 
literature, a service system was only examined from a particular phase of the whole 
system life-cycle; in particular, a service system was investigated from the phase of 
design, planning and control separately [Wang 2010]. 
 
(3) From a management perspective, the issues in operations management, marketing, 
human resources have been widely discussed [Rai and Sambamurthy 2006, Sengupta 
2006, Li et al. 2007]. The most important work was given by Daskin [2010] in his recent 
book, service science. Although his book was named as service science, he has 
investigated the service system from the management point of view only; in particular, he 
has provided comprehensive discussions on quantitative methodologies, particularly 
optimization and queuing theory, has applied them to solve a variety of problems in 
service systems, and has aimed at facilitating decision-making during their operations and 
management. 
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2.2.2 Service-oriented System 
 
2.2.2.1 Introduction  
 
Different from service system, the concept of service-oriented system is proposed from a 
technological point of view. From a technological perspective, a service-oriented system 
(SO system) is a system based on service-oriented architecture (SOA). SOA is a way of 
designing software systems; in particular, it aims at (1) offering a flexible infrastructure 
and operation environment and (2) generating the independent and reusable functions (or 
services) to end-user applications or other services in a network via standard interfaces, 
according to Papazoglou et al. [2007]. In the context of SOA, a service focuses on the 
autonomous means of retrieving and processing information according to Liu and Deters 
[2008], which is different from the definition discussed in Section 2.2. The details of the 
concepts are discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.2.2 Concepts: service and service-oriented architecture  
 
The definition of service-oriented system depends on the definitions of service and SOA, 
respectively. There are different definitions of service and SOA, among which the 
definitions proposed by three important organizations, W3C (World Wide Web Consortium), 
OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards) and the 
open group, are widely accepted, as listed in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3 Definitions of service and SOA 
 Service SOA  
W3C A service is a set of actions that 
form a coherent whole from the 
point of view of service providers 
and service requesters. A service 
requester is the entity that is 
responsible for requesting a service 
from a service provider; in 
particular, service requester is a 
web service agent. A Service 
Provider is an agent that is capable 
of and empowered to perform the 
actions associated with a service; in 
particular, service provider is a web 
service agent. 
A Service Oriented 
Architecture (SOA) is a form 
of distributed systems 
architecture that is typically 
characterized by the 
following properties: Logical 
view, Message orientation, 
Description orientation, 
Granularity, Network 
orientation and Platform 
neutral. 
[Booth 
et al. 
2004] 
OASIS A service is a mechanism to enable 
access to one or more capabilities, 
where the access is provided using 
a prescribed interface and is 
exercised consistent with 
constraints and policies as specified 
by the service description. 
Service Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) is a paradigm for 
organizing and utilizing 
distributed capabilities that 
may be under the control of 
different ownership domains. 
[OASIS 
2006] 
The 
open 
group 
A service:  
(1) Is a logical representation of a 
repeatable business activity that has 
a specified outcome (e.g., check 
customer credit; provide weather 
data, consolidate drilling reports)  
(2) Is self-contained  
(3) May be composed of other 
services  
(4) Is a “black box” to consumers 
of the service 
Service-Oriented Architecture 
(SOA) is an architectural 
style that supports service 
orientation. 
Service orientation is a way 
of thinking in terms of 
services and service-based 
development and the 
outcomes of services. 
An architectural style is the 
combination of distinctive 
features in which architecture 
is performed or expressed. 
[the 
open 
group 
2011] 
 
The definitions proposed by W3C are from a web service perspective; in particular, 
service refers to the web service with the form of software. The definitions proposed by 
OASIS and the open group are more general; in particular, they are from a business 
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process perspective [IBM 2011a]. It is noted that none of these definitions refers to any 
specific architecture. 
 
Box [2004] summarized the principles of SOA into four features: (1) Boundaries are 
explicit, (2) Services are autonomous, (3) Services share schema and contract, not class, 
and (4) Service compatibility is determined based on policy. A common goal of the four 
features is to develop loosely coupled distributed systems based on the notion of services. 
Liu and Deters [2008] concluded six characteristics for the service-oriented systems: (1) 
distributed, (2) homogeneous and yet heterogeneous, (3) open, (4) dynamic, (5) 
hierarchical and heterarchical, and (6) scalable. 
 
2.2.2.3 Related work  
 
The service-oriented system is mainly examined from a perspective of engineering; 
however, some researchers studied the service-oriented system from perspectives of 
science and management as well. Therefore, similar to service system, related work is 
summarized from three perspectives: science, engineering and management.  
 
(1) From a science perspective, the basic concepts, such as service, software as a service, 
service-oriented computing, service-oriented architecture, and service-oriented system 
were discussed in [Turner et al. 2003, Jones 2005, Papazoglou et al. 2007]. Furthermore, 
a discipline, called service-oriented science was proposed in [Foster 2005]. 
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(2) From an engineering perspective, researchers have investigated main aspects of the 
service-oriented system life cycle [Kontogiannis et al. 2007], such as collaborative 
specification and modeling [Karle and Oberweis 2008], design [Papazoglou and Heuvel 
2006], implementation [Schmidt et al. 2005, Jameela et al. 2011], evaluation [Tsai 2005], 
operation and maintenance and different applications [Lane and Richardson 2011]. It is 
noted that most of the studies only addressed particular areas of life-cycle; of the studies 
that attempt to address an entire life-cycle, few of them have been validated with real-life 
scenarios [Lane and Richardson 2011].  
 
(3) From a management perspective, researchers have addressed some important issues, 
such as service level management [Muller 1999, Tosic et al. 2005], management 
information modeling and communication [DMTF 2005], different management 
techniques [Almeida et al. 2006, Tseng and Wu 2007], and self-management [Cao et al. 
2004, Lewis et al. 2004]. Liu and Deters [2008] have given a good literature review on 
the topics above and have summarized the characteristics of service-oriented systems as 
well as the major challenges of management. From a broader management point of view, 
there are some work on the business level of service-oriented systems [Cherbakov et al. 
2005, Demirkan et al. 2005, Demirkan et al. 2008]. 
 
2.2.3 Relationship between Service System and Service-oriented System 
 
(1) The concepts of service system and service-oriented system are proposed from 
different perspectives. As discussed in Section 2.2.1 and Section 2.2.2, the service system 
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concept was proposed from an economic perspective while the service-oriented system 
concept was proposed from a technological perspective.  
 
(2) The two concepts may be coupled. In real-world applications, the two concepts may 
be coupled. On one hand, a service system may be built up based on different 
technologies; in particular, it may be built up based on the service-oriented architecture 
technology, which leads a service system to be a service-oriented system. Therefore, the 
concepts of service-oriented service system and non-service-oriented service system 
make sense. On the other hand, the service-oriented architecture may be applied in 
different application domains, including manufacturing systems, service systems and so 
on. Therefore, the concepts of service-oriented manufacturing system and service-
oriented service system make sense.  
 
For example, Ordanini and Pasini [2008] discussed that the service-oriented architecture 
is a good tool to implement the service co-production and value co-creation according to 
the service-dominant (S-D) logic. In Section 2.2.1, it has been discussed that service co-
production and value co-creation are two important features of a service system and S-D 
logic is the economic foundation of service system. IBM also has the same point of view, 
as shown in Figure 2.2. They consider that the service-oriented architecture is with the 
technology domain, and different application systems built upon SOA are with the 
application domain. It is noted that in Figure 2.2, communication system, e-commerce 
system and finance system are all service systems. 
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Figure 2.2. Service-oriented architecture with different application domains (Adopted 
from: https://researcher.ibm.com/researcher/view_pic.php?id=152) 
(3) Both concepts can be examined from a system’s point of view. Although the two 
concepts are proposed from different perspectives, they can be examined from the 
engineering perspective; in particular, both of them can be examined from a system’s 
point of view; furthermore, the research methodology on one concept may be applied to 
the other.  
 
In the current literature, a service system was only examined from a particular phase of 
the whole system life-cycle [Wang 2010]; in particular, a service system was investigated 
from the phase of design, planning and control separately. The literature review in 
Section 2.2.2 has shown that the same problem remains for the service-oriented system. 
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In the information system management, there is a particular concept to describe the whole 
life-cycle of the systems, called systems development life-cycle. The systems 
development life cycle (SDLC) is a conceptual model used in systems engineering, 
information system and software engineering, which describes the stages involved in a 
system development project, from an initial feasibility study through maintenance of the 
completed application. From a system’s point of view, both service system and service-
oriented system have subsystems of infrastructure, substance and management and they 
can be studied with a similar system approach. 
 
2.3 Resilience Concept: Its Origin and Definitions in Different Disciplines 
 
This section first introduces the origin of the resilience concept, particularly the origin of 
the resilience term in English. As stated in Section 2.1, resilience has been a 
multidisciplinary concept. Besides safety engineering, there are many other disciplines 
that also employ this concept. Thus, Section 2.3.2 introduces the development of the 
concept of resilience in different disciplines. Section 2.3.3 presents and discusses 
definitions of the resilience concept in these disciplines (other than safety engineering) as 
well as the features of the definitions. The resilience concept in the context of safety 
engineering will be discussed in Section 2.4. 
 
2.3.1 Origin of Resilience Concept 
 
The word resilience was introduced into English language in the early 17th century from 
the Latin word resilire with the meaning of leaping back or rebounding [McAslan 2010, 
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Oxford dictionary 2012]. The current definitions of resilience in the dictionaries are listed 
in Table 2.4.  
 
 Table 2.4 Definitions of the term Resilience in dictionaries 
 Definition  
I 1: the ability of a substance or object to spring back into 
shape; elasticity 
2: the capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness 
[Oxford Dictionary 
2012] 
II 1: the capability of a strained body to recover its size and 
shape after deformation caused especially by compressive 
stress 
2: an ability to recover from or adjust easily to misfortune or 
change 
[Merriam Webster 
2012] 
 
III 1: the power or ability to return to the original form, position, 
etc., after being bent, compressed, or stretched; elasticity. 
2: ability to recover readily from illness, depression, 
adversity, or the like; buoyancy. 
[Dictionary.com 
2012] 
 
 
The definitions above show that the resilience of an object refers to its ability of returning 
to the original state. This concept of resilience has been introduced into different 
academic disciplines to express the property of different objects or systems.  
 
2.3.2 Development of the Resilience Concept in Different Disciplines 
 
The first use of resilience concept in the academic work could be classified into material 
science [McAslan 2010]. In the 19th century, Tredgold used the resilience concept to 
represent the timber's property of sustaining sudden and severe loads without breaking in 
two of his papers [1818a, 1818b]. Mallet also used the resilience concept to describe the 
performance of materials under severe conditions and discuss the suitability of materials 
in the construction of vessels and buildings [Fairbairn 1865, Mallet 1856, Mallet 1862]. 
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The second area which has employed the resilience concept is ecology. Holling [1973] 
introduced the concept of resilience into the ecology and defined the resilience as a 
property of an ecological system which enables the system to absorb changes and still 
persists. It is noted that Holling's work [Holling 1973] has an important impact on the 
development of the resilience concept within ecology and many other disciplines. Thus, 
the details of his work, particularly his two main contributions on the ecological 
resilience are introduced in the following.  
 
His paper in 1973 was the first attempt on the study of the ecological resilience. He 
considered two properties of an ecological system, resilience and stability and compared 
the two properties [Holling 1973]. He defined the stability as "the ability of a system to 
return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance", as opposed to the resilience 
defined by himself in 1973 in [Holling 1973]. He further stated in [Holling 1973]: “a 
system may be of high resilience but has low stability, as it may fluctuate greatly.”  
 
Holling and other researchers summarized key features of ecological systems and 
discussed the two categories of understandings of resilience concept in the ecological 
literature, and they further extended the resilience concept to an integrative theory to 
understand and analyze the complexity, dynamics and sustainability of ecological, 
economic and social systems in [Holling 2001, Holling and Gunderson 2002, Holling et 
al. 2002]. Their theory was also referred to as resilience theory [Redman and Kinzig 2003, 
Redman 2005]. Holling summarized the key features of ecological system into four 
points [Holling 1996, Holling and Gunderson 2002]: "(1) change is neither continuous 
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and gradual nor consistently chaotic, (2) Spatial attributes are neither uniform nor scale 
invariant over all scales, (3) ecological systems do not have a single equilibrium with 
homeostatic control to remain  near it, and (4) policies and managements that apply fixed 
rules for achieving constant yield, independent of scale, lead to systems that increasingly 
lose resilience." Two definitions of resilience in the ecological literature summarized by 
Holling are engineering resilience and ecological resilience [Holling 1996, Holling and 
Gunderson 2002]. Engineering resilience only considers one equilibrium state of the 
system; while ecological resilience views that an ecological system has multiple 
equilibrium states. It is noted that the definition of engineering resilience is not the 
definition of resilience in the context of engineering; rather it is a definition in the context 
of ecology. In the best knowledge of the writer, Holling favoured the ecological 
resilience definition.   
 
Another important application of the resilience concept is to health and social work. It is 
also called resilience theory, which has the same name yet a different context from the 
resilience theory discussed above in the field of ecology. The resilience theory in the 
context of health and social work focuses on the resilience of human and human society, 
including individual resilience, family resilience, community resilience, resilience-based 
policy and resilience in social work; see the work of [VanBreda 2001].  
 
Besides the early applications in the three disciplines discussed above, the resilience 
concept has been introduced into many other fields and has become to be a 
multidisciplinary concept. Different disciplines may focus on different perspectives. 
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Some efforts have been done on the classification of resilience definitions [VanBreda 
2001, Muddada 2010, Bhamra et al. 2011]. Table 2.5 lists the different disciplines that 
have adopted the resilience concept.  
 
Table 2.5 Different disciplines with application of resilience concept  
 Discipline Literature 
1 Material Science Tredgold 1818a, 1818b, Nagdi 1993 
2 Ecology Holling 1973, Gunderson 2000, Walker et al. 2002 
3 Health and social work VanBreda 2001, Phaneuf 2003, Kaplan et al. 1996 
4 Psychology Luthar et al. 2000, Luthans et al. 2006 
5 strategy management Hamel and Valikangas 2003 
6 supply chain management Christopher and Peck 2004, Sheffi 2005, Muddada 2010
7 computer science Najjar and Gaudiot 1990, Laprie 2008 
8 Disaster management Bruneau et al. 2003, Paton et al. 2000 
9 Safety Engineering Hollnagel et al. 2006 
10 Archaeology Redman 2005, Redman and Kinzig 2003 
 
 
2.3.3 Definitions of the Resilience Concept in Different Contexts 
 
In each discipline, the resilience concept has been studied in the context of a particular 
object or system. Table 2.6 shows definitions of resilience for various objects or systems. 
Table 2.6 indicates that although the resilience concept has a common feature of 
springing back to a normal situation after change as the meanings in the dictionaries, 
these definitions have different focuses. Next, several remarks are given for further 
explanation. 
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Table 2.6 Definitions of resilience in the context of different objects 
 Context Definition Literature 
1 Material Resilience is the ability of the material to return to 
its original shape after temporary deflection. 
Nagdi, 1993 
2 Ecological 
system 
Resilience is a measure of the ability of a system 
to absorb changes of state variables, driving 
variables, and parameters, and still persist. 
Holling 
1973 
 
3 Socio-
ecological  
System 
Resilience is the potential of a system to remain in 
a particular configuration and to maintain its 
feedbacks and  functions, and involves the ability 
of the system to reorganize following disturbance-
driven change. 
Walker et al. 
2002 
4 Individual Resilience is the capacity to maintain competent 
functioning in the face of major life stressors.  
Kaplan et al. 
1996 
5 Family Family resilience refers to the characteristics, 
dimensions, and properties of families which help 
families to be resistant to disruption in the face of 
change and adaptive in the face of crisis situations. 
McCubbin 
and 
McCubbin, 
1988 
6 Community 
/Organization 
The ability of social units (e.g., organizations, 
communities) to mitigate hazards, contain the 
effects of disasters when they occur, and carry out 
recovery activities in ways that minimize social 
disruption and mitigate the effects of future 
earthquakes. 
Bruneau et 
al. 2003 
7 Organization 
/Business 
/Company 
Resilience refers to a capacity for continuous 
values, processes, and behaviors that 
reconstruction. It requires innovation with respect 
to those organizational systematically favor 
perpetuation over innovation. 
Hamel and 
Valikangas 
2003 
8 Company Resilience refers to the ability of a company to 
bound back from a large disruption-this includes, 
for instance, the speed with which it returns to 
normal performance levels (production, services, 
fill rate, etc.) 
Sheffi 2005 
9 Supply chain  Resilience is the ability of system to return to its 
original or desired state after being disturbed. 
Christopher 
and Peck 
2004 
10 Computer 
network 
A measure of network fault tolerance. Najjar and 
Gaudiot 
1990 
 
Remark 1: The resilience of a system is defined and understood based on the examination 
of the system's key features. As discussed in the aforementioned part of this section, 
Holling's definition of ecological resilience was proposed based on his summary of 
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ecological system's four key features [Holling1973]. Thus, different features of different 
systems result in different resilience understandings and then concepts. 
 
Remark 2: For a particular system, the resilience concept may have different definitions 
which come from different perspectives or disciplines. For example, the individual 
resilience was examined in both health and psychology; the community resilience was 
studied in both disaster management and social work. In Table 2.6, definition 6 and 
definition 7 could be viewed as definitions of organization resilience; in particular, 
definition 6 was proposed from a perspective of disaster management and definition 7 
was proposed from a perspective of business management. Both definition 7 and 
definition 8 could be viewed as company resilience; in particular, definition 7 was 
proposed from a perspective of business management which focuses on the company 
itself and definition 8 was proposed from a perspective of supply chain management 
which focuses on a company's role in a supply chain network. 
 
Remark 3: Even in the same discipline, researchers may have different understandings on 
the resilience concept. As introduced in the aforementioned part of this section, there are 
mainly two definitions of resilience in ecology, namely engineering resilience and 
ecological resilience. The goal of this section is not to discuss and find a unified 
definition of resilience; yet the goal is to find common features of various definitions of 
this concept. 
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Remark 4: In the same discipline, researchers may focus on the resilience of different 
targets. For example, in supply chain management, Sheffi [2005] studied the concept of 
resilience from the perspective of one company; while Christopher and Peck [2004] 
focused on the resilience of a whole supply chain.  
 
2.4 Resilience Engineering: Resilience in Safety Engineering 
 
Resilience and safety may be closely related. Resilience engineering can only be well 
understood through the understanding of the evolution of the whole safety engineering 
discipline. Section 2.4.1 summarizes the evolution of safety engineering; in particular, the 
safety engineering approaches are summarized into three categories with three important 
properties which reflect humans' understanding of safety: component-based safety 
engineering, system safety engineering and resilience engineering. Section 2.4.2 and 
Section 2.4.3 introduce component-based safety engineering and system safety 
engineering, respectively. Section 2.4.4 reviews the definitions of resilience in the 
context of safety engineering. 
 
2.4.1 Evolution of Safety Engineering: A Summary 
 
Safety is defined by Mil-Std-882 as "freedom from those conditions that can cause death, 
injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to 
the environment" in [Department of Defence of USA, 2000]. Or, in short, safety is 
"freedom from unacceptable risks" in [Hollnagel et al. 2011]. Risk is defined as "effect of 
uncertainty on objectives" in [ISO 31000, 2009]. The unacceptable risks may happen to 
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humans, systems or environments, and the harmful event caused by such risks is called 
accident. An accident is defined as "an unplanned event or event that results in an 
outcome causing death, injury, damage, harm, and/or loss" in [Ericson 2011].  
 
The evolution of safety engineering goes along with the development of technology and 
human society and it is driven by the demand from the economy development and also by 
the methodology progress. Therefore, the safety engineering discipline can be examined 
from different perspectives, as shown in Figure 2.3. From a technology perspective, 
safety engineering emerged with the industrial revolution and initially focused on the 
safety demand of mass production. With the information technology revolution, the 
social-tech systems, especially service systems, became popular and their safety demands 
turned out to be important issues of safety engineering. Correspondingly, from a target 
system perspective, the focus of safety engineering experienced a shift from 
manufacturing systems to service systems.  From an economy perspective, safety 
engineering witnessed the shift from manufacturing economy to the service economy. 
From a methodology perspective, safety research had two major schools of methods, 
quality analysis and quantitative analysis; eventually safety engineering has come into a 
multi-discipline subject. 
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Technology Industrial revolution IT revolution
Target system Manufacturing system Soco-tech system
Economy Industrial economy Service economy
Accident Component accident System accident Human factor
Methodology Quality anlysis Quantitative analysis Multi-discipline
Perspective Deveopment
 
Figure 2.3 Different perspectives on safety engineering evolution  
Table 2.7 Evolution of safety engineering 
Category I II III 
Where accidents 
come from 
Component System  System 
How accidents 
spread 
Linear chain Complex interaction Safety-failure 
balance 
Examples models Sequential accident 
models, 
Epidemiological 
accident models 
Sociological models 
System modeling 
approaches 
Cognitive systems 
engineering models 
 
Property Reliability Robustness Resilience 
 
Different factors in Figure 2.3 drive the development of safety engineering. As discussed 
above, safety is defined as "freedom from unacceptable risks" in [Hollnagel et al. 2011]; 
therefore, the key issue in safety engineering is about understanding risk or accident. 
Next, the evolution of safety engineering is discussed corresponding to this perspective; 
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in particular, research on the safety engineering is summarized into three categories: 
component-based safety engineering, system safety engineering and resilience 
engineering, as shown in Table 2.7. Details of the three categories are given in this 
section. 
 
2.4.2 Component-based Safety Engineering 
 
The traditional understanding of safety follows a linear logic and views the safety 
performance of a system as the sum of the safety performance of each component, which 
could be called as component-based safety engineering. The earliest concept with this 
understanding may be "the axiom that a chain is no stronger than its weakest link is one 
with essential mathematical implications" proposed by Pierce in 1926, which resulted in 
the focus on the critical component of the system [Verma et al. 2010]. From such a point 
of view, a system's safety performance could be understood by two classes of accident 
models and an important system property. The two classes of accident models are 
sequential accident models and epidemiological accident models, which try to examine 
how the accidents spread among the components and further lead to the failure of the 
whole system. The system property is reliability.   
 
2.4.2.1 Sequential accident models  
 
The earliest and classical way to understand the accident is an event chain thinking, 
which leads to a class of models, called sequential accident models, or event-based 
accident models [Qureshi 2007, Zio 2009, Verma et al. 2010]. These models consider 
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that an accident happens as the outcome of a chain of discrete events in a temporal order; 
see [Qureshi 2007, Hollnagel 2002]. One of the earliest models with this thinking is the 
Domino theory in [Heinrich 1931], which explains accidents as the result of domino 
effect with five factors, as shown in Figure 2.4 [Ferry 1988, Qureshi et al. 2007]. There 
are other popular models or approaches that belong to this class, such as Accident 
Evolution and Barrier (AEB) model [Svenson 1991, 2001], Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) [Qureshi et 
al. 2007, Verma et al. 2010]. Sequential accident models work well on the simple 
systems; therefore, it is also called simple linear system models [Lundberg et al. 2009].  
 
 
Figure 2.4 Domino model [Adopted from Qureshi et al. 2007] 
2.4.2.2 Epidemiological accident models  
 
This class of models considers accidents as similar with the spreading of a disease; in 
particular, both apparent factors and potential factors that happen to exist together in 
space and time lead to the accidents [Hollnagel 2002, Qureshi et al. 2007, Lundberg et al. 
35 
 
2009]. The earliest epidemiological approach was proposed by Gordon [1949] to address 
the accident as the result of the interacting process of three factors, agent (e.g. faulty 
ladder, cold), host (e.g. food discipline) and environment (e.g. terrain, management of 
troops) [Lundberg et al. 2009]. The most well-known model of this class is the Swiss 
chess model proposed by Reason [1990], as shown in Figure 2.5 [Qureshi et al. 2007].  
This model considers that a complex system has some defences and barriers and the 
accident is the result of interactions of weakness, or holes (both active and latent) in these 
barriers [Reason 1990, Perneger 2005]. The epidemiological accident models work well 
on complex systems; therefore, it is also called complex linear system models. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Swiss cheess model [Adopted from Qureshi et al. 2007] 
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2.4.2.3 Reliability and reliability engineering 
 
(1) Reliability Concept 
Both of the two classes discussed above follow the linear logic which focused on 
accidents spreading among the components. As an important safety property, reliability is 
also introduced into engineering field with the same perspective, which is usually used to 
examine a system's safety performance.   
 
Reliability is defined as "the ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time" [Zhang 2007, Verma et 
al. 2010]. Quantitatively, reliability can be represented by the probability of no 
operational interruption during a given period of time [Birolini 2010]. A reliable system 
may have redundant parts that can fail and be repaired. The concept of reliability thus 
applies to both non-repairable and repairable items [Birolini 2010]. 
 
It is noted that reliability and safety are different concepts. In some situations, safety and 
reliability could be viewed as the same properties, especially for simple systems; 
however, in some special situations, especially for complex systems, they are not 
identical. In other words, a safe system may be not reliable and a reliable system may not 
be safe. The main reason that a reliable system is unsafe is that some components or 
subsystems are able to correctly implement their requirements; however, these 
requirements are unsafe for the system or incomplete to deal with expected or unexpected 
conditions [Leveson 2011]. A well-known example is the loss of the Mars Polar Lander, 
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which was attributed to noises [Leveson 2000]. That means: the Mars Polar Lander was 
reliable, but it was not a safe system. 
 
(2) Reliability Engineering 
Reliability, as an important property of the system, has been well discussed in the current 
literature from an engineering point of view, which forms a discipline called reliability 
engineering. As pointed out by Leveson [2000], "the reliability engineering approach to 
safety rests on the assumption that accidents are caused by component failures."  
 
From a system’s structural point of view, reliability engineering has three main aspects: 
component reliability, system reliability and reliability of repairable component and 
systems [Modarres et al. 2010]. The component reliability analysis is based on 
probability and statistics theory and mainly deals with (i) different distributions of 
component reliability, (ii) component reliability models, and (iii) reliability distribution 
estimation. The system reliability analysis methods are mainly the reliability block 
diagram method, fault tree and success tree method, event tree method, master logic 
diagram and failure mode and effective method [Modarres et al. 2010].  
 
It is noted that the component and system reliability discussed above are largely 
applicable to non-repairable items. Reliability of repairable component and systems 
considers different models, such as homogeneous process model, renewal process model, 
general renewal process model to determine the failure characteristics of items and their 
reliability. The item here may refer to a system, subsystem, or component. The important 
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assumption for the repairable reliability is that the time to repair is assumed to be 
negligible [Modarres et al. 2010, Birolini 2010].  
 
From a system’s life-cycle point of view, system reliability is examined from different 
phases, such as reliability at a design phase, test for components and assemblies, 
maintainability analysis, quality control and reliability test, and reliability of the 
production phase [Birolini 2010].  
 
Reliability of a service system has also been investigated in the literature. For example, 
Billinton and Allan [1996] gave a systematic reliability evaluation for power systems; in 
particular, they further decomposed the reliability of a system into two concepts, 
adequacy and security. Adequacy refers to system's performance related with static 
conditions; while system security refers to system's performance related with inner 
disturbances [Billinton and Allan 1996]. These two concepts, adequacy and security, 
were examined separately in [Billinton and Allan 1996]. 
 
2.4.2.4 Brief conclusion  
 
The understanding of safety by the component-based safety engineering approaches can 
be summarized into two simple conclusions: (1) A system fails because its components 
fail; and (2) The accidents spread among the components following the linear principle. 
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2.4.3 System Safety Engineering 
System safety engineering views safety as a problem of the system and uses the system 
theory and approach to deal with the safety issues. As such, a system's safety can be 
studied by three schools of accident models and an important system property. The three 
schools of accident models are sociological accident model, systems model, and 
cognitive engineering model. The system property is robustness. 
 
2.4.3.1 Sociological accident model  
 
The sociological accident model focuses on the analysis of root causes of accidents of a 
system. Two typical examples are normal accident theory (NAT) [Perrow 1984, 1999] 
and high reliability organizations (HRO) [Roberts 1990, LaPort 1996]. Perrow’s normal 
accident theory (NAT) considers that accidents of technological systems are inevitable 
[Perrow 1999]. He further considered two dimensions of a system's structure (i.e., 
interactive complexity and loose/tight coupling) as the main cause for a system’s 
accidents; his view of accidents is a top-down view. HRO theory examines system safety 
from the organizational perspective. Although HRO put emphasis on the organizational 
factors of system safety, it still has a bottom-up view of accidents. It is noted that both 
NAT and HRO seem to say that redundancy is the only way to handle accidents [Marais 
et al. 2004].  
 
2.4.3.2 System model  
 
From 1990s to 2000s, a thought that safety should be viewed as a property of the system 
emerged among many others, some important studies refer to [Rasmussen 1997, 
40 
 
Hollnagel 2002, Woods and Cook 2002, Leveson 2004a]. The emergence of such a 
systems approach may be attributed to the fact that systems have been more software-
intensive and further connected with the Internet making the systems more coupled with 
uncertain dynamics and more open to new attacks [Leveson 2004b].  
 
Leveson [2000] summarized the primary differences between a systems approach and a 
traditional safety engineering approach as: "(1) top-down systems thinking rather than a 
bottom-up fault tracing, reliability engineering focus and (2) focus on the integrated 
socio-technical system as a whole and the relationships among the technical, 
organizational, and social aspect." There are two representative models of this system 
approach school: the hierarchical socio-technical framework proposed by Rasmussen 
[1997] and STAMP (System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes) proposed by 
Leveson [2004a].  
 
Rasmussen's hierarchical socio-technical framework views the cause of accidents as a 
complex process at different levels, as shown in Figure 2.6 [Qureshi et al. 2007]; in 
particular, he claimed that a system is more than the sum of its elements and a model of 
the system for safety analysis can never be built up by a bottom-up aggregation of 
models, but a top-down system-oriented approach based on control theoretic concept 
[Rasmussen 1997]. The idea of different levels of subsystems for a social-technological 
system is not new; but it is Rasmussen that first introduced this idea into safety 
engineering. His contribution also rests with (1) introducing a control perspective to 
safety engineering, (2) viewing safety engineering as a multi-discipline study, and (3) 
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safety analysis with a focus on functional abstraction rather than structural 
decomposition. However, in his framework, there is still the event chain thinking 
especially at the hazardous process level according to [Leveson 2004a]. It is in the 
writer's opinion that Rasmussen's approach is difficult to be practiced or implemented 
due to the ambiguity in his approach. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6 Hierarchical socio-technical framework [Adopted from Qureshi et al. 2007] 
Leveson's STAMP model was proposed based on the work of Rasmussen, especially the 
control-theoretic operations [Leveson 2004a]. It was the first time that the safety was 
stated as the emergent property of a system, though Rasmussen did imply that. It is noted 
that the emergent property means that it can never be summed up from the performances 
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of individual components. Leveson stated: "system theory is a useful way to analyze 
accidents, particularly system accidents" [Leveson 2004a]. Thus, the STAMP model 
takes the safety problem as a control problem; furthermore, the accident is the result of an 
inadequate control. In the opinion of the author of this thesis, the STAMP model has not 
made clear about (1) whether the control in the model is a real-time process or just an off-
line process, and (2) what the controller is and its action is. As it is known, the 
contemporary control system theory does not explicitly include any change in the plant as 
a control action. That said, the controller's output does not include any action or process 
leading to a change of the plant. This consequently leaves the plant system design and 
reliability engineering out from the safety concept. 
 
2.4.3.3 Cognitive systems engineering models 
 
The cognitive systems engineering concept was proposed by Hollnagel and Woods [1983] 
with the trend that computer was more frequently used in the human-machine systems 
and the systems became more intelligent. A cognitive system views humans as a part of 
the system and the system is adaptive and able to plan and modify its actions based on the 
knowledge and models of the system itself and its environment [Hollnagel and Woods 
1983]. Cognitive system engineering considers two aspects in design of a cognitive 
system; one is the man-machine system (MMS) itself and the other is the cognitive task, 
as shown in Figure 2.7.   
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Figure 2.7 Cognitive systems engineering in the design process 
The principles of cognitive systems engineering were applied to the safety engineering 
and two accident models were proposed: the Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method (CREAM) [Hollnagel 1998] and the Functional Resonance Accident Model 
(FRAM) [Hollnagel 2004]. CREAM is a bi-directional method with both retrospective 
analysis and prospective analysis of accidents; in particular the analysis process is 
recursive instead of hierarchical or sequential [Hollnagel 1998, Serwy and Rantanen 
2007].  FRAM uses the principle of stochastic resonance to explain complex accidents 
and to identify risks (i.e., potential failures) in a dynamic system [Hollnagel and Goteman 
2004]. In the author's opinion, the cognitive engineering approach is applicable to 
human-machine system only. The key issue is task allocation between the machine and 
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human in light of safety. The approach does not cover the safety problem of a machine 
system. 
 
2.4.3.4 Robustness and robustness engineering 
 
(1) Robustness Concept 
Robustness is a property of a system related to noises. In particular, robustness is defined 
as "an ability that allows a system to maintain its functions against internal and external 
perturbations or noises" in [Kitano 2004, Zhang 2007]. Robustness of a system focuses 
on how a system is insensitive to noises. In Perrow’s work, as mentioned above, 
interactive complexity is one important cause for a system’s accidents. He defined 
interactive complexity as "the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and unexpected 
sequences of events in a system that either not visible or not immediately 
comprehensible" in [Perrow 1984]. His theory seems to emphasize the noises within the 
system but to neglect the noises coming from the system's environment that affect the 
system's performance per se. Design and control are important engineering activities to 
affect a system’s robustness. As such, there are the notions of robust design and robust 
control in the literature but the two are less integrated. Robustness is a property that is 
built upon reliability. A system is said to be robust by satisfying the two conditions: (1) 
the system is reliable in individual components and their connections, and (2) the system 
is insensitive to noises. Details of the justification of these assertions will be provided in 
later chapters of the thesis.  
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(2) Robustness Engineering 
The earliest work on the system’s robustness is robust design which was developed by 
Fisher and Yates in 1920s; particularly they used the statistical design of experiments 
(DOE) method to agricultural system [Fisher 1951]. From the 1950s to 1960s, Taguchi 
established the foundations of robust design for quality control in process plants [Taguchi 
1986]. Taguchi viewed robustness as "a state where a technology, products, or process's 
performance is minimally sensitive to factors (including aging) causing variability at a 
low unit manufacturing cost" in [Taguchi 1986]. He further explained that there are two 
types of quality in a product or process: customer quality and engineered quality. 
Robustness engineering is associated with engineered quality. He divided a product 
design process into three stages: system design, parameter design and tolerance design; 
furthermore, he proposed the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) as the measure of robustness. 
The robust design method has been proved to be a successful method in different 
industrial fields according to [Phadke 1989, Taguchi 1986].  
 
From an engineering perspective, a system’s robustness is also examined by other 
approaches, for example, robust control [Feng and Brandt 1998], robust planning 
[Tizghadam and Leon-Garcia 2009] and robust management [Wolkerstorfer et al. 2010, 
Marco et al. 2010]. In the current literature, the term “robustness engineering” is only 
used in the literature of robust design; particularly, they called robust design as robust 
engineering or robustness engineering. However, design, control, planning and 
management, are all engineering activities, and they should be included in the scope of 
robustness engineering. Therefore, in this thesis, robust engineering has a more general 
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sense than that in the literature with consideration of all the robust engineering activities 
mentioned before.   
 
2.4.3.5 Brief conclusion  
 
Safety is an emergent property of the whole system, and accidents happen due to 
complex non-linear interactions among components and external and internal 
disturbances.  
 
2.4.4 Resilience Engineering 
 
2.4.4.1 Understanding safety through the resilience concept  
 
The concept of resilience in the context of safety engineering was proposed by Hollnagel 
et al. [2006]; in particular, resilience engineering uses the resilience concept to describe 
the safety performance of a system. Resilience is also viewed as an emergent property of 
a system.  
 
Resilience engineering could be viewed as an extension of system safety engineering, as 
Hollnagel's resilience engineering also views safety as a system's issue, and makes further 
step on the understanding of safety. The basic concepts and precepts of resilience 
engineering have been addressed by different researchers [Hollnagel et al. 2006, 
Patternson et al. 2007, Hawks and Reed 2006, Bursztein and Goubault-Larrecq 2007, 
Zhang 2007]. Different from component-based safety engineering and system safety 
engineering, resilience engineering does not focus on how accidents happen and how 
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accidents may lead to the failure of a system; there is not any particular accident 
mechanism in the notion of resilience for the system [Hollnagel et al. 2010]. There are 
many factors that affect a system's safety, and there is no clear difference between the 
factors leading to safety and factors leading to failure. Resilience engineering defines 
safety as "an ability to succeed under varying conditions" in [Hollnagel et al. 2010]. From 
a resilience engineering perspective, safety and failure are not two absolutely different 
states; in particular, the safety of a system refers to "a state of the balance between the 
safety factors and failure factors which are the further outcome of the core process of the 
system" in [Hollnagel et al. 2010].  
 
2.4.4.2 Definitions of resilience in the context of safety  
 
The definitions of resilience in other disciplines have been presented and discussed in 
Section 2.3. This section focuses on the definitions of resilience in the context of safety; 
in particular, the definitions of resilience are classified into three categories, as shown in 
Table 2.8. 
 
The first category views the resilience of a system as the similar thing with reliability or 
robustness. For example, Victoria Transport Policy Institute [2010] used the concept of 
reliability to define resilience. Another example is the work of Bongard et al. [2006], 
where the resilience of a system was considered as the ability of a system that can recover 
from an unexpected damage and a continuous self-modeling method was proposed to 
enable a machine system to autonomously recover its own topology from unexpected 
change by reconfiguring the system Note that their system does not have any built-in 
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redundancy. The resilience concept in Bongard et al. [2006] is similar with the second 
category of definition of resilience; however, they also used robustness to label such a 
property without any differentiation from resilience. There were also some work that 
used the concept of resilience, e.g. [Rosenkrantz et al. 2005, Wang and Ip 2009]; 
however, their concept of resilience seems to make more sense of reliability. This 
category of definitions of resilience has not shown a clear understanding of resilience, 
which leads to the confusion of the three properties, reliability, robustness and resilience. 
It is necessary to clarify their relationships. 
 
Table 2.8 Definitions of the resilience in the context of safety 
Category Definition Literature 
I Reliability or robustness. Victoria Transport 
Policy Institute 2010, 
Bongard et al. 2006 
II The ability of a system to recover to meet the 
demand from a partial damage.  
Zhang 2007 
III The intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its 
functioning prior to, during, or following changes 
and disturbances so that the system can sustain 
required operations under both expected and 
unexpected conditions. 
Hollnagel et al. 2010 
 
 
The second category of definition of resilience followed the resilience concept discussed 
in Section 2.3. The typical one was proposed by Zhang, as shown in Table 2.8. Zhang 
and Lin presented a comparison of different definitions of resilience and showed a 
situation where there was no agreed definition for resilience [Zhang and Lin 2010]. Their 
conclusion was similar with the result of Section 2.3, as the resilience of a particular 
system depends on its particular features. However, this definition does not work for the 
service systems. For example, the initial reason of the India power system failure, as 
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mentioned in Chapter 1, was the large increased demand which cannot be met by the 
system. In such a case, the system's failure was not caused by any damage. 
 
The third category of definition of resilience was proposed by Hollnagel et al. [2010], as 
shown in Table 2.8. Hollnagel further proposed four cornerstones of resilience as: 
"knowing what to do, knowing what to look for, knowing what to expect, and knowing 
what has happened" [Hollnagel et al. 2010]. This definition actually covers the traditional 
concepts of safety, reliability and robustness, and makes further extension; in particular, 
resilience concept deals with the damaged situation – a point of resilience stressed by 
Zhang [2007]. Therefore, this category of definition of resilience is an all-inclusive 
definition, which is similar with the third category of definition of service system 
discussed in Section 2.2. The all-inclusive feature of the definition further makes 
different properties of a system, such as reliability, robustness and resilience, vague. Thus, 
it also does not work for a service system.  
 
2.4.4.3 Related work 
 
Resilience engineering mainly concerns socio-technical systems [Allenby and Fink 
2005]. In a socio-tech system, the human plays an important role. On one hand, the 
human is a part of the system, or the human could be viewed as a component of the 
system; the human may make errors or may not be available in time. On the other hand, 
the human is an important resource for the recovery of the possible damage of the system 
[Wang et al. 2013b]. The research in the current literature can be summarized into two 
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categories, (1) how to measure the resilience of a system, and (2) how to enhance the 
resilience of a system. 
 
Regarding the measurement of resilience, Rosenkrantz et al. [2005] used fault tolerance 
to measure the resilience, which considered the number of node failures and edge failures 
while the network can still keep its normal function. Wang and Ip [2009] proposed an 
approach to evaluate the logistics network resilience based on the redundant resource and 
reliability of nodes and edges. Both of these studies mentioned above focused on what is 
“left” in the system after damage – or called “remaining” part of the system; in particular, 
their example systems keep normal functions without interruptions. They measured the 
resilience of a system through the physical redundancy or functional redundancy, which 
is the case of reliability. Lhomme et al. [2011] described a shared diagnosis approach 
between different urban service network managers based on the scientific assessment of 
failures and interdependencies. However, they only considered the technical network in 
the assessment of failures without any consideration of service itself. Kanno et al. [2011] 
proposed a method to assess the resilience of a service system during a disaster. They 
considered both service activities and infrastructure into the method; in particular, their 
services are only related with human activities. However, the way that service is provided 
to meet demands is related not only with human’s activities but also other substances on 
the infrastructure [Wang et al. 2013b]. Ferreira et al (2010) introduced an approach to 
measuring the resilience by means of a questionnaire. Allenby and Fink [2005] 
considered that the evaluation of resiliency only makes sense in terms of an identified 
system and particular challenges.  
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Regarding the enhancement of resilience for a system, one of the important contributions 
on resilience was made by Leveson et al. [2006] who used their previous approach, 
STAMP, to enhance resilience with the following features. First, they viewed the whole 
problem as a control problem. As such, there is a goal, and resilience is associated with 
drifts in the behaviour of the system away from that goal. Second, they employed the 
system dynamics approach [Sterman 2000] to model the dynamics of the system. Third, 
they developed safety resource allocation (SRA) system. SRA makes decisions on 
resource allocation to diminish identified drifts in the system. Their approach has not 
explicitly represented the domain structure and ontology of the system; i.e., they have 
missed a so-called domain model. It should be noted that the domain model corresponds 
to what we called “conceptual object model”, which is very important to make an 
intelligent system. Another limitation of their approach is that the problem of 
vulnerability prediction has to be modeled as a time-driven continuous problem, which is 
due to the fact that the system dynamic approach they applied eventually results in a 
continuous time driven equation. As far as the control of the system toward recovery of 
the remaining system to its original function, they did not explicitly describe how this can 
be done.  
 
From a system’s life-cycle point of view, the system’s resilience is examined from 
different phases, such as design, planning and control (management). In the current 
literature, the resilience is mainly examined from a particular phase, for example, 
resilient design [Ulieru 2007] and resilient management [Hall-May and Surridge 2010, 
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Jung and Pedram 2008].  This is also the case for the previous concepts, service system, 
service-oriented system, reliability and robustness. 
 
Another deficiency of the current research on measurement and enhancement or 
improvement of resilience is that the confusion on the understanding of resilience may 
lead the work to a wrong direction, for example, using the reliability measurement for 
resilience [Najjar and Gaudiot 1990, Wang and Ip 2009].  
 
2.4.4.4 Brief conclusion 
 
The understanding of safety through the resilience engineering approaches can be 
summarized into two conclusions: (1) safety is the balance between the outcome of safe 
factors and the outcome of failure factors, (2) resilience engineering focuses on how to 
measure and improve the system's resilience; however, the current work in the literature 
is far insufficient due to the unclear understanding of the system's resilience. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter reviews two topics: service system and resilience engineering.  
 
(1) Regarding the service system, a similar concept, service-oriented system is also 
introduced and discussed. However, it appears that an identity of the service system is 
still not clear; in particular, the key features of service system with regard to safety 
performance are not clear. 
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(2) Regarding the resilience concept, its development and definitions in different 
disciplines are discussed for further understanding the concept in the context of safety 
engineering.  
 
(3) Regarding the resilience engineering, it is discussed based on the introduction of the 
whole evolution of the safety engineering discipline. Three categories of safety 
engineering approaches, namely component-based safety engineering, system safety 
engineering and resilience engineering are discussed. Three important safety properties 
related with these three categories, namely reliability, robustness and resilience are also 
discussed separately. However, the summary of the resilience definitions indicates that 
the relationships among the three R properties of systems especially service systems still 
remain unclear; furthermore, the current resilience understandings do not work for the 
service system. The awareness of these issues is very important, as they are the keys 
which lead to the proper efforts on the measurement and improvement of the resilience. 
 
Thus, the next two chapters contribute to the better understandings of service system and 
its property of resilience.  
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CHAPTER 3 
TOWARDS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF SERVICE SYSTEMS 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In Section 2.2, several important definitions of service system in the current literature 
were introduced, and the difficulties with these definitions in terms of distinguishing 
service system from other systems were discussed as well. The two main problems in the 
current definitions of service system are: (i) they tend to focus on the concept of service 
and miss a system's perspective of service, i.e., service system, and (ii) they tend to be 
all-inclusive. Indeed, there is still an on-going debate on what service system is and why 
there is a need to distinguish a service system from other systems; note that the two 
questions in debate are inter-related. A well-known example which may reflect the debate 
is that Fortune Magazine has given up its attempt to differentiate service firms from 
manufacturing firms since 1993 after many years of publishing both the Fortune 
Industrial 500 and Fortune Service 500 [33]. The Fortune’s movement may lead to the 
view that there is no need to consider service as an independent economy entity.  
 
This thesis argues that service system has its own identity and subsequently, provides a 
note on the two phenomena as mentioned elsewhere, namely (1) change in world job 
distribution over different sectors of economy in the 2007 report by the International 
Labor Organization, and (2) no differentiation of service firms from manufacturing firms 
in Fortune Magazine since 1993. It is noted that the existing definitions of the service 
system in literature were listed in Section 2.2.  
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This chapter is thus organized in the following. Section 3.2 describes three systems, 
namely manufacturing, agricultural and product systems to prepare for the comparison of 
them with service system in order to study the identity of service system. Section 3.3 
presents a unified definition of service system. Section 3.4 gives a discussion of the 
difference of a service system from a manufacturing, agricultural and product system. 
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter with an analysis of the underlying reason behind the 
aforementioned two phenomena. 
 
3.2 Agricultural System, Manufacturing System and Product System 
 
An agricultural system produces plants and food. The generic architecture of an 
agricultural system is such that it includes humans (farmers), equipment, soils and 
organization, where the organization performs the administration and management 
functions. Examples of the agricultural system are the rice farm system, pig farm system 
and so on. 
 
A manufacturing system makes engineered products. The generic architecture of a 
manufacturing system is such that it includes humans (workers), equipment, and 
organization. It can be seen from this definition that a manufacturing system does not 
have elements provided by nature, a point which allows the manufacturing system to be 
distinct from the agriculture system. Examples of the manufacturing system are the iron 
and steel industry system, chemical plant system and so on. 
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A product system is a tangible entity that performs the conversion and/or transfer of 
motion, force and power. The generic architecture of a product system is such that it does 
not include humans but humans are certainly a user of a product system. Examples of the 
product system are car, cell phone and so on. 
 
The next section will give a new definition of service system. The three systems 
discussed above will serve a test-bed to justify whether the new definition can 
differentiate a service system from a manufacturing system, a product system and an 
agricultural system. 
 
3.3 A Unified Definition 
 
The writer defines service and service system as follows. A service is a function that is 
achieved by interactions between a human and an entity under a protocol. A service 
system or organization or firm consists of three subsystems: (i) an infrastructure, (ii) a 
substance, and (iii) a management to directly meet the demands of humans (who are also 
defined as consumers). The infrastructure is of a network, and substance “flows” over an 
infrastructure. The management plays roles such as coordinating, leading, planning and 
controlling, which are applied to both the infrastructure and substance systems. 
 
Remark 1: The key feature of service system is that the system can meet the customers' 
demands directly, not through other systems. The sense of a service lies in that a human’s 
status or state is changed to meet his or her need directly by operation of a system.  
Production of goods needed by a human is not a service, as it focuses on the event from a 
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“raw” material to a “product” (i.e., goods.); the demand of humans or the customers is 
met by goods, not directly by a production process of goods. Therefore, an agricultural or 
a manufacturing system is not a service system. A transportation system which moves 
goods from one place to another where the customer receives the goods is a service 
system, as it focuses on the change of goods in its location and time to meet a human’s 
need. 
 
Remark 2: The demands of the customers and services offered by a service system are 
interactive. The customer in this definition refers to the human not any other entity say 
company. The demands of humans change and the service systems need to meet the 
demands. This implies that the demands of humans have impact on the output of the 
service systems or the demands could be viewed as a part of the input of the service 
systems. Note that the services supplied by the service systems may also affect the 
demands of customers. For example, some special rules may be applied to a 
transportation system to constrain the use of some roads, which will then change the 
demands of customers. Another example is the power supply system which may change 
the price of electricity and thus affect the demands of customers. 
 
Remark 3: The new definition covers both the structural and functional aspects of a 
service system as well as the aspect of operation management. This definition does not 
highlight the term ‘organization’, which differs from the others’ in the literature, e.g. the 
one of [Pinhanez 2009]. The new definition is considered that the concept of organization 
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has been implied in the concept of the system. Organization refers to putting things 
together, which is exactly the nature of any system. 
 
Remark 4: The service system as defined is structurally generic and functionally general. 
The phrase ‘structurally generic’ implies that the concepts and features captured of 
service system are common for all types of service systems. The phrase ‘functionally 
general’ means that all kinds of services such as transportation of goods, health service 
and travel advisory agency are covered. 
 
Remark 5: The substance can have four generic types: material, human or animal, energy, 
data or signal. Data further make sense for information or knowledge depending on a 
service’s receiver especially on the effect of the service to the receiver per se. According 
to Zhang [1994], when a data is used to inform a user of something that is otherwise not 
available to that user, the data is called information; when a data has an effect on a user 
such that the user enables to do something, where ‘to do something’ is otherwise not 
possible, the data is called knowledge. The infrastructure includes both equipment and 
humans. 
 
Remark 6: A resource is a physical or cognitive entity with limited availability and 
accessibility that needs to be consumed to obtain a benefit from it. In the context of the 
service system as defined, a resource could refer to both the infrastructure and substance; 
that is to say, there may be an infrastructure resource or a substance resource. 
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Remark 7: That the structural aspect of a service system puts emphasis on network is to 
capture a situation where the points where resources “meet” substances typically have 
many and change with respect to time and space. For instance, in emergency evacuation, 
transportation tools are resources to be put into an infrastructure system (road, bridge, 
etc.) [Wang et al. 2013b]. Where tools are put on infrastructure is determined depending 
on situations, and this decision is in fact a part of the management decision. It is required 
that a service system must be a network structure and have many “ports” linking to 
customers and many “ports” to which resources can be connected. With the proposed 
definition, service system and networked service system are on the same page.  
 
Remark 8: A protocol is an agreement or constraint between service providers and 
service demanders. A chair in a meeting room is not a service system, as there is no 
protocol specified per se. A chair is a product. However, a meeting service department is 
a service system, as there must be a protocol available between anyone who wants to use 
a meeting room. In this context, a chair in the meeting room becomes a part of the 
meeting service system, through which a part of the services, e.g., provision of the 
seating function, is achieved. 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, the most popular definition of service system, namely the 
third category of definition which was proposed by Spohrer et al. [2007, 2008], focuses 
on the value-coproduction configuration. However, the essence of economy is value 
production or co-production which meets the people's demand. Along this line of 
thinking all economies could be called service economy [Vargo et al. 2008], which does 
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not sound reasonable. The proposed definition in this section clearly resolves this issue 
through narrowing the scope of the concept. In the definition here some economic sectors 
or systems meet customers' demands directly; while others meet customers' demands 
indirectly, in particular via a manufacturing or agricultural system. The former systems 
are service systems and the latter systems are either manufacturing systems or 
agricultural systems. 
 
Several examples of the service system based on the new definition can be illustrated. A 
telecommunication system is a kind of service system, where infrastructure is the 
equipment such as cable, switch and so on [He 2008] and substance is the data. 
Management is the data flow control policy. A travel agent system is a kind of service 
system, where infrastructure in this case is human agent and transportation equipment, 
and substance is tourists. Management is planning and scheduling of the equipment and 
tourist. Hospitals and medical centers are a kind of service system, in which the 
infrastructure consists of both medical professionals and equipment, and substance 
consists of patients, and management makes sense for both the infrastructure (medical 
doctors and equipment) and substance (patients) systems. 
 
3.4 Relationships to Other System Concepts 
 
In the following, the difference of a service system (based on the proposed definition) 
from the three other systems (i.e., agricultural system, manufacturing system, and product 
system) is further explained. 
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A product system is not a service system because a product system is not of a network, 
does not have many ports to many customers, and further a product system has only an 
infrastructure system only. For instance, a cellular phone alone is not a service system, as 
it has no substance; however, when it is integrated with a telecommunication system, it 
carries substance, which makes it as a part of the telecommunication system that is a kind 
of service system. A single and integral subject or system is not a service system even if 
this subject or system provides a service to a customer. This is because such a system is 
not of network when a service is provided. For example, a human who provides a 
massage service is not a service system.  
 
More recently, the concept of product-service system (PSS) has emerged to offer a 
seamless integration of products and services. The use of and ownership of a PSS are 
separated; in particular, a PSS is developed by the sale of its use instead of its ownership 
[Mont 2002]. A PSS can be viewed as a specialized product system owing to its product 
effect, and a PSS can be viewed as a specialized service system owing to its service 
effect. Therefore, a PSS is neither a product system nor a service system but a system 
composed of a service system and a product system. 
 
A manufacturing system or an agricultural system is not a service system because they 
focus on transforming “raw” materials to “products”, through which they meet customers' 
demands. There is a view that a manufacturing system or an agricultural system may 
include a transportation system from a point of view of customers in [Li 2004]. While 
such a view may be meaningful to the end customer, the manufacturing system and 
62 
 
transportation system are different in their ways to meet customers' demands; furthermore, 
they are subject to different principles in design and operation management. This means 
that the two systems need a separate attention at a point where design and management 
are concerned. It is more meaningful to have an integrated system such as 
“manufacturing-service”, “product-service” systems, and “service-manufacturing-
product”. These integrations have not eliminated the identity of each member system but 
rather bring together the member systems for a better business performance. The 
rationale behind these integrated systems is that features of member systems may have 
some coupled effects on the customer satisfaction and customer-perceived value. These 
integrated systems may be viewed as a kind of service system or a kind of product or 
manufacturing system in some contexts. 
 
3.5 Conclusion with Further Discussion 
 
This chapter presented a unified definition of service system. This was achieved by 
taking a view of service system from both the structural and functional aspects. The goal 
of developing a unified definition of service system was that the definition should be 
generic, general, and functional in addition to provision of an identity of the service 
system, distinguishable from the agricultural system, manufacturing system, and product 
system. It appears that the proposed definition has achieved this goal. Furthermore, with 
this definition, the two phenomena mentioned before can be explained.  
 
For the phenomenon that Fortune Magazine has not differentiated the manufacturing firm 
from the service firm since 1993, the underlying reason is that the generic architecture of 
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the service system and that of the manufacturing system are of no difference, yet the 
difference being at the instance level (e.g., number of humans, degree of automation, type 
of machines, etc.). It is noted that a unified definition of the manufacturing system, 
similar to the unified definition of the service system can be found in the work of [Zhang 
and van Luttervelt 2011]. Consequently, a company may have both the manufacturing 
business and the service business, as both can produce values. Assessment of a company 
from its value can hardly then distinguish the value created by its manufacturing system 
or its service system. As such, with the attention to economic nature only, there is no 
need to separate service from manufacturing system. 
 
For the phenomenon of a dramatic increase of jobs percentage in service sectors, first this 
may come at some expense of the decrease of jobs in manufacturing systems and second 
this may be caused by inclusion of the service system in many firms which were 
originally 100% manufacturing firms in the last decades. This second point is further 
related to the need of coping with the decline of employment in the manufacture sector, 
especially in some developing nations (e.g., China) in the last decades owing to the side 
effect of enterprise reform. Further, dissolving one large service system which previously 
worked for several manufacturing firms into several small service systems incorporated 
by these manufacturing systems will introduce redundancy in small service systems, 
thereby increasing the total number of jobs in service sectors. The third reason for the 
increase of jobs percentage in service sectors may be related to the missing of a unified 
definition of the service system, a proposition hold by this thesis. Indeed, the missing of a 
correct definition of service system can lead to a situation where all types of systems are 
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viewed as service systems. Consequently, manufacturing systems are thus viewed as 
service systems, and naturally the number of jobs in the service sector will increase, 
while the number of jobs in the manufacture sector will decrease. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
DOMAIN MODELING FOR SERVICE SYSTEM AND ITS APPLICATION 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Modeling of ontology or domain of service system is an essential step to more effectively 
manage service systems across different firms. There are two major roles for a domain 
model: a common language for different humans to communicate with each other about a 
domain (service in this case) and a tool to allow the computer system to understand the 
semantics of a domain (service in this case). As such, a domain model will facilitate both 
distributed human-centered decision making and computer-assisted decision making in 
design and operation of a system in the domain. A unified approach to domain modeling 
is still absent in the service and service system. A justification of this observation will be 
provided in Section 4.2. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to propose a framework for domain modeling for service 
system. It is noted that the focus in this chapter is on the framework for modeling or 
generic model [Zhang et al. 1993, Zhang 1994], instead of a concrete model of service 
systems. That said; the work presented in this section will only provide a set of modeling 
building blocks tailored to service system. It is expected that with this framework, a 
generic service system domain model can be established, followed by specialized service 
system domain models such as enterprise information systems or transportation systems. 
To achieve this objective is to apply a general domain modeling tool called FCBPSS, 
which was developed by Lin and Zhang [2004, 2005] upon a careful analysis of various 
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similar modeling tools which are only based on three concepts: function, structure, and 
behaviour. 
 
This chapter is further organized as follows. In Section 4.2, a literature review on domain 
modeling of service system is presented. In Section 4.3, the FCBPSS framework is 
briefly described. In Section 4.4, the framework for domain modeling for the service 
system using the FCBPSS is proposed. Section 4.5 discusses the effectiveness and 
usefulness of the model. Section 4.6 applies the proposed model to examine the generic 
variables of service system. Section 4.7 concludes this chapter. 
 
4.2 Related Work 
 
Modeling of service system is known as an important topic due to ever increased 
complexity of the modern service system. A systematic modeling approach to service 
systems requires domain modeling first. Domain modeling is considered to be similar to 
ontology modeling in this thesis, and they further depend on the definition of domain of 
an application – service system in this case. There are only a few studies in literature on 
domain modeling in the context of service system. Besides, they are all based on the 
problematic definitions of service system; see discussions in Section 2.2 and Chapter 3, 
respectively.  
 
Stanicek and Winkler proposed a conceptual model for the service system [Stanicek and 
Winkler 2010]. It is noted that a domain model is a kind of conceptual model. The 
limitations of their model are: (1) the model is based on an extension of the service 
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system definition proposed by Spohrer et al. [2007], which has difficulty in providing an 
identity of the service system, and (2) the model is much focused on the service delivery 
not on the constituent elements of the service system. The proposed framework in the 
present chapter will be shown to overcome these shortcomings. Further, the proposed 
framework also overcomes some shortcoming with the model of Stanicek and Winkler 
[2010] in that the proposed framework represents the whole generalization/specialization 
lattice of conceptual modeling of the service system, whereas Stanicek and Winkler’s 
model is at a certain level of this lattice.  
 
Dinh and Thi [2010] presented a conceptual framework for service modeling in a 
network of service system and used simplified UML (Unified Modeling Language) for 
the meta-model in the framework. Their work was also based on the definition of service 
system proposed by Spohrer et al. [2007], which, however, involves some conflict. As 
discussed in Section 2.2 and Chapter 3, the definition of service system by Spohrer et al. 
has a very general scope and views that individuals, families, firms, nations, and 
economies are all instances of the service system [Spohrer et al. 2007]; however, the 
framework proposed by Dinh and Thi [2010] considered service system into a narrow 
scope which views network as a higher level of service system. Further, UML is a tool 
which is based on object-oriented (OO) paradigm. The OO modeling approach is 
restricted in its expression power to real world phenomena and activities, as it flats them 
into a framework which has only two levels: object and its method or end and means.  
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In general, as far as the domain modeling tools are concerned, the current tools employed 
for domain modeling in the context of service systems are at most based on the OO 
paradigm. These tools are not natural in modeling of rich real world semantics in service 
systems. Specifically, they are poor at capturing the domain semantics in why, how, 
where and when a means can achieve an end; the modeling approach based on the 
method in OO is just too general to capture these semantics. The FCBPSS [Lin and 
Zhang 2004, Zhang et al. 2005] to be introduced in the next section can capture these 
semantics. 
 
4.3 The FCBPSS Framework for Domain Modeling 
 
The FCBPSS framework is a methodology as well as tool to develop a conceptual or 
domain model of the dynamic system proposed by Lin and Zhang based on the FBS 
framework [Lin and Zhang 2004, Zhang et al. 2005].  
 
The FBS framework was initially proposed to increase the intelligence of computer 
systems for fault analysis [De Kleer 1984, Kuipers 1984]; in particular, the FBS in their 
work refers to the Function-Behaviour-State (FBS) model. The FBS tool has been 
successfully applied to different areas such as engineering design, simulation and 
diagnosis and software engineering in [Ulrich and Seering 1988, Umeda et al. 1990, 
Umeda and Tomiyama 1995, Umeda et al. 2005, Kruchen 2005].  
 
The FCBPSS framework was proposed by modification and extension of the Function-
Behaviour-State (FBS) framework to have more layers of concepts [Lin and Zhang 2004, 
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Zhang et al. 2005]. The FCBPSS framework has a set of key concepts: (1) structure, (2) 
state, (3) behaviour, (4) principle, (5) function, (6) context, (7) relationship among 
concepts (1)–(6), and (8) system decomposition. Figure 4.1 shows these concepts and 
their relations [He 2008]. The definitions of these concepts are referred to the reference 
[Lin and Zhang 2004, Zhang et al. 2005], while Appendix A of the thesis provides 
simplified definitions for the convenience of readers.  
 
Figure 4.1 Architecture of FCBPSS framework [He 2008] 
The next section will present a domain modeling framework for service systems, which is 
illustrated by several typical service systems, such as enterprise information system and 
transportation system. 
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4.4 FCBPSS Model of Service System 
 
 
4.4.1 System Decomposition 
 
As stated in the proposed definition in Section 3.2, a service system has three subsystems: 
infrastructure system (IS), substance system (SS) and management system (MS). IS and 
SS are related to each other by the inherent constraint that the SS depends on the IS or the 
SS must “flow” within the IS and both IS and SS are under the management of MS. The 
flow of SS follows certain constraints which could be called “substance flow rules”. 
These rules are derived from a particular service system under investigation. The 
dynamics of service system is determined by the flow of SS under the constraints of these 
rules. MS is a body of decisions in its nature; in particular, the MS is designed and 
implemented based on objects to be managed: IS and SS. The FCBPSS model of service 
system will focus on the IS and SS. In the following, these models are presented.  
 
4.4.2 Structures of the IS and SS 
 
(1) Structure of the IS 
The structure of the IS refers to a network of components including both physical entity 
and human. This network can be further represented by graph formalism to facilitate the 
modeling. In the case of the public transportation system, node is defined for place and 
arc is defined for lane. Suppose a particular transportation system has M nodes and N 
directed arcs. A transportation system can be represented as a directed graph denoted by 
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G and  ,G N A , as shown in Figure 4.2. In the case of an enterprise information 
system, the structure of IS is a network composed of various components; in particular, 
there are three typical components, namely hardware systems, software systems and 
human experts who provide technological supports for the system. Similarly, node can be 
defined for components and arc can be defined for links among the components.  It is 
noted that different graphs can be used to represent the IS of a service system, such as 
directed graph, undirected graph, weighted graph and non-weighted graph, or mixture of 
them. Which one is employed depends on the nature of a particular service system and a 
particular purpose to examine the system. 
1 2
3 4
place
lane
 
Figure 4.2 Structure of a transportation system 
(2) Structure of the SS 
The structure of SS refers to different types of substances, the connections among 
different types of substance and the distribution of different types of substance, as shown 
in Figure 4.3. For the enterprise information system, as mentioned above, the substance 
refers to enterprise information flows in the enterprise information system; in particular, 
the substance may be classified into different types depending on their different 
properties or attributes. For example, the substance of a particular enterprise information 
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system may include different types of information flows, such as financial information, 
production material information, and production process information and so on. In the 
case of a transportation system, the substance includes different types of humans with 
different transportation tools and different relationships among them. The different 
transportation tools will enable humans to have different behaviours; instances of the 
different relations may be such that two or more people belong to the same family, and 
they had better be transported together. 
Structure of SS
different types of 
substance
connections among 
different types
distribution of different 
types
 
Figure 4.3 Structure of SS 
At a particular time, the substance of an information system stays on a particular node or 
arc of the infrastructure system. Therefore, the distribution state of the substance is also 
considered in the representation of the structure of the SS. Again, different substances 
have different features. For example, the information of the enterprise information system 
moves very fast in the connection line. The information is usually viewed to stay on a 
particular node, namely a terminal or storage and ignore the transmission time when 
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modeling. Therefore, only the distribution state of substance on the nodes can be used to 
represent the structure of SS for the enterprise information system. Take another typical 
service system, a water supply system, as an example. The substance, water, has different 
features. The transmission time of water in the arcs may or may not be ignored, 
depending on the modeling accuracy. In the latter case, the distribution of water on both 
the node and arc is used to represent the structure of the water supply system. 
 
4.4.3 Behaviours and States of the IS and SS 
 
(1) Behaviour and State of the IS 
Entities in the IS are perceived by a set of properties, and these properties are called 
states in the FCBPSS framework. For the IS of an enterprise information system, states 
thus refer to the properties of the hardware systems, software systems and human experts. 
For example, a data storage system may have the following states: available memory 
space, readability, writability and so on. For the IS of a transportation system, the states 
refer to the properties of the roads and places, as shown in Figure 4.4, including the state 
of place, characterized with {initial occupancy, place capacity} (Figure 4.4), the state of 
road, characterized by (travel time, lane capacity) where a road has several lanes with 
different directions (Figure 4.4), and flow patterns. 
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Figure 4.4 States of IS of a transportation system 
The behaviour of the IS is the causal relationship among its state variables. For the IS of 
an enterprise information system, the behaviour of a component, say storage, may refer to 
the change of the available memory space, or readability or writability. In the case of a 
transportations system, the behaviour of IS may refers to that the road changes from one 
flow pattern to another flow pattern, as shown in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Behavior of IS of a transportation system 
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(2) Behaviour and State of the SS 
The states of the SS refer to the properties of the substance flow on the IS. For an 
enterprise information system, the states of the SS, may refer to the amount of 
information on nodes and the rate of the information flow on edges. In the case of  a 
transportation system, the states of the SS, as shown in Figure 4.6,  include the numbers 
of humans and vehicles on the places, the velocities of humans and vehicles on the roads, 
and so on.  
 
Figure 4.6 State of SS of a transportation system 
The behaviour of the SS is the causal relation among its state variables. For an enterprise 
information system, the behaviour of the SS may refer to the change of amounts of 
information on nodes and rates of information flows on edges. In the case of a 
transportations system, the behaviour may refer to the change of the numbers of humans 
on different places, as shown in Figure 4.7. 
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Figure 4.7 Behavior of SS of a transportation system 
4.4.4 Principles of the IS and SS 
 
(1) Principle of the IS 
The principle of the IS governs the behaviour of objects or subsystems in IS. For an 
enterprise information system, as mentioned above, one of the behaviours of a particular 
storage component may refer to the change of the available memory space. However, 
such behaviour must obey the principle that the available memory space changes within a 
range between the predefined minimum bound and maximum bound. An enterprise 
information system is built upon a particular computer network system, the principles of 
IS include the protocols and controls of different objects or subsystems in IS, which 
decompose the whole IS into seven layers in logic, namely application layer, presentation 
layer, session layer, transport layer, network layer, data link layer and physical layer. For 
a transportation system, as mentioned in Section 4.4.3, one of the behaviours is that the 
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road changes from one flow pattern to another flow pattern. This behaviour, as shown in 
Figure 4.5, must obey the following principle: the number of different flow patterns is 4 
and the flow pattern of one road must change within the domain. 
 
(2) Principle of the SS 
The principles of SS govern the behaviours of SS. For the SS of an enterprise information 
system, the principles may refer to the flow protocols that govern the different types of 
information flows over the IS. In the case of a transportation system, the principles of SS 
may refer to the traffic rules that govern the different flows on the roads, including 
humans and vehicles. 
 
4.4.5 Functions and Contexts of the IS and SS 
 
The function is defined as "a purpose in the mind of human users and can be realized by 
the system (structure) owing to certain behaviours existing in the structure" [Lin and 
Zhang 2004]. For a service system, the services provided by the system, are the functions 
of the system in the FCBPSS domain. The functions of the whole service system are 
performed by the functions of the IS and SS. The context refers to "a particular 
environment where a particular system operates or works or makes sense" [He 2008]. 
Considering its particular features, a service system has two different contexts: (1) 
normal context, and (2) abnormal context, as shown in Fig. 4.8. 
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Figure 4.8 Contexts and functions of a service system 
A. The normal context is a regular environment where a service system works. In this 
context, all components of the system are in its normal states and the functions of a 
service system are described as a regular function. 
 
B. The abnormal context refers to a special circumstance where a service system works. 
For example, in a particular emergency situation, a part of the enterprise information 
system may break down. In this context, other healthy parts of the enterprise information 
system need to meet a larger demand than the normal situation. The functions of a service 
system under an abnormal context are called as the transient functions. 
 
Next, the functions and contexts of IS and SS are discussed respectively. 
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(1) Function and Context of the IS 
The functions of IS will be explained in the normal context and abnormal context, 
respectively. 
 
In the normal context, IS of a service system has regular functions which provide regular 
infrastructure services to the SS. The regular function means that different components of 
IS work in a stable state. The regular function can be measured by the average ability of 
the IS to provide a stable situation for the SS. For example, the IS of an enterprise 
information system provides information infrastructures for different information flows 
in a system. In a normal situation, the IS has an average ability to support the flow of SS 
and further to provide information services to an enterprise.  
 
In the abnormal context, the IS of a service system has transient functions which provide 
special infrastructures to the SS. In this context, the IS usually cannot work in a normal 
manner due to partially damages or largely increased demands, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
When a large-scale athletic meeting is held in a place, the wireless communication 
demand will increase in a huge amount. Therefore, the wireless communication system 
needs to meet this demand. We call the wireless communication system in this case 
having a transient function. Another typical example is the transportation system that 
needs to evacuate a large number of people from one place to another in an emergency 
situation. Regarding an enterprise information system, when parts of the system break 
down due to online attack (for example), other un-damaged parts of the system need to 
meet the demand of the enterprise operation. Since the transient function of the IS is to 
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meet a special demand, it can be measured by the maximum ability of the IS to provide to 
the SS in an abnormal situation. To perform the maximum function, the IS may need 
optimal recovery solution. 
 
Figure 4.9 Examples of abnormal context 
(2) Function and Context of the SS 
In the normal context, the service of the whole service system provided to the customers 
is exhibited as the flow of the SS flowing on the IS. Therefore, in the normal context, SS 
of a service system has regular functions which provide general services to the customers 
of the whole service system. The regular function means different components of SS 
works in a stable state. The regular function can be measured by the average ability of the 
SS to provide for the SS in a stable situation. For example, the SS of an enterprise 
information system provides information services to an enterprise. This regular function 
can be measured by the average ability of information service provided by the SS to the 
enterprise. 
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In the abnormal context, SS of a service system has transient functions which provide 
special services to the customers. As discussed before, in this context, the IS usually 
cannot work in a normal manner due to partially damages or largely increased demands. 
The transient function of SS can be measured in terms of meeting a transient demand 
from customers in a particular abnormal situation.  
 
4.5 Effectiveness and Usefulness of the Model 
 
The FCBPSS approach along with its application has been shown useful in the context of 
various applications [Umeda et al. 1990, He 2008]. For the service system, the 
effectiveness and usefulness of the proposed domain model in this section are explained 
as follows. 
 
4.5.1 Effectiveness of the Model 
 
 
The proposed model is effective; in particular, it could play the two roles stated in 
Section 4.1. First, it is used as a common language for different humans involved in 
service systems to communicate with each other about the service system under concern. 
It is easy for people to have a thorough understanding of a particular service system with 
the proposed model. Second, the proposed framework could be further converted by a 
particular computer language (e.g. UML), which allows the computer system to 
understand the semantics of a particular service system. 
 
82 
 
4.5.2 Usefulness of the Model 
 
First, it is useful to understand the service system and clarify a particular methodology or 
strategy on the system. The domain model documents the key concepts, and the domain-
vocabulary of the service system. The domain model provides a structural view of the 
system that can be effectively used to verify and validate understanding of a problem 
domain among various groups of humans. It is especially helpful as a communication tool 
and a focusing point to understand the system and its related methodology. For example, 
when we undertake a management strategy for a networked service system, it will be 
easy to understand the strategy with the proposed domain model. 
 
Second, it is useful to design of the service system. The system decomposition and the 
key concepts in the domain model give the presentation of design notion, which is the 
basis of the design process of the service system. In the design process, the structure of 
the system becomes a part of variables in the math model. The domain model provides a 
support to define these variables; in particular, when the topology of the system changes, 
the domain model provides a source of knowledge for re-defining the variables. 
 
Third, it is useful to management of the service system. Management of the system 
usually involves the structure and behaviour of a system. For example, in the resilience 
management of the service system, the structure and behaviour of a system are necessary 
to be considered for creating different recovery solutions. 
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Fourth, it is useful to measure the properties of the service system. The key concepts in 
the domain model are the basis of measurement of different properties of the service 
system. Again take the resilience property as an example. The definitions of normal 
context and the abnormal context, with the regular function and transient function, not 
only distinguish the property domain, but also indicate a potential way to measure the 
resilience property of the service system from different contexts. 
 
4.6 Variables of Service System 
 
As an application of the domain model, variables that are responsible for the behaviour of 
a service system are identified. 
 
4.6.1 Both Demands and Supplies as a Variable 
 
As discussed in Section 3.2, the key feature of service system is that it meets human’s 
demand directly. This feature could be further expressed as dynamic multiple demand-
supply relationships, which determine the performance of a service system. 
 
(1) A service system has multiple demand-supply relationships.  A service system may 
have different functions to meet human's different demands; in particular, a service 
system with only one function could be viewed as a special case. Furthermore, a function 
of a service system only makes sense for the pair of supply and demand. That is to say, 
for a service system, if it only manufactures goods or produces goods but no humans 
there as a direct receptor of the goods, the function of the service system does not make 
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sense. Different from service system, manufacturing systems only produce goods. 
Although the goods will eventually be used by humans, a manufacturing system focuses 
on goods production only.  
 
(2) The demand-supply relationships are dynamic. First, the service demand changes, and 
the service supplier has to follow this change. A manufacturing system targets on 
production of goods with both known and unknown demands. When more goods are 
produced with a manufacturing system, the extra goods can be in an inventory. That 
means a manufacturing system can still move on even though there is no demand per se. 
This situation can never happen to a service system, and there is no sense to say service 
when demand is not there.   So, the service system is essentially a leader-follower system. 
Second, a service system has many "stable" states, and they change with respect to time.  
 
4.6.2 Network Structure as a Variable 
 
Network structure is a variable responsible for the functioning of a service system. 
Service systems have a very large scale of networks. There is a paradox with the network 
structure. On one hand, it allows for providing more services to demands regardless of 
where, when and how. On the other hand, it increases the complexity of a system, which 
makes the system's safety more unpredictable. Zio [2009] considered that networked 
systems had an additional dimension of complexity in modeling of a system. As stated by 
Perrow in the normal accident theory [Perrow 1999], two related dimensions—interactive 
complexity and loose/tight coupling are the main reasons responsible for a system’s 
accidents. The accidents could be separated into two types; one caused by component 
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failure and the other one caused by interaction failure [Leveson 2004b]. The 
aforementioned contradictory situation to the network structure can be called "network 
paradox". In the case of a service system, the large scale of network feature further 
aggravates these problems due to the presence of a large amount of components and 
interactions in the system but on the other hand, the network structure facilitates rapid 
satisfaction of demands. 
 
4.6.3 Humans as a Variable 
 
As a component of the service system, the human, plays two roles regarding safety 
performance: source of risk and source of resilience enhancement. 
 
(1) From the traditional perspective of safety engineering, the human, as a component of 
the system, may cause problems for the system. The reasons could be classified into two 
categories: (a) human does not perform correct behaviours required by the system 
designer, and (b) human does perform correct behaviours; however, the correct 
behaviours do not handle the unexpected external disturbances, as stated by Leveson 
[2000], “Although many of the accidents in high-tech systems such as aircraft are being 
blamed on the pilots or controllers, the truth is that these systems are often designed in 
such a way that they are inducing new types of human behaviour and human error: The 
problems are not simply in the human but in the system design.” 
 
(2) From the resilience perspective, the human is viewed an essential resource for 
building the system’s resiliency. Hollnagel proposed four abilities for building system's 
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resiliency, namely anticipation, monitoring, learning and responding [Hollnagel et al. 
2010]. As the intelligent part of the service system, the humans are important for these 
abilities. Of course, the modern service system has increasingly number of artificial 
intelligent parts which can do similar jobs of human experts. However, the humans are 
still critical in the decision making. 
 
4.6.4 Configuration of Resources as a Variable 
 
A service system has infrastructure subsystem (IS) and substance subsystem (SS), which 
are considered to be resources within a service system. The configuration of the resources 
determines the system's ability to provide service to humans. As known, a human is a 
highly flexible system and the demands from humans are also flexible. The service 
system has to work in a flexible manner to meet such flexible demands; in particular, the 
flexibility is achieved through the reconfiguration of resources. A service system is a 
network with a large number of components, which provides the system with more 
options for reconfiguration.  
 
4.6.5 Information Flow as a Variable 
 
Information is an important substance in a service system. Information flows in two ways: 
(1) it flows within a service system through software and (2) it flows between a service 
system and its outside through internet. Thus, a service system is a software intensive and 
internet accessible system. This feature has critical effects on the system's performance.  
 
87 
 
The software plays an intelligent role in the service system, and it could be viewed as 
component or subsystem of the service system. Furthermore, it links all the other 
components and makes them work together. Thus, software has been a key factor in the 
interactions among different components. However, software may also be a source of 
accidents. As discussed in Section 4.6.2, there are two types of accidents, which are 
caused by component failure and interaction failure, respectively [Leveson 2004b]. The 
second type of accidents caused by interactions is usually commanded by software, 
which is difficult to examine with traditional safety approaches [Leveson 2004b].) The 
software itself may have faults which are mostly design faults due to the human error in 
the programming or inability to deal with some unexpected situations [Lyu 1995, Keiller 
1991]. The current service systems link with the internet. A service system gets 
information from the internet and it may also provide service to the humans through the 
internet. However, it is well-known that the internet is a source of risks. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter proposed a framework for domain modeling for service system. The novelty 
of the proposed domain modeling framework for the service system has been contributed 
by the unified definition of the service system and the domain modeling tool FCBPSS. In 
comparison with the related method of Umeda and Tomiyama [31], the FCBPSS 
framework includes a complete set of concepts underlying a system, being able to capture 
the semantics of why, how, where, and when the means achieves the end. The FCBPSS 
framework thus goes beyond the object-orientation paradigm in modeling information 
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and knowledge. Based on the domain model, this chapter further discussed the variables 
of a service system, which have critical influences on its performance. 
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CHAPTER 5 
UNDERSTANDING RESILIENCE OF SERVICE SYSTEMS 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Having a clear understanding of resilience, especially for a service system, is another key 
issue of this thesis. Section 2.3 and Section 2.4 have reviewed the concept of resilience in 
the current literature; the results have shown two problems in understanding of resilience 
in the current literature. The first problem is that the current definitions do not work for 
service systems due to the lack of consideration of the service systems' key features. The 
second problem is that the relationship among three properties, namely reliability, 
robustness and resilience, of a system in the context of safety engineering is unclear; in 
particular, the resilience property was sometimes mixed up with the two other properties, 
even in some top journals, say Science [Bongard et al. 2006]. This situation has hindered 
development of technology for the resilience of service systems, e.g. resilience 
measurement [Rosenkrantz et al. 2005, Wang and Ip 2009], as discussed in Section 
2.4.4.2. 
 
This chapter addresses the foregoing two problems through three steps: (1) to give a 
definition of resilience for the service systems in Section 5.2, (2) to clarify the 
relationship among reliability, robustness and resilience in Section 5.3, and (3) to build a 
framework to facilitate modeling and analysis of the resilience of a service system in 
Section 5.4. 
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5.2 Definition of Resilience for Service System 
 
5.2.1 Definition of Safety and Related Concepts for Service System 
 
Definition 1: Supply function is defined as the service provided by a service system, 
namely the output of a service system, which meets the customers' demand. A service 
system may have a number of different supply functions. Suppose that a service system 
has m supply functions. Then, the supply functions could be represented as: ,1SiF i m  . 
 
Definition 2: Design function is defined as the maximum of the service that could be 
provided by a service system, and it is determined by the design requirement at the design 
stage. A service system may have a number of design functions. Suppose that a service 
system has m design functions. Then, the design functions could be represented as: 
,1MiF i m  . A design function represents the maximum ability with which a service 
system offers a particular service; while a supply function is the actual service provided 
by a service system. Obviously, the relationship between the supply functions and design 
functions is: ,1S Mi iF F i m   . 
 
Definition 3: Demand function is defined as the demand from customers. The customers 
may have different demand functions. Suppose that a customer of the service system has 
m demand functions. Then, the demand functions could be represented as: ,1DiF i m  . 
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There are two relationships between the supply function and demand function: balance 
and imbalance, which are defined as follows. 
 
Definition 4: Balance between the supply function and the demand function is defined as 
the relationship between the supply functions and demand functions such that 
,1S Di iF F i m   . A service system is also called in a balanced situation if the supply 
function and demand function are balanced. Two implications come from this definition. 
As stated in Section 3.2.3, the demand function of a customer and the supply function 
offered by a service system are interactive. For example, the design function of a service 
system may be much larger than the actual demand at a particular time. The interactive 
feature of a service system will make the system's output, namely the supply function, 
exactly equal to the demand function. Further, the definition implies that the balance of a 
service system requires that all the supply functions meet the demand functions. 
 
Definition 5: Imbalance between the supply function and the demand function is defined 
as the relationship between the supply function and demand function such that: 
, ,1S Di ii F F i m    . A service system is also called in an imbalanced situation if the 
supply function and demand function are imbalanced. According to this definition, if 
there is one supply function that cannot meet the demand function, the service system is 
in an imbalanced situation. It is noted that, if a supply function is larger than the 
corresponding demand function, the interactive feature of the service system will 
decrease the supply function to meet the demand function. Thus, the imbalanced situation 
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always corresponds to the situation where one or more supply functions are less than the 
demand functions. 
 
The situations of balance and imbalance may be transferable. Thus, a service system may 
be rebalanced. The rebalance process is defined as follows. 
 
Definition 6: Rebalance is a process that a service system transfers from an imbalanced 
situation to a balance situation.  
 
Based on the definitions and discussions above, safety of a service system is defined as 
follows. 
 
Definition 7: Safety of a service system is defined as the dynamic balance between the 
multiple supply functions and the multiple demand functions.  
 
This definition of safety is quite different from the traditional definition of safety, as 
discussed in Section 2.4. According to the traditional understanding of safety, a system is 
not safe because some components fail as discussed in category I of safety engineering in 
Section 2.4.2, or because complex non-linear interactions among different coupled 
components and disturbances lead to emergent phenomena as discussed in category II of 
safety engineering in Section 2.4.3. In other words, a system is not safe because 
something wrong with the system. However, the proposed definition indicates that even 
there is nothing wrong in a system (particularly service system), it may be still not safe, 
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as it may not meet the customers' demands. The failure of the power system in India that 
happened in July 2012 introduced in Chapter 1 is a good example. The investigation of 
this accident has shown that the initial reason of the accident was over use the power 
from the system.  
 
5.2.2 Definition of Resilience for Service Systems 
 
The resilience of a service system is defined as a property that allows the system to 
rebalance the supply function and demand function from imbalanced situations. Four 
remarks are given below for further explanation on this definition. 
 
Remark 1: According to the definition of safety in Section 5.2.1, an imbalanced situation 
means an unsafe situation.  
 
Remark 2: The domain model of service system in Chapter 4 has shown that a service 
system could be examined from different perspectives, such as state, structure, function 
and so on. The proposed definition of resilience implies that the resilience property 
should be examined from the perspective of function.  
 
Remark 3: Resilience does not aim at returning to the original states, or structure or 
functions of the system; it aims at making the supply functions meet the demand 
functions.  
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Remark 4: The imbalanced situation implies that supply functions are less than demand 
functions. Therefore, the ability of a resilient service system is to respond to the 
imbalanced situations and to meet the demand functions. This point will be given further 
discussion in Section 5.4.  
 
5.2.3 Comparison with Other Definitions 
 
Section 2.4.4 reviewed three categories of definitions of the resilience concept in the 
context of safety engineering. A summary of the proposed definition of the resilience 
concept vs. other definitions are given below.  
 
(1) Proposed definition vs. category I. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.4.2, the definitions of category I use reliability or robustness 
to define resilience. According to the proposed safety definition in Section 5.2.1, the 
concepts of reliability and robustness are both related to the balance situation of a system; 
while, the concept of resilience is related to transferring from the imbalanced situation to 
the balance situation, namely rebalance process. The details of the relationship among 
reliability, robustness and resilience will be given further discussion in Section 5.3. 
 
(2)  Proposed definition vs. category II. 
As discussed in Section 2.4.4.2, category II defines resilience as the ability of a system to 
recover to meet the demand from a partial damage [Zhang 2007]. This is a typical 
traditional understanding of the resilience concept, which considers that the imbalanced 
situation of a service system is caused by partial damages with the system. Therefore, 
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category II could be viewed as a special case of the proposed definition. In other words, 
there may be different reasons that lead to the imbalanced situations of a service system; 
a partial damage is a typical reason, which decreases the supply functions. Obviously, 
another possible reason is the increase of demand functions. Thus, the proposed 
definition covers the scope of the definition of category II.  
 
(3) Proposed definition vs. category III.  
As discussed in Section 2.4.4.2, the definition of category III is a generic and all-
inclusive definition which covers the traditional concepts of safety, reliability and 
robustness. Obviously, the definition of category III also covers the scope of the proposed 
definition of resilience.  
 
The comparisons above show that: (1) the proposed definition of resilience considers the 
special features of the service systems, and (2) the scope of the proposed definition has 
overlapping area with other definitions. A brief summary is given in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1 Proposed definition of resilience VS others’ definitions of resilience 
Category Key feature of Definition relationship 
I Reliability or robustness. Category I  proposed 
definition 
II Recover ability from partial damage Category II  scope of 
proposed definition 
III All-inclusive Category III  scope of 
proposed definition 
Proposed 
Definition 
Rebalance ability from imbalanced situations  
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5.3 Reliability VS Robustness VS Resilience 
  
As discussed in Section 2.4, safety of a system has ever been described by three 
properties, namely reliability, robustness, and resilience. This section tries to clarify the 
relationships among the three Rs (i.e., Reliability, Robustness, Resilience) from different 
perspectives. 
 
5.3.1 Different Understandings of Safety 
 
Reliability refers to a traditional understanding of safety expressed in category I of safety 
engineering. Such an understanding, as discussed in Section 2.4.2, considers that 
accidents are caused by component failure, and the accidents spread as a linear chain. 
Reliability is a component-based property [Leveson 2011]. Safety and reliability has a 
close relationship and they may have the same connotations with respect to the simple 
system. In the development of reliability engineering, there was a main shift from 
component centric focus to the system level reliability [Saleh and Marais 2006]. Thus, 
the modern definition of reliability has been applicable to both component and system.  
 
Robustness reflects the human's understanding of safety expressed in category II of safety 
engineering.  Such an understanding, as discussed in Section 2.4.3, considers safety as an 
emergent property of the whole system, and accidents happen due to the complex non-
linear interactions among different coupled components and external and internal 
disturbances. Thus, robustness is a property of a system not component.  Robustness is a 
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property built upon reliability. A system is viewed to be robust by meeting two 
conditions: (1) the system is reliable, and (2) the system is insensitive to noises. 
 
Resilience reflects the human's understanding of safety expressed in category III of safety 
engineering. This understanding also considers safety as an emergent property of the 
whole system and accidents spread  as complex interactions in the system; furthermore, 
safety is not about a stable state, and it is a dynamic balance between the thing that makes 
the system go right and the thing that makes the system go wrong [Hollnagel et al. 2011]. 
Resilience further considers how to increase the things that make the system go right.  
 
5.3.2 Different Safety States 
 
Both reliability engineering and robustness engineering try to design a safe system and 
maintain the system at the safe state. Thus, reliability and robustness both consider that a 
system has two states only: failure and functioning.  
 
However, resilience considers that safety and failure are not only two different states. 
There may be multiple states between safety and failure; furthermore, there may be 
multiple safe states and multiple unsafe states. For example, a service system may have 
different balanced situations which correspond to different supply and different demand; 
it may also have different imbalanced situations.  
 
It has been discussed in Section 5.2 that the imbalanced situations may be caused by 
partial damage of a system. It is noted that the system’s reliability property also involves 
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the situation that a system has some damaged component(s); however, the reliability 
approach only uses redundancy to solve this issue. As discussed in Section 2.3.2, the 
assumption for the repairable reliability is that the time to repair is assumed to be 
negligible and the system is in the continuous operation without interruption [Birolini 
2010]. In other words, a system may have a damaged component; but, this system is only 
viewed to be reliable when it has a redundant component or its function could be 
implemented by other components. However, in resilience engineering, recovery of the 
damaged component(s) or subsystem(s) is considered without assumption of any 
continuous operation. Therefore, one key issue in resilience engineering is to know what 
to do; in particular, how to make a system respond to the imbalanced situations where a 
part or parts of the system are damaged. 
 
5.3.3 Different Focuses 
 
The assumption of reliability of a system relies on the reliability of all of its components. 
Thus, the reliability property focuses on whether each component of a system can work 
as designed. According to the domain model of service system proposed in Chapter 3, it 
can be seen that reliability actually examines a system from a structural perspective. 
When dealing with a recovery situation, the system needs to keep its functions even 
during recovery process. Therefore, continuous operation is important for the reliability 
property; furthermore, the repairable ability only applies to the redundant items [Birolini 
2010].  
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The robustness of a system focuses on a system’s performance under different noises; in 
particular, a system needs to maintain its functions against internal and external noises. 
According to the domain model of service system proposed in Chapter 3, it can be seen 
that robustness actually examines a system from a functional perspective. The means to 
improve robustness is the component or subsystem design [Taguchi 1986] and operation 
management. 
 
The resilience of a system focuses on a system’s performance facing damage or other 
unsafe situations; in particular, the system can return to the safety state from the unsafe 
state. Therefore, the recovery ability or the rebalance ability in the context of service 
system, is necessary for the system’s resiliency. The reliability property may also deal 
with the recovery, as discussed in Section 2.4.2; however, its recovery ability only 
applies to the failed redundant parts. Thus, from the reliability perspective, the time for 
recovery is assumed to be negligible and the system will not experience any break during 
recovery process. The recovery ability in resilience is beyond the scope of (component) 
redundancy; furthermore, resilience depends on the system's ability to reconfigure all 
resources. This reconfiguration ability is not required by reliable or robust systems.  
 
5.3.4 Being Coupled 
 
The three Rs are coupled, which means that there are some overlapping areas in the three 
concepts. There are two perspectives to analyze these coupled relationships. The first 
perspective is on the development of each concept. The second perspective is in the 
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context of a particular system, say a service system. The coupled relationships among 
three Rs are discussed from these two perspectives in the following sections. 
 
5.3.4.1 Perspective of concept development 
 
The developments of the three R concepts in the field of safety engineering have some 
similar experience, which may be a general phenomenon in any knowledge development. 
That is, a concept when it was originally proposed usually has a relatively narrow scope; 
however, with the development of the concept, its scope trends to be larger. The three Rs 
are good examples to reflect this phenomenon. 
 
When originally proposed, the basic scopes of the 3Rs are as follows. (1) the reliability 
concept mainly considers if the system could remain its normal functions and does not 
care about the noise, (2) the robustness concept only considers noise and its goal is to 
make the system remain its required functions under different noises, and (3) the 
resilience concept mainly considers how to rebalance the system from some imbalanced 
situations.   
 
However, with the further developments, all the three concepts were extended to the 
more general meanings.  
 
(1) Extension of reliability. The reliability concept in some current literature also deals 
with a system’s performance under noises. For example, as discussed in Section 2.4.2.3, 
Billinton and Allan [1996] decomposed the reliability of the system into two concepts, 
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adequacy and security. They further defined system security as "the ability of a system to 
respond to disturbances arising within that system" in [Billinton and Allan 1996]. Their 
work of reliability has already involved the scope of robustness. The difference is that the 
robustness concept considers not only the internal disturbances but also the external 
disturbances. Reliability has also been extended to the scope of resilience in terms of 
transportation system [Victoria Transport Policy Institute 2010]. 
 
(2) Extension of robustness. Bongard et al. [2006] considered robustness as the same with 
resilience, which means that the robustness property also deals with the situation of 
system’s partial damages. Although, as discussed in the beginning of this chapter, the 
research in this thesis does not agree with such an extension, this is a trend of concept 
extension for robustness in this case. It is noted that this is a paper published in Science, 
which always has a reputable name. Little [2003] viewed the robustness of a system as a 
combined property of reliability and resilience.  
 
(3) Extension of resilience. As discussed in Section 2.4.4, resilience recently has been 
extended to the whole scope of system’s safety; in particular, it is viewed as the ability to 
succeed under varying conditions [Hollnagel et al. 2010]. Therefore, the resilience 
concept has covered the scopes of reliability and robustness in the recent literature. 
 
5.3.4.2 Perspective of service system 
 
From the perspective of service system, as defined in Section 5.2, resilience refers to the 
ability of rebalancing from imbalanced situations. Similarly, reliability and robustness 
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refer to the abilities of keeping a system in the balance situations; in particular, 
robustness focuses on the system's performance under noises. The balance situations 
mean that the supply functions meet the demand functions. However, in practice, there 
must be a bound that limits the difference between the supply function and demand 
function; a difference beyond the bound will lead to an imbalanced situation. In other 
words, there is not an absolute broader line between the balanced situation and the 
imbalanced situation; there is a vague area between the balanced situation and 
imbalanced situation. Therefore, there is also a vague area between the properties of 
reliability, robustness and resilience.  
 
5.3.5 The Three Rs May Have Conflicts 
 
As the three Rs focus on different aspects of system’s safety performance, they may have 
some conflicts with different approaches to achieve their goals.  
 
(1) High reliability may result in less robustness and resilience. The important approach 
for reliability is redundancy. Designer must decide a proper redundancy degree for 
critical elements; thus, the costs of redundant systems will be high [Anderson and 
Bartholdi 2000]. The reconfiguration ability is an important factor related with a system’s 
resilience. The management of information of such a system will be difficult and costly 
especially when the redundant elements need to be synchronized from time to time. For 
example, the replication of a large database takes a long time and also uses a large 
network bandwidth. Increased redundancy will also increase the inconsistency between 
elements [Liu et al. 2010]. The design and control of such a system will be more 
103 
 
complicated, which will affect the system’s robustness and resilience. Furthermore, the 
limited resource is an important assumption of reliability [Birolini 2010]; therefore, high 
cost for redundancy will affect a system’s effort on improvement of robustness and 
resilience. 
 
(2) High resilience may result in less reliability and less robustness. Liu et al. [2010] 
explained that resilience may have conflict with other system attributes. The means to 
achieve resilience is adjusting system’s resources and reconfiguration of its structure. 
Furthermore, the reconfiguration of structure is based on the modularization. However, 
these two concepts will increase the number of interfaces where errors are prone to occur, 
which is the important source of system’s uncertainty. Therefore, resilience enhancement 
may result in less reliability and less robustness.  
 
(3) High reliability and robustness may result in less resilience. Similar with the second 
point above, a reduction in the number of interfaces is important for improvement of 
reliability and robustness. However, this may reduce the possible reconfiguration options 
for a system and reduce the adjusting ability of the system. Therefore, high reliability and 
robustness may affect a system’s resilience.  
 
5.4 A Framework for Resilience Analysis 
 
Upon the discussion on the concepts of service systems and resilience, this section 
establishes a framework with which to analyze the resilience property of the service 
systems.  
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5.4.1 Framework 
 
There are two basic issues of resilience research on the service systems, namely 
measurement and improvement, as discussed in Chapter 1. This section presents a 
framework for resilience analysis on a service system, which facilitates further 
developments on the methodology of these two issues in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
respectively.  
 
According to the definition proposed in Section 5.2, resilience of a service system can be 
measured through its ability of rebalancing the supply functions and demand functions 
from imbalanced situations. The rebalance ability of a service system means that the 
system can generate some rebalancing solutions under the imbalanced situations. 
Obviously, the available "best" rebalancing solution will determine the resilience 
performance of a service system.  The improvement of the resilience performance of a 
service system refers to generating a better rebalancing solution. Thus, the two issues, 
measurement and improvement, are coupled, as they are both related with the rebalancing 
solutions. The differences between the two issues are: (1) the measurement issue 
considers to how to evaluate or define the current available "best" rebalancing solution, 
and (2) the improvement issue considers how to generate a better rebalancing solution for 
a service system. 
 
According to the definition of rebalance, there may be two possible ways to eliminate the 
difference between the supply functions and the demand functions: (1) to increase the 
supply functions and (2) to decrease demand functions. The increase in supply functions 
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further depends on the available resources of a service system and how to use the 
resources, namely reconfiguration of the resources. The decrease in demand functions 
usually has two options: (a) to increase the price of service, and (b) to cut some demand 
functions directly. The first option is a flexible way to decrease the demand from an 
economic perspective. The second option is a mandatory way under some emergency 
situations. For example, in the evacuation process, some roads may be constrained to be 
one-directional. 
 
Therefore, the resilience analysis on a service system could be summarized as Figure 5.1. 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Resilience analysis on a service system 
Several remarks are made below as s summary of the resilience analysis framework 
presented in Figure 5.1.  
 
Remark 1: There are two basic issues of resilience analysis on a service system, 
measurement and improvement. 
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Remark 2: Both measurement and improvement of resilience are related to rebalancing 
solutions, which could be generated in two ways: increase of supply functions and 
decrease of demand functions. 
 
Remark 3: Decrease of demand functions could be implemented through flexible ways or 
mandatory ways. The corresponding methods, however, are not generated from an 
engineering perspective. 
 
Remark 4: Increase of supply functions depends on the available resources and 
reconfiguration of the resources. The corresponding methods are generated from an 
engineering perspective, which is the focus of this thesis. 
 
Next section will discuss the available resources of a service system for its resilience.   
 
5.4.2 Available Resources for Resilience 
 
The conceptual model proposed in Chapter 4 has pointed out that there are two main 
categories of resources within a service system, namely infrastructure system and 
substance system. There may be some extra input resources to a service system for 
development of the rebalancing solutions. Therefore, the available resources for 
resilience analysis on a service system could be viewed as two categories, as shown in 
Figure 5.2: (1) inherent resources, including IS and SS, and (2) extra input resources. If a 
service system rebalances itself only through the inherent resources, it could be viewed as 
a self-healing system. 
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Figure 5.2 Resources for resilience of a service system 
The definition of service system in Section 3.3 and the definition of balance in Section 
5.3.1 both discussed the interactive feature between the supply functions and demand 
functions; in particular, the demand functions affect the supply functions. Thus, the 
demand functions could also be viewed as a kind of input, namely input information, to 
the service systems.   
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
(1) Safety and resilience are defined in terms of a service system. The definitions are 
proposed by considering the important features of service systems.  
 
(2) The relationships among reliability, robustness and resilience are clarified. The three 
Rs reflect human's different understanding of safety and have different focuses. They are 
coupled concepts and may also have conflicts. 
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(3) A framework is proposed to analyze the resilience property of a service system. This 
framework considers two foundational issues of resilience analysis, measurement and 
improvement; furthermore, both of them rely on the rebalancing solutions under 
imbalanced situations. The rebalancing solutions rely on available resources and their 
reconfiguration strategy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
MEASUREMENT OF RESILIENCE 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents a methodology of the resilience measurement for a service system. 
First, axioms of resilience measurement are discussed in Section 6.2. Second, 
mathematical models based on these axioms are developed in Section 6.3. Third, two 
cases, transportation system and enterprise information system, are employed to illustrate 
and validate the proposed measure in Section 6.4 and Section 6.5, respectively. At last, 
conclusions are given in Section 6.6. 
 
6.2 Axioms for Resilience Measurement 
 
Following the discussion in Chapter 5, this thesis measures the resilience of a service 
system by maximization of the set of imbalanced situations, which can be rebalanced 
with bounded time and resources. Four important corollaries are derived in the following, 
which are taken as the axioms for the resilience measurement. 
 
Axiom 1: The resilience of a system can only be measured for a particular imbalanced 
situation. 
 
Axiom 2: A system which can rebalance the supply and demand relation from a larger 
imbalanced situation is more resilient. 
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Axiom 3: A system which can rebalance the supply and demand relation from the 
imbalanced situation with less time is more resilient. 
 
Axiom 4: A system which can rebalance the supply and demand relation from the 
imbalanced situation with less resource is more resilient. 
 
The above axioms show that there are three factors affecting a rebalancing solution: (1) 
imbalanced situation, (2) rebalancing time, and (3) rebalancing cost. It is noted that 
Allenby and Fink [2005] had a similar thought with axiom 1; in particular, they claimed 
that "resiliency is not a global characteristic of a system and it can be meaningfully 
determined only with reference to an identified system and particular challenges" 
[Allenby and Fink 2005]. Axiom 1 implies that a service system may be (1) resilient 
under an imbalanced situation say situation A, and (2) not resilient under another 
imbalanced situation say situation B. Thus, it is reasonable to measure a service system's 
resiliency in terms of a particular situation. It is not reasonable to compare two different 
systems under different imbalanced situations. 
 
It is noted that axiom 2 is similar with the measurement in robust control, which finds the 
bound on perturbations that the system can endure and such a bound is viewed as the 
measure of robustness [Cheres et al. 1989, Chen and Han 1994, Feng and Brandt 1998]. 
The difference lies in that the robust control method requires a system to be in a stable or 
reliable condition; while a system's resilience may consider non-stable or imbalanced 
situations. 
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For a networked service system under a particular imbalanced situation, there may be 
different rebalancing solutions and the best solution will determine the resilience of the 
system. The rebalancing solutions certainly depend on the available rebalancing time and 
resources. The axioms actually imply that given different conditions, there may be 
different measurements. For example, given bounded rebalancing time and resources, the 
measurement is a maximization of imbalanced situations. Given an imbalanced situation 
and available rebalancing cost, the measurement is a minimization of rebalancing time. 
Next, mathematical models based on the foregoing axioms are presented, respectively. 
 
6.3 Mathematical Models for Resilience Measurement  
 
This section presents mathematical models based on the foregoing axioms, including 
assumptions, variable definitions, objective functions and constraints. Simple examples 
are also given to illustrate the models. 
 
6.3.1 Model based on Axiom 2 
 
6.3.1.1 Assumptions  
 
(1) Given required rebalancing time for each function and total resource constraints. 
 
(2) All the supply functions and demand functions are rebalanced within the 
corresponding required time. 
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6.3.1.2 Variable definition 
 
Table 6.1 Variable definition in the model based on Axiom 2 
m : the total number of functions; 
n : the number of categories of resources; 
wi : weight of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ,
1
1
m
i
i
w

 ; 
, ( )
t
i jr x  
: the number of resource j needed by  function i at time t with rebalancing 
solution x,  1, 2, ,i m  , 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
jR  : the total number of resource j, 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
t
iD  : the demand function i at time t, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
( )tiS x  : the supply function i at time t with rebalancing solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
iT  : the required time for the rebalance of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
x : rebalancing solution 
 
Note that rebalancing solution x is the decision variable of the model. 
 
6.3.1.3 Objective function and constraints 
 
The objective is to maximize the imbalanced situation that can be rebalanced, as shown 
in Fig. 6.1. In Fig. 6.1, the upper solid strait line is the demand function i ( tiD ), which is 
supposed to be a constant; the dashed curve is the supply function with a rebalancing 
solution x. The lower solid straight line labels the initial supply function at time 0 without 
any rebalancing solutions. Within the given required time, the supply function with 
rebalancing solution must meet the demand function. 
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( )tiS x
t
iD
0
iS
iT  
Figure 6.1 Maximization of imbalanced situation 
Max 
0 0
0
1
( )m i i
i
i i
D S xw
D
  (6.1) 
s.t. ( ) ,t ti i iS x D t T  , 1, 2, ,i m   (6.2) 
  ,
1
( ) , 1, 2, , , max 1,2, ,
m
t
i j j i
i
r x R j n t T i m

       (6.3) 
 
In the above, Eq. (6.1) represents the imbalanced situation at beginning; Eq. (6.2) 
represents the constraints of rebalancing time for different functions; Eq. (6.3) represents 
the resource constraints.  
 
6.3.1.4 Illustrtion 
 
A very simple transportation system example is given to show how the model works. In 
this example, we only consider the maximum imbalanced situation for which the system 
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can rebalance and the rebalancing time and cost are ignored. Fig. 6.2 is an original 
transportation system with only two nodes. Two edges link the two nodes. The travel 
time and edge capacity are as shown in the figure. Suppose that the unit of travel time is 
minute. In this example, the imbalanced situation is assumed such that the transportation 
demand from A to B increases from 10 per 2 minutes to 15 per 2 minutes due to some 
reason. The rebalancing solution is based on contraflow approach [Wolshon et al. 2005], 
namely reversing the edge B to A, as shown in Fig. 6.3. With this rebalancing solution, 
the maximum transportation ability from A to B becomes 20 per 2 minutes. Therefore, 
the largest imbalanced situation that can be rebalanced is such that the transportation 
demand from A to B rises to 20 and the imbalance degree is (20-10)/20=50%. Thus, the 
resilience of this transportation system facing the particular imbalanced situation due to 
the increased transportation demand from A to B is 50%.  
 
Figure 6.2 Original transportation system with only two nodes 
 
Figure 6.3 Rebalancing solution 
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6.3.2 Model based on Axiom 3 
 
6.3.2.1 Assumptions  
 
(1) Given the imbalanced situation, required rebalancing time and resource constraints. 
 
(2) All the supply and demand functions are rebalanced within the corresponding 
required time. 
 
It is noted that axiom 3 implies that the actual rebalancing time does not equal to the 
required rebalancing time. 
 
6.3.2.2 Variable definition 
 
Table 6.2 Variable definition in the model based on Axiom 3 
M : the total number of functions; 
N : the number of categories of resources; 
iw  : weight of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  , 
1
1
m
i
i
w

 ; 
, ( )
t
i jr x  
: the number of resource j needed by  function i at time t with rebalancing 
solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  , 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
jR  : the total number of resource j, 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
( )iC x  : the completion time for the rebalance of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
t
iD  : the demand function i at time t, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
( )tiS x  : the supply function i at time t with rebalancing solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
iT  : the required time for the rebalance of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
X : rebalancing solution 
 
Note that rebalancing solution x is the decision variable of the model. 
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6.3.2.3 Objective function and constraints 
 
Min 
1
( )m i
i
i i
C xw
T
  (6.4) 
s.t. ( ) , ( ), 1, 2, ,t ti i iS x D t C x i m     (6.5) 
  ,
1
( ) , 1, 2, , , max 1,2, ,
m
t
i j j i
i
r x R j n t T i m

       (6.6) 
 ( ) , 1, 2, ,i iC x T i m    (6.7) 
 
In the above, Eq. (6.4) represents the resilience of the system; Eq. (6.5) represents the 
actual rebalancing time for each function; Eq. (6.6) represents the resource constraints; 
Eq. (6.7) represents the constraint of rebalancing time. 
 
6.3.2.4 Illustration 
 
A simple example of enterprise information system is employed to show how the model 
works. An enterprise information system is a very special service system in that such a 
system usually has backup and could be rebalanced from even 100% lost of functions. 
We consider a scenario that an enterprise information system is fully damaged. There are 
two functions in this system, which are totally lost. There are two categories of resources. 
The total number of resource 1 is 2; the total number of resource 2 is 4. All the functions 
are treated with the same importance and thus the weight for each function is 0.5. Due to 
the limitation of resources, the two functions cannot be rebalanced synchronously. This 
implies that a rebalancing solution needs to choose a particular order among a set of 
rebalance tasks.  The information of rebalancing solutions is given in Table 6.3. ip  is the 
process time for the recovery of function i. Obviously, the optimum solution for this 
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problem is with the order of [1,2]. The fitness value is 0.9375, which implies that the 
system could be rebalanced a little earlier than the required recovery time. 
 
Table 6.3 Rebalance parameters 
Function Resource 1, ,1ir  Resource 2, ,2ir  ip  (min) iT  (min) 
i=1 2 3 2 2 
i=2 2 4 5 8 
 
 
6.3.3 Model based on Axiom 4 
 
6.3.3.1 Assumptions  
 
(1) Given the imbalanced situation, required rebalancing time, and resources constraints. 
 
(2) All the supply and demand functions are rebalanced within the corresponding 
required time. 
 
Axiom 4 implies that the actual used resources do not equal to the resource limits. 
 
6.3.3.2 Variable definition  
 
Note that rebalancing solution x is the decision variable of the model. 
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Table 6.4 Variable definition in the model based on Axiom 4 
m : the total number of functions; 
N : the number of categories of resources; 
iw  : weight of resource j, 1, 2, ,j n  , 
1
1
n
j
i
w

 ; 
, ( )
t
i jr x  
: the number of resource j needed by  function i at time t with rebalancing 
solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  , 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
jR  : the total number of resource j, 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
( )jU x  : the required resource j with rebalancing solution x, 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
iT  : the required time for the rebalance of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
t
iD  : the demand function i at time t, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
( )tiS x  : the supply function i at time t with rebalancing solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
x : rebalancing solution 
 
 
6.3.3.3 Objective function and constraints 
 
Min 
1
( )n j
i
j j
U x
w
R
  (6.8) 
s.t. ( ) ,t ti i iS x D t T   (6.9) 
  ,
1
( ) ( ), 1, 2, , , max 1,2, ,
m
t
i j j i
i
r x U x j n t T i m

       (6.10) 
 ( ) , 1, 2, ,j jU x R j n    (6.11) 
 
In the above, Eq. (6.8) represents the resilience of the system; Eq. (6.8) represents the 
constraint of the rebalancing time; Eq. (6.10) represents the actual used resources in the 
rebalance process; Eq. (6.11) represents the resource constraints. 
 
6.3.3.4 Illustration 
 
We consider a scenario that an enterprise information system is fully damaged. There are 
two functions in this system, which are totally lost. There are two categories of resources. 
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The total number of resource 1 is 4; the total number of resource 2 is 8. All the resources 
are treated with the same importance and the weight for each category of resources is 0.5. 
The information of the rebalancing solutions is given in Table 6.5. ip  is the process time 
for the recovery of function i. Due to the constraint of required rebalancing time, there 
are two rebalancing solutions: (1) rebalance the two functions with the order of [1,2], and 
(2) rebalance the two functions concurrently.  Obviously, the optimum solution for this 
problem is the first one with the order of [1,2]. The fitness value is 0.5, which implies 
that the system could be rebalanced with only half of the available resources. 
 
Table 6.5 Rebalance parameters 
Function Resource 1, ,1ir  Resource 2, ,2ir  ip  (min) iT  (min) 
i=1 2 3 2 4 
i=2 2 4 5 8 
 
6.3.4 Discussion 
 
Several remarks are given below for further explaining of the models. 
 
Remark 1: The models in this section are general expressions of different axioms. When 
the models are applied to a particular service system, the rebalancing solution x needs to 
be expressed in detail according to the available solution of the system. 
 
Remark 2: The assumptions are important, which determine the context of resilience 
measurement. It is only with the same assumption that the resilience of two similar 
service systems, for example, two transportations systems, can be compared. 
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Remark 3: Different axioms may have conflicts. For example, to rebalance a system from 
a larger imbalanced situation may require more time and resources; a rebalancing 
solution with less time may require more resources.  
 
Remark 4: The three models may be considered together for a service system. In this way, 
the measurement of resilience turns into a multi-objective optimization problem. 
Preferences of a service system may be given to different objectives.   
 
6.4 Validation Case 1: Transportation System 
 
This section applies the proposed methodology to measure the resilience of a 
transportation system. 
 
6.4.1 Transportation System 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a transportation system is viewed as having two levels: 
infrastructure level and substance level; in particular the substance level includes the 
substance which “flows” over the infrastructure. We view them as the subsystems of an 
entire transportation system, namely transportation infrastructure (TI) system and 
transportation substance (TS) system. They are, however, related to each other by the 
constraint that the TS system depends on the TI system or the TS must “flow” within the 
TI system. The flow of TS follows certain constraints which are called “traffic rules”. 
The dynamics of the transportation system is determined by the flow of TS under the 
constraints of these rules. 
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Figure 6.4 A transportation system 
A transportation system is a service system that has the notions of demand and supply. 
The demand can be generally defined as moving a part of 
 1, 2, , ; :    i iTS i n n the number of TS   from one place (A) to another place (B) within 
a time denoted by  i A BT   (see Fig. 6.4a). Places A and B are a part of a transportation 
system, especially a part of its TI system. Further, at one time say t, the demand may be 
more than one (see Fig. 6.4a where there is a demand from place C to place D at time t 
along with the demand from place A to B). In Fig. 6.4a, we show a logical level of the 
transportation system at time t, and in Fig. 6.4b, we show a possible scenario at the 
physical infrastructure level where the two transportation tasks (A to D; A to B) may 
share one segment (E to F) in the transportation system. Such a sharing essentially leads 
that planning of the movement of substances becomes extremely difficult. The supply of 
service is made with the substance such as vehicles and infrastructures such as roads. 
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6.4.2 Problem Definition 
 
We assume that a transportation system is in an imbalanced situation and a rebalancing 
solution is adopted to rebalance the system. Next, the imbalanced situation and the 
rebalancing solution are expressed in detail. 
 
6.4.2.1 Imbalanced situation  
 
The scenario is that one place is in a dangerous area (single source) where victims are to 
be evacuated within a required time, and the other place is in a safe area (single 
destination) to which the victims are to be sent. A transportation network lies in between 
the source and destination; in particular, the transportation system is partially damaged in 
an emergency condition. The demand of evacuating the victims is much larger than the 
regular transportation demand between the source and destination. Therefore, the 
transportation system functioning with a regular manner cannot meet the demand, which 
leads to an imbalanced situation of the system.   
 
The network system is composed of a set of places and a set of roads (Fig. 6.5). Each 
road has lanes which have opposite directions and are grouped in terms of their directions 
– i.e., there are two groups. In Fig. 6.5, edge 1->2 is a group of lanes with the same 
direction in road 1-2 and edge 2->1 is the other group of lanes with the opposite direction 
to edge 1->2 on road 1-2. We further consider the case that a road has lanes which have 
all in one direction as a special case of the general case that a road has lanes that have the 
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opposite directions. The direction of the lanes of a road is defined as flow pattern of the 
road. The flow pattern of all roads of a transportation system is defined as the flow 
pattern of the transportation system. Each lane has a capacity and a travel time. The 
capacity of a lane is defined as the maximum number of evacuees who can be transported 
per unit period. Each edge also has a capacity and a travel time. The capacity of an edge 
is the sum of all lanes in this edge. The travel time of an edge is equal to the travel time 
of each lane in this edge.  
1 2
3 4
A place
Road
 
 
Figure 6.5 Conceptual model of the transportation system  
 
 
6.4.2.2 Rebalancing solution  
 
The regular rebalancing solution for the imbalance situation described in Section 6.4.2.1 
is planning the substance of the system. The planning of a transportation system is meant: 
(1) to determine the flow pattern of the system, which is called task 1, and (2) to 
determine how the substance flows over the infrastructure with a particular flow pattern, 
which is called task 2. A transportation system has an original flow pattern; in particular, 
one road usually has two edges (or two groups of lanes) with opposite directions. Thus, 
task 1 of planning refers to reversing the directions of some edges, i.e., the contraflow 
method [Wolshon et al. 2005]. Task 1 is also called flow pattern planning in this thesis.  
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6.4.2.3 Measurement of resilience  
 
In this problem, the transportation system needs to evacuate victims from a dangerous 
place to a safe place within a required evacuation time. Thus, axiom 2 and its 
corresponding mathematical model should be applied to measure the resilience of the 
transportation system; in particular, the resilience is described with maximization of the 
number of victims that could be evacuated within the required evacuation time. 
 
6.4.3 Mathematical Model 
 
The state of a road is represented in terms of edges as shown in Fig. 6.6. In this figure, 
the d1, d2, d3, d4 represent four states with corresponding edge patterns associated with 
each of them. Fig. 6.7 is the result by adding information of place (i.e., i, j) to Fig. 6.6. 
Variable ijx  is introduced to represent the information of edge i->j; in particular 1ijx   
represents the flow from i to j and 0ijx   represents the flow from j to i. As such, the state 
of a road connecting place i to place j can be expressed by  ,ij jix x , as shown in Fig. 6.7. 
It should be noted that when the travel times and capacities of two edges in a road are 
different, pattern d1 and pattern d4 are different. Only in the special case that the travel 
times and capacities of the two edges in one road are the same, the pattern d1 and the 
pattern d4 have the same transportation ability. This has implied the need of the 
consideration of the 4 flow patterns (instead of 3 patterns considered by Kim et al. [2008]) 
in an emergency situation. For the evacuation of victims from a source place s to a 
destination place d, the flow pattern of the roads associated with these two nodes should 
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be ones as shown in Fig. 6.8. In this figure, we show that for the source place, all flows 
must be outgoing, and for the destination node, all flow must be incoming.  
 
Figure 6.6 Flow patterns on a single road 
 ,ij jix x
 
Figure 6.7 Definition of the domain of the variable to represent the flow patterns  
 
Figure 6.8 The flow patterns which are associated with source place and destination place 
Let us use ‘node’ for place and ‘arc’ for edge. A particular transportation system has m 
nodes and n directed arcs. As such, a transportation system can be represented as a 
directed graph denoted by G and  ,G N A . A flow pattern is, thus, a snapshot of the 
network G starting from the transportation or evacuation task to the completion of the 
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task. Each node has a capacity and an initial occupancy. Each arc also has a capacity and 
a constant travel time. Next, the concepts about evacuation time are defined. 
 
The individual evacuation time of one evacuee (ETi , where i stands for this evacuee) is 
defined as a period of time from the moment when the first evacuee in the crowd leaves 
from a source node to the moment when evacuee i arrives at a destination node. The total 
evacuation time of all evacuees (TET) is defined as a period of time from the moment 
when the first evacuee in the crowd leaves from a source node to the moment when the 
last evacuee arrives at a destination node. The average evacuation time (AET) is defined 
as 
1
q
i
i
AET ET q

                                                                  (6.12) 
where q is the total number of evacuees in a source node.  Assume that at the beginning, 
there are evacuees in a certain node.  
 
The objective of resilience measurement is to find a rebalancing solution to maximize the 
number of victims within a given required evacuation time. It is noted that the required 
evacuation time refers to the total evacuation time (TET).  
 
6.4.3.1 Variable definition  
 
The variables are defined in Table 6.6. 
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Table 6.6 Variable definition in measurement model for transportation system 
 ,G N A  : directed network with N set of nodes and A set of arcs (static network); 
m N  : number of elements in set N ; 
n A  : number of elements in set A; 
ijc  : capacity of arc  ,i j ; 
ij  : travel time of arc    , , ,i j i j A  ; 
ia  : node capacity (the maximum number of evacuees who can stay in node i); 
S : source node; 
Q : initial number of evacuees in node s; 
 pred i  :   | ,j j i A  , predecessors of node i; 
 succ i  :   | ,j i j A  , successors of node i; 
D : destination node that receive the evacuees who initially stay in node s; 
T : required total evacuation time;  ,T T TG N A  : the time expansion of  ,G N A  over a time horizon T; 
TN  :   | ; 0,1, ,i t i N t T    ; 
TA  : set of arcs over a time horizon T; 
 ij tf  : flow (number of evacuees) that leave node i at time t and reach node j at time ijt  without rebalancing solution, , , 1, ,i j N k Q    ; 
( 1)iy t   
: ( ), ( 1) , , 0, ,i t i tf i N t T     , represents the number of evacuees who 
prefer to stay in node i at time t for at least one unit time without 
rebalancing solution; 
 'ij tf  : flow (number of evacuees) that leave node i at time t and reach node j at time ijt   with rebalancing solution, , , 1, ,i j N k Q    ; 
' ( 1)iy t   
: ( ), ( 1) , , 0, ,i t i tf i N t T     , represents the number of evacuees who 
prefer to stay in node i at time t for at least one unit time without 
rebalancing solution; 
ijx  : the state of flow from i to j on the arc (i,j);  ,ij jix x  : flow pattern between the node i and j; 
F 
:     , ,ij jix x i j A   , flow pattern of the network, which is the 
decision variable of the model. 
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6.4.3.2 Objective function and constraints 
 
As expressed in the model in Section 6.3.1, the largest imbalanced situation that can be 
rebalanced depends on two evacuation abilities: (1) the evacuation ability with the 
original transportation system, which is called evacuation ability 1, and (2) the evacuation 
ability of the transportation system after an optimal flow pattern planning, which is called 
evacuation ability 2. Given a required total evacuation time, the evacuation ability 1 will 
be a constant, which is the result of the optimization of Eq. (6.13); 
 
( )0
max si
i succ s
T
t
tf
                                                                     (6.13) 
The evacuation ability 2 depends on the rebalancing solution of an optimal flow pattern, 
which is expressed by 
 '
( )0
max si
i succ s
T
t
tf
                                                                    (6.14) 
The objective function and constraints are given below; 
Max 
   
 
'
'
( ) ( )
( )
0 0
0
maxsi si
si
i succ s i succ s
i succ s
T T
t t
T
t
t t
t
f f
f
 

 

 

 

 
(6.15) 
s.t.  
0 ( ) ( )
( )
0
T
si
t i succ s
id
i pred d
t
T
t
f t f
  
    (6.16) 
        
( ) ( )
1 ,  , 0, ,ijli li
l pred i j succ i
i i f t f ty t y t i N t T           (6.17) 
  0 0,  ,iy i N i s     (6.18) 
  0 , 1, , ,i iy t a t T i N      (6.19) 
  0,1      ,ijx i j A    (6.20)  
  
0,     1
, ,
1,      0
xij
x i j Aij xij
   
 (6.21)  
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  ' '
0 ( ) ( )
( )
0
si id
T
t i succ s i pred d
t
T
t
f t f
  
    (6.22)  
        ' ' ' '
( ) ( )
1 ,  , 0, ,i i li ijli
l pred i j succ i
f t f ty t y t i N t T
 
          (6.23)  
  ' 0 0,  ,iy i N i s     (6.24)  
  '0 , 1, , ,i iy t a t T i N      (6.25)  
  ' ( )0 , ,ij ij ij ji jif t i j Ax c x c     (6.26)  
  1, 0, ,si isx x s i A     (6.27)  
  1, 0, ,id dix x i d A     (6.28)  
 
In the above, Eq. (6.15) represents the resilience of the system, namely maximization of 
the imbalanced situations. Eq. (6.16) to Eq. (6.19) represent the constraints of evacuation 
with the original transportation system. Eq. (6.16) represents the constraint of evacuation 
with the original transportation system that the number of victims evacuated from the 
source node equals to the number of all victims evacuated to the destination node; Eq. 
(6.17) calculates the number of victims who stay in node i at time t+1; Eq. (6.18) 
represents the constraint that there are no victims in the nodes at time 0 except the source 
node; Eq. (6.19) represents the node capacity. 
 
Eq. (6.20) to Eq. (6.28) represent the constraints of evacuation with flow pattern 
planning. Eq. (6.20) represents the constraint that ijx  is a 0-1 variable; Eq. (6.21) 
represents the constraint that ijx  is the opposite of ijx ; Eq. (6.22) represents the 
constraint that the number of victims that are evacuated from the source node equals to 
the number of the victims are all evacuated to the destination node; Eq. (6.23) calculates 
the number of victims who stay in node i at time t+1; Eq. (6.24) represents the constraint 
that there are no victims in the nodes at time 0 except the source node; Eq. (6.25) 
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represents the node capacity; Eq. (6.26) represents the arc capacity; Eq. (6.27) represents 
the flow pattern of the roads associated with the source node s; and Eq. (6.28) represents 
the flow pattern of the roads associated with the sink node d. 
 
6.4.4 Solving the Model 
 
6.4.4.1 Sketch of the proposed method 
 
The objective function (6.15) is the combination of two separate equations, namely Eq. 
(6.13) and Eq. (6.14).  
 
Eq. (6.13) describes the evacuation ability of the original transportation system. For a 
given transportation system and a given demand (i.e., total evacuation time), Eq. (6.13) 
with its constraints (6.16)-(6.19) is viewed as a minimum cost flow problem, which has 
nothing to do with the rebalancing solution of flow pattern planning. Thus, Eq. (6.13) can 
be obtained by an existing minimum cost flow algorithm, e.g. dual ascent algorithm or 
RelaxIV [Bertsekas and P. Tseng 1994] and is treated as a constant in the objective 
function (6.15). In other words, the maximal imbalanced situation that can be rebalanced 
only depends on the optimal rebalancing solution. Details of the optimization of Eq. (6.13) 
are shown in Fig. 6.9, which is called MNE (Maximum Number of Evacuees) algorithm.  
In Fig. 6.9, MCFA, TET and MNE represent minimum cost flow algorithm, total 
evacuation time and maximum number of evacuees who can be evacuated within the 
required evacuation time T, respectively. 
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Figure 6.9 MNE algorithm 
With the result of Eq. (6.13), the objective function (6.15) (i.e. maximum imbalanced 
situation) is converted to maximize Eq. (6.14) (i.e., the evacuation ability with an optimal 
rebalancing solution) with its constraints of (6.20) to (6.28.).  
 
To solve the model, i.e., Eq. (6.15) or Eq. (6.14) with its constraints of (6.20) to (6.28.), a 
method is proposed to get the optimal rebalancing solution (namely the optimal flow 
pattern) first, as shown in Fig. 6.10. The proposed method has two layers (upper-layer 
algorithm and lower-layer algorithm). The two layers are coupled in the sense that in 
each round of iteration, the upper-layer algorithm will need to call the lower-layer 
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algorithm. The lower-layer algorithm is a minimum cost flow algorithm (MCFA), e.g. 
dual ascent algorithm or RelaxIV [Bertsekas and P. Tseng 1994].  In this MCFA, we set 
the number of evacuees as the result of Eq. (6.13). The upper-layer algorithm is to find 
the optimal flow pattern. It is noted that according to Kim and Shekhar [2005], the 
planning problem here is a NP-complete problem. Therefore, the upper-layer algorithm 
for flow pattern planning is an intelligent evolutionary computing algorithm, PSO 
(particle swarm optimization) in particular. After we find the optimal rebalancing 
solution, namely the optimal flow pattern, we use the MNE algorithm, as shown in Fig. 
6.9, to get the maximum number of evacuees that can be evacuated within given required 
evacuation time, and further calculate the objective function (6.15).  
 
 
Figure 6.10 Sketch of the proposed method for flow pattern planning 
6.4.4.2 PSO algorithm 
 
The PSO algorithm was first developed by Kennedy and Eberhart based on the mimic of 
a social model [Kennedy and Eberhart 1995, Kennedy and Eberhart 1997]. The algorithm 
has been widely investigated and applied [Shi and Eberhart 1998, Trelea 2003, Wang and 
Wang 2008]. The basic PSO algorithm uses a swam of m particles to search a D-
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dimensional problem space, and each particle has a velocity 
( 1( , , , , )i i id iDv v v  v , 1 i m  , 1 d D  ) and a position ( 1( , , , )i id iDi x x x  x ) . 
Details of the basic PSO algorithm are referred to the reference [Kennedy and Eberhart 
1995, Wang and Wang 2008]. The basic PSO algorithm is for the continuous variable 
optimization problem. The PSO algorithm for the discrete variable problem can be found 
from [Kennedy and Eberhart 1997, Wan et al. 2004]. Our problem is a discrete variable 
problem, so we apply the discrete PSO algorithm. Details of the PSO for our problem 
include (1) encoding, (2) update formula, (3) stop criterion, and they are given as follows. 
 
(1) Encoding 
Encoding is to design the representation of the position of a particle. Let 
Rn : the number of roads in the transportation network; 
sn : the number of roads linked to the source node which is equal to the number of arcs 
( , ), ( , )s i s i A  ; 
dn : the number of roads linked to the destination node which is equal to the number of 
arcs ( , ), ( , )i d i d A  . 
The number of roads whose flow patterns are unknown is represented as follows: 
R s dL n n n                                                        (6.29) 
The position of particle i is represented as: 
1( , , , ),1i ij iLi x x x j L   x                                 (6.30) 
where  0,1, 2,3ijx   which will be further explain below. 
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There is a conversion between the encoding space and the solution space, which is 
illustrated in Fig. 6.6. In Fig. 6.6, the left part is the code, and the right part is the flow 
pattern of a road. The mapping function is self-explained in the figure. 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Conversion between the encoding space and the solution space 
(2) Update formulas 
The position vector of a particle is composed of integers. So, the update formulas of the 
position and the velocity are designed as follows. 
1 21 0
0
( ( ) ( )),
(0, 4 )( ),
k k k k k
ij ij ij gj ijk
ij k
ij
Int v c p x c p x c
v
v Random cInt r
   


    

 
   (6.31) 
1 1 mod(4)k k kid id idx x v
                                                                (6.32) 
In the above, ( )Int  is the function to get the integer part of   ; 1c  and 2c are learning 
factors, which are two positive constants; , , [0,1]U    , which are pseudo random 
numbers with the homogeneous distribution in [0,1], and 0c is a constant in [0,1], which is 
used to decide the update mode of the velocity. Eq. (18) means when a random number 
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 is not greater than 0c , the velocity is updated according to the traditional mode which is 
as follows: 
1
1 2( ( ) ( ))
k k k k k k
ij ij ij ij gj ijv Int v c p x c p x                    (6.33) 
When  is greater than 0c , the velocity is updated according to the random mode which is 
as follows: 
1 (0, 4)( )k kij ijv v RandomInt                                    (6.33) 
where (0, 4)Random  is a random generator between 0 and 4. Further, the mod number is 
used to prevent the particle from flying out of the boundary. The absolute value of    is 
used to keep the position non-negative. 
 
(3) Stop criterion 
A positive integer NG is taken as the maximum iteration number. If the iteration number 
k is greater than NG, the algorithm is stopped. NG is set based on the trial-and-error for a 
particular problem.  
 
The entire procedure of the algorithm has the following steps.  
 
Step 1: Set 1c , 2c and 0c . Initialize a swarm including m particles with random positions 
inside the solution space. *x  is the best solution and *( )f x  is the best fitness value. 
Step 2: Call MCFA to evaluate the fitness of each particle. That the index of the one gets 
the best fitness is set as g. The position and fitness of the particle g are used to update *x  
and *( )f x . 
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Step 3: Update the velocity and position of particles according to Eqs (6.31) and (6.32).  
Step 4: If the stop criterion is satisfied the algorithm ends; otherwise go to Step 2. 
 
6.4.5 Experiment 
 
6.4.5.1 Experimental setting  
 
Fig. 6.12 illustrates a transportation system which has been partially damaged by losing 
the lane 4 ->5. There are seven places. The transportation system needs to evacuate 
victims from Place 1, which is the source node, to Place 7, which is the sink node. The 
capacity of a place is represented by a bracket “{}” in Fig. 6.12. For example, the 
capacity of Place 1 is 100; the capacity of other six places can be seen, respectively, from 
Fig. 6.12. The “-” in the bracket adjacent to Place 7 means that Place 7 is a shelter and its 
capacity is regarded as infinitely large.  The road and lane are expressed by connection 
between places (see Fig. 6.12). Both capacity and travel time of a lane are indicted on the 
arc by a parenthesis “( )”. For example, Lane 1->2 has travel time 2 and capacity 3, and 
Lane 2->1 has travel time 2 and capacity 4. Place 1 has N evacuees, which means that 
there are N people who need to be evacuated. The evacuation demand is such that all the 
victims must be transferred from Place 1 to Place 7 within 15 time units. It is noted that 
the number 15 here is the total evacuation time (TET) – see the previous definition in 
Section 6.4.3.  
 
The algorithm has the following settings: the swarm size m=5; the maximum iteration 
number NG=10. The algorithm is programmed by java and the experiment is performed 
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on a computer with a dual-1.66GHz CPU and a 1.5GB memory. Further, the algorithm 
runs 10 times for the settings. 
 
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
(1,2)
(1,3)
(4,1)
(4,1)
(1,2)
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(travel time, edge capacity)
 
Figure 6.12 Damaged transportation system (the source node is 1; the destination node is 
7) 
6.4.5.2 Results and discussion  
 
(1) Results 
First, the MNE algorithm is used to optimize Eq. (6.13) to find the maximum number of 
evacuees who can be evacuated by the original damaged transportation system. The result 
is 19. Therefore, the maximum evacuation ability of the original transportation system is 
evacuating 19 evacuees within 15 time units. 
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Second, the two-layer algorithm is used to find the maximum number of evacuees who 
can be evacuated by the transportation system with the rebalancing solution of flow 
pattern planning. The result is 38. Therefore, the evacuation ability of the transportation 
system with the optimal rebalancing solution is evacuating 38 evacuees within 15 time 
units. Input the two numbers of evacuation ability, namely 19 and 38, into the objective 
function and we obtain that the maximum imbalanced situation of the system that can be 
rebalanced is (38-19)/38=50%, which is used to express the resilience of the original 
transportation system. It is noted that the optimal rebalancing solution for resilience is not 
unique; the two optimal rebalancing solutions of flow patterns are shown in Fig. 6. 13. 
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Figure 6.13 Two optimal flow patterns for the system 
(2) Discussion 
The results of this example indicate that 50% difference between the evacuation demand 
and supply compared to the evacuation demand could be rebalanced with the rebalancing 
solution of flow pattern planning. Thus, the resiliency of the example system gives a 
good explanation of axiom 1 for resilience measurement, as shown in Fig. 6.14.  
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Figure 6.14 Resilience of the example system 
Next, illustrations are given for the size of the search space for the given network. The 
example network has seven nodes. In the lower-layer algorithm, the original network is 
converted to a time expanded network (TEN) whose size is related to T (required 
evacuation time).  T is 15 in the experiment. As such, the TEN has 106 nodes. In the 
upper-layer algorithm, one solution represents a flow pattern of five roads, and the whole 
search space has 1024 solutions. 
 
6.4.6 Conclusion 
 
This section uses an example of transportation system to validate the approach of 
resilience measurement. A mathematical model based on axiom 2 for resilience 
measurement was formulated to maximize the imbalanced situation that can be 
rebalanced with rebalancing solutions. The rebalancing solution only considered flow 
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pattern planning, which is one of the most important methods to increase the evacuation 
ability of a transportation system in emergency both in theory [Wolshon et al. 2005] and 
in practice [Dong and Xue 1997, Xue and Dong 2000, Kim and Shekhar 2005, Kim et al. 
2008].  
 
There are some limitations in the rebalancing solution expressed in the model. First, the 
contraflow method in the real-world application is rooted in a single lane; yet our model 
only captures a group of lanes. Therefore, the model cannot describe the situation where 
lanes are different in one group which has one flow direction. Second, in the 
implementation of the contraflow method in practice, there is a setup time (i.e., the time 
to reverse the direction of flow). This time has not been considered in the presented 
model. Third, the scalability issue is to be addressed, though our experience is that the 
computation overhead seems to be manageable.  
 
6.5 Validation Case 2: Enterprise Information System 
 
This section applies the proposed methodology to measure the resilience of an enterprise 
information system for an imbalanced situation. 
 
6.5.1 Enterprise Information System 
 
As a typical service system, an enterprise information system has two subsystems: 
infrastructure system (IS) and substance system (SS). The infrastructure system includes 
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the computers, network devices, databases and so on, and the substance system refers to 
the information which “flows” over the infrastructure. The dynamics of an enterprise 
information system is determined by the flow of the SS under the constraints of the IS.  
 
An enterprise information system is usually a widely distributed operational information 
system. As discussed in Section 6.3.2, an enterprise information system is a very special 
service system in that such a system usually has backup and could be rebalanced from 
even 100% loss of functions. Providing high availability for such a system is complex for 
several reasons according to [Cai et al. 2006]: (1) failures at any components may cause 
cascading failures of the entire system due to distributed information flows [Zhang 2008]; 
(2) distributed resources may be shared by multiple flows; (3) insufficient resources for 
system safety due to intensive processing requirement; (4) high requirement of recovery 
time for information flows. It is noted that the failures mentioned here, including 
transient failures and non-transient failures, refer to the software failure in the context of 
the enterprise information system [Gavrilovska et al. 2002]. The recovery from these 
failures is only related to the software-based recovery without consideration of physical 
damage or the IS damage. This section extends the software-based recovery to the 
physical damage. The physical damage cannot usually be recovered with the software-
based approach; on the contrary, it needs extra resources, including computers, network 
devices, and human resources to recover. 
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6.5.2 Problem Definition 
 
6.5.2.1 Imbalanced situation and rebalancing solutions 
 
We consider a scenario that an enterprise information system is fully damaged. There are 
m functions in the system and n categories of resources to recover the functions. The 
number of resources j ( 1, 2, ,j n  ) needed for the recovery of function i ( 1, 2, ,i m  ) 
is denoted by ijr . The amount of resources for each category is limited. The process time 
needed for the recovery of function i is ip . We assume that functions are not recovered at 
the same time. This assumption implies that the recovery may take a particular order 
among a set of recovery tasks and the rebalancing solution of the whole enterprise 
information system depends on this recovery order. For function i, there is a completion 
time, denoted by ic . It is noted that the completion time ic  is different from the process 
time ip  in that the completion is the sum of the starting time for function i and its process 
time. The order of the recovery of different functions are denoted by S, which is 
represented by  
 (1), , ( ), , ( )S i m         (6.34) 
where ( )i  refers to the ith function to be recovered. Obviously, the completion time ic  is 
the function of S. Therefore, ic is further represented by ( )ic S . The required time for the 
recovery of function i is represented by id . 
 
We further consider that the enterprise information system is resilient, which means the 
system can be recovered from the imbalanced situation within the required time. 
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6.5.2.2 Measurement of resilience  
 
The enterprise information system need to be rebalanced within the required time from 
fully damaged situation with an order of recovery of different functions. Thus, axiom 3 
and its corresponding mathematical model should be applied; in particular, the resilience 
is described with a minimization of the rebalancing time.  
 
6.5.3 Mathematical Model 
 
6.5.3.1 Variable definition  
 
The variables are defined in Table 6.7. 
 
Table 6.7 Variable definition in measurement model for enterprise information system 
m : the total number of functions; 
n : the number of categories of resources; 
iw  : weight of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  , 
1
1
m
i
i
w

 ; 
ijr  : the number of resource j needed by the recovery of function i, 
1, 2, ,i m  , 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
jR  : the total number of resource j, 1, 2, ,j n  ; 
iP  : the process time for the recovery of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
S :  (1), (2), , ( ), , ( )i m  , sequence of recovery; 
( )iC S  : the completion time for the recovery of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
iT  : the required time for the recovery of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
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6.5.3.2 Objective function and constraints 
 
Min ( )
1
( )m i
i i i
C S
wT
  (6.35) 
s.t. (1) (1)C P  (6.36) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),0
, 1, 2, , ,
1, 2, , , 1
k
i k i i k i l j j
l
C C P r R j n
i m k m i
  

      
   

   


 (6.37) 
 ( ) ( ) , 1, 2, ,i iC S T i m    (6.38) 
 
In the above, Eq. (6.35) represents the minimization of the rebalancing time; Eq. (6.36) 
represents the completion time of the first function; Eq. (6.37) represents the resource 
constraints; Eq. (6.38) represents the constraint of recovery time. 
 
6.5.4 Solving the Model 
 
Since the model includes non-analytical constraints and the objective function cannot be 
computed analytically, the model may be solved by evolutionary algorithms. The genetic 
algorithm (GA) can be employed for solving the model. The entire algorithm has two 
layers of solvers, as shown in Fig. 6.15. The first layer contains GA which finds the best 
task recovery schedule or sequence and the second layer contains RS (Recovery 
Schedule) which computes the recovery schedule and completion time for each function. 
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Figure 6.15 Sketch of the two-layer algorithm 
There are two key issues in the implementation of the GA for this model, which are: (1) 
coding and (2) handling of the constraint (6.37). For the first issue, coding scheme is 
designed as  (1), (2), , ( ), , ( )i m  , where ( )i  represents a number between 1 and m. For 
the second issue, the solutions that do not satisfy constraint (6.37) will simply be 
abandoned in the iteration. 
 
The RS algorithm is designed as follows (given a sequence  (0), (1), , ( )v m  ): 
 
Step 1: Let (0) 0c  ,  (0), (1), , ( )v m  , (1), , 1, 2, ,j j jCT R r j n    , 1i  , 0p  , 
( ) ( )i ic p . 
Step 2: 1i i  , if i m , stop; else, go to Step 3. 
Step 3: If ( ), , 1i j jr CT j n    , go to Step 4; else go to Step 7. 
Step 4: ( ) ( )pvi ic c p  , ( ), , 1, 2, ,j j i jCT CT r j n    , k i . 
Step 5: If 
1k kv v
c c  , go to Step 6. 
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Step 6: kx v , 1k kv v  , 1kv x  , 1k k  . If k p , go to Step 2; else go to Step 5. 
Step 7: 1p p  , , , 1, 2, ,pj j v jCT CT r j n    , go to Step 3. 
 
In the RS algorithm, the definitions of ( )ic , ( )ip , ( ),i jr , jR are the same as those in Section 
3.1. jCT , p, k, x are temporary variables in the algorithm. 
 
6.5.5 Experiment 
 
To illustrate how the model and algorithm work, an example is employed. Table 6.8 
gives the information about function recovery for a particular enterprise information 
system. There are five functions in this system, which have been damaged by the outer 
attack. There are two categories of resources. The total number of resource 1 is 7; the 
total number of resource 2 is 10. All the functions are treated with the same importance 
and the weight for each function is 0.2 (equal weighting). 
 
Table 6.8 Recovery parameters 
Function Resource 1 ,1ir  Resource 2 ,2ir  iP (min) iT (min) 
i=1 2 3 2 7 
i=2 2 4 5 8 
i=3 4 3 3 8 
i=4 2 3 3 10 
i=5 3 4 4 10 
 
The original solution space has 120 solutions. The optimum solutions for this problem 
are:[1,2,4,5,3], [1,4,2,5,3], [2,1,4,5,3], [2,4,1,5,3], [4,1,2,5,3], [4,2,1,5,3], respectively. 
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All these solutions result in the same optimum recovery schedule and the same fitness 
value. According to the lower-layer algorithm RS, we can get the optimum recovery 
schedule, which is: (1) function 1, function 2 and function 4 are recovered first at the 
same time and will be completed after 2 minutes, 5 minutes and 3 minutes, respectively, 
(2) then, function 5 will be recovered immediately after the recovery of function 1 is 
completed and will be completed after another 4 minutes which indicates the total 
recovery time of function 5 is 6 minutes, and (3) last, function 3 will be recovered after 
the recovery of function 5 is completed and the total recovery time of function 3 is 8 
minutes. The fitness value of this optimal schedule is 0.5621. This result implies that the 
functions of the enterprise information system can be recovered within 56.21% of the 
required time. 
 
6.5.6 Conclusion 
 
This section uses an example of enterprise information system to validate the approach of 
resilience measurement. A mathematical model based on axiom 3 of the resilience 
measurement is formulated to minimize the rebalancing time. It is remarked that the 
proposed measure for resilience is similar to the production scheduling problem. 
However, the result of the example indicates that the optimum recovery schedule or 
sequence does not follow the shortest processing time (SPT) rule or earliest due-date 
(EDD) rule in the production scheduling problem [Baker and Trietsch 2009]. In fact, this 
does not come to a surprise, as there are two significant differences with these two 
problems. First, the SPT and EDD rules are only applicable to a single source scheduling 
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problem; whereas the resilience measurement problem is essentially a multiple resource 
scheduling problem. Second, the SPT or EDD schedule is optimal if the objective is to 
minimize the average flow time; whereas the resilience measurement problem not only 
considers the completion time for function recovery but also the required time. 
 
 
6.6 Conclusions 
 
This chapter proposed the axioms of the resilience measurement based on the definition 
of resilience in Chapter 5. Different mathematical models based on different axioms were 
presented. Two example systems, transportation system and enterprise information 
system, were used to validate the proposed methodology.  
 
In Section 6.4, the rebalancing solution of a transportation system only considered 
planning the substance of the system, e.g. flow pattern planning. In Section 6.5, the 
rebalancing solution of an enterprise information system only considered the resource 
reallocation for different recovery solutions. However, these rebalancing solutions may 
not always meet the resilience requirement of a service system, and other rebalancing 
solutions are necessary. For example, in an enterprise information system, the 
infrastructure reconfiguration is also an important means to recover the damaged 
functions. The next chapter will address this issue in the context of integrated design and 
operation of service systems. 
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CHPATER 7 
IMPROVEMENT OF RESILIENCE 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, improvement of the resilience performance of a service 
system simply means to generate a better rebalancing solution; in particular, from an 
engineering perspective, the rebalancing solutions focus on reconfiguration of resources. 
This chapter presents a methodology for improving the resilience property of a service 
system by (1) proposing a conceptual model as well as a mathematical model for 
reconfiguration of resources by integration of design, planning and management, and (2) 
developing algorithms to solve the mathematical model. Therefore, in Section 7.2, a 
conceptual model for integrated design, planning, and management of a service system 
for resilience is presented along with a general computational model. In Section 7.3, a 
specific model with its algorithms is presented. At last, conclusions are given in Section 
7.4. 
 
7.2 Integration Strategy of Resource Reconfiguration 
 
This section proposes a system level methodology of resource reconfiguration by 
integration of design, planning and management. 
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7.2.1 Design, Planning and Management 
 
First, three reconfiguration strategies, design, planning and management are defined.  
 
The design of a service system is defined as reconfiguration of infrastructure of the 
service system; in particular, it is meant to determine the parameters of the infrastructure, 
including the parameters of the nodes and arcs. Fig. 7.1 is an example of design as the 
rebalancing solution for a damaged wireless communication system in an imbalanced 
situation [sinonet 2012]. In Fig. 7.1, a wireless communication system was damaged due 
to a flood happened in Beijing in 2012 and it can not meet the demand of customers. 
Thus, one new node was built into the communication network by a temporary 
emergency wireless communication vehicle.  
 
Figure 7.1 Example of design in rebalancing solution  
(adopted from http://www.sinonet.org/news/china/2012-07-27/216300_2.html) 
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The planning of a service system is defined as reconfiguration of substance of the service 
system; in particular, it is meant to determine the parameters of the substance flows and 
how the substance flows over the infrastructure. Fig. 7.2 is an example of flow pattern 
planning with contraflow method as the rebalancing solution for a transportation system 
in an imbalanced situation in Houston during Hurricane Rita evacuation [Kim et al. 2007]. 
In Fig. 7.2, (a) is the network before contraflow and (b) is the network after contraflow.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Example of planning in rebalancing solution [Kim et al. 2007] 
The management of a service system is defined as reconfiguration of extra input 
resources which are used to reconfigure of infrastructure and substance; in particular, it is 
meant to determine (1) the parameters of extra resources input into the system, say task 1, 
and (2) the reconfiguration of these resources in IS and SS, say task 2. Task 1 is 
performed according to the difference between supply and demand. If a supply function 
does not meet the demand function, the corresponding resources to improve this supply 
function will be input into the system. Thus, task 1 determines the types of resources and 
the amounts of each type. Task 2 determines how to use the input resources, namely 
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configuration of these resources in IS and SS. Obviously, management is coupled with 
the other two reconfigurations, namely design and planning. Fig. 7.3 is an example of a 
school bus (input resource) was assigned to evacuate victims from forest fires in northern 
Saskatchewan in 2008 [CTV 2008].  
 
 
Figure 7.3 Example of evacuation management in rebalancing solution [CTV 2008, 
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20080703/fire_sask_080703/200
80703/] 
It is noted that the three definitions above use the term "reconfiguration", not 
configuration. The reason is that in a particular imbalanced situation, a service system has 
already been in a status that all the resources are configured and a rebalancing solution is 
generated by reconfiguring some resources. Fig. 7.4 summarizes an illustration of three 
reconfigurations. 
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Parameters of nodes
Parameters of arcs
determine
Parameters of patterns of 
substance flows over IS
Parameters of substance 
flows over IS
determine
Parameters of input resources
Configuration of input 
resources in IS and SS
determine
Design
Planning
Management
 
Figure 7.4 Design, planning and management 
 
7.2.2 Integration Framework 
 
A reconfiguration strategy on different resources is expressed into an integration 
framework, as shown in Figure 7.5.  
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IS
Design strategy
SS
Planning stragy
Management strategy
OutputInput
 
Figure 7.5 A framework of integration of design, planning and management 
In Figure 7.5, IS refers to the infrastructure system and SS refers to the substance system. 
The Input includes extra input resources and input information (demand functions). The 
out refers to the supply functions. Next, design, planning and management are given 
detailed definitions for a service system in the context of rebalancing solutions.  
 
Figure 7.5 implies that the rebalance of a service system to make the supply functions 
meet the demand functions has two options: (1) to reconfigure the resources within a 
service system, namely IS and SS, to improve the supplied functions, and (2) to 
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reconfigure both resources within the service system and extra resources from the input 
to improve the supply functions.  
 
Several remarks are given below for further explanation on the framework. 
 
Remark 1: Three types of resources are considered in the resilience analysis: IS, SS and 
input resources. 
 
Remark 2: Three types of reconfigurations are considered to increase the supply functions: 
design, planning and management.  
 
Remark 3: Three types of reconfigurations show the potential ability of resilience. The 
three types of reconfigurations may be performed separately or be performed 
simultaneously. It is noted that in the current literature, the three reconfigurations are 
usually examined separately. However, it is obvious that integration of them as a whole 
could improve resilience. 
 
Remark 4: The regular reconfiguration strategies, design, planning and management that 
work in a separate manner, could be viewed as the special cases of the integrated manner. 
Another three possible special cases of the integration framework are: integration of 
design and planning, integration of design and management, integration of planning and 
management. 
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7.2.3 Mathematical Model of Integration Strategy  
 
This section presents a general mathematical model to formulate the integration strategy 
of resource reconfiguration.  
 
7.2.3.1 Assumptions  
 
The model considers the integration of design, planning and management. As the goal of 
this model is to find the maximum ability of resilience, all the available input resources 
are used in the management strategy. Thus, task 1 of management (see definition in 
Section 7.2.1.1) is not considered. The assumptions of the model are given below. 
 
(1) Given a networked service system in an imbalanced situation. 
 
(2) Given required rebalancing time. 
 
(3) Three reconfiguration activities, namely design, planning and management 
approaches are considered in the rebalancing solution. 
 
(4) Multiple types of substance are considered in the substance system. 
 
(5) Given two types of extra input resources for design and planning respectively. 
 
7.2.3.2 Variable definition 
 
The variables of the model are given in Table 7.1 Note that the decision variables are: 
dx , px  and mx . 
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Table 7.1 Variable definition in the model of integration strategy 
 ,G N A  : directed network with N set of nodes and A set of arcs; 
m : the total number of functions; 
dn  : the category number of extra input resources for design; 
pn  : the category number of extra input resources for planning; 
iw  : weight of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ,
1
1
m
i
i
w

 ; 
1
,
k
i jr  
: the number of resource of category 1k needed by arc  ,i j  in 
design,  ,i j A , 1 1, 2, , dk n  ; 
2k
jr  
: the number of resource of category 2k needed by node j in 
planning, j N , 2 1, 2, , pk n  ; 
( )tiS x  : the supply function i at time t with rebalancing solution x, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
iT  : the required time for the rebalance of function i, 1, 2, ,i m  ; 
ijd  : design variable for arc ( , )i j A ; 
jd  : design variable for node j N ; 
Q : category number of substance 
ijp  : patterns of substance flow over ( , )i j A ; 
l
ijf  : amount of substance flow of type l over ( , ) , 1, ,i j A l Q   ; 
1k
ijr  : management variable for arc 1( , ) , 1, , di j A k n   ; 
2k
jr  : management variable for node 2, 1, , pj N k n   ; 
1dx  :  ( , )ijd i j A  , design variables for arcs in the network; 
2dx  :  jd j N  , design variables for nodes in the network; 
1px  :  ( , )ijp i j A  , planning variables for patterns of substance flows; 
2px  :  ( , ) , 1, ,lijf i j A l Q    , planning variables for amounts of substance 
flows; 
1mx  :  1 1( , ) , 1, ,kij dr i j A k n    , management variables for reconfiguration 
of input resources for design; 
2mx  :  2 2, 1, ,kj pr j N k n    , management variables for reconfiguration of 
input resources for planning;  
dx  : 1 2d dx x  , decision variable set for design; 
px  : 1 2 p px x , decision variable set for planning; 
mx  : 1 2m mx x  , decision variable set for management; 
x :  x   , ,d p mx x x , rebalancing solution 
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7.2.3.3 Objective function and constraints 
 
The objective is to maximize the supply functions.  
Max 
1
( )i
m
T
i i
i
w S x

  (7.1) 
s.t. x x  , ,d p mx x x , 1, 2, ,i m   (7.2) 
 1 2 d d dx x x  (7.3) 
 1dx  ( , )ijd i j A   (7.4) 
 2dx  jd j N   (7.5) 
 1px  ( , )ijp i j A   (7.6) 
 2px  ( , ) , 1, ,lijf i j A l Q     (7.7) 
 1 2 m m mx x x  (7.8) 
 1mx  1 1( , ) , 1, ,kij dr i j A k n     (7.9) 
 2mx  2 2, 1, ,kj pr j N k n     (7.10) 
  1, 0d d mg x x  (7.11) 
  2, , 0p d p mg x x x  (7.12) 
   0m mg x  (7.13) 
 
In the above, formula (7.1) represents the supply functions at the corresponding required 
rebalancing time. Eq. (7.2) represents the rebalancing solution is a function of design 
variables, planning variables and management variables. Eq. (7.3) represents design 
variable set consisting of two sets, one for arcs and the other one for nodes, which are 
further defined in Eq. (7.4) and (7.5), respectively. Eq. (7.6) and (7.7) represent the 
planning variables for patterns and amounts of substance flow. Eq. (7.8) represents 
management variable set consisting of two sets, the one for input resources for design and 
the other one for input resources for planning, which are further defined in Eq. (7.9) and 
(7.10), respectively. Formulas (7.11), (7.12) and (7.13) represent constraints for design, 
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planning and management, respectively; furthermore, these three formulas imply the 
coupling relationship among three decision variable sets, namely , ,d p mx x x .  
 
7.2.3.4 Discussion 
 
The proposed model contains multiple types of variables. The decision variables for 
design are discrete variables. If only one parameter level is considered, the design 
variables are binary variables; if multiple parameter levels are considered, the design 
variables are integer variables. The planning variables are continuous variables. The 
management variables depend on particular categories of input resources. If the resources 
are vehicles in a transportation system, the corresponding variable is a integer variable; if 
the resources are memory space in an enterprise information system, the corresponding 
variable is a continuous variable. 
 
The proposed model is a multiple layer optimization model. The design is a layer 
optimization problem, which contains the reconfiguration of IS and configuration of input 
resources for design. The planning is a two layer of optimization problem, which 
configures patterns and amounts of substance flows. The management is a layer of 
optimization problem, which configures resources for design and planning. Therefore, the 
model generally has four layers of optimization process, which requires heavy 
computational efforts. 
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7.3 Validation Case of Transportation System 
 
This section applies the proposed methodology to improve the resilience of a 
transportation system. 
 
7.3.1 Problem Definition 
 
The scenario is that one place is in a dangerous area (single source) where there are a few 
categories of victims who are to be evacuated. There are also a few different categories of 
safe places to which the victims are to be sent. A transportation network lies in between 
the source and destinations; in particular, the transportation system is partially damaged 
in an emergency condition. The demand of evacuating the victims is much larger than the 
regular transportation demand between the source and destinations. Therefore, the 
transportation system functioning with a regular manner cannot meet the demand, which 
leads to an imbalanced situation of the system. The general features of the transportation 
systems are the same as those in Section 6.4.1. Next, the details of the evacuation 
demands and rebalancing solution are explained.   
 
7.3.1.1 Evacuation demands  
 
The victims on the source place are ranged into different categories based on their 
characteristics. The destination places are also classified into different categories 
according to the categories of the victims they receive. We label the different categories 
of victims with different evacuation priorities. Different categories of victims have 
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different evacuation demands, as shown in Fig. 7.6: (1) the victims of the same category 
will be evacuated to the corresponding destinations; for instance, the victims who are 
injured need to be sent to the hospital and the victims without injury need to be sent to 
normal residence places, and (2) the victims with higher priority will be evacuated 
earlier; for example, the injured victims need to be evacuated first. 
Source
1
2
3
4
5
6
First category 
destinations
Second category 
destinations
First category 
victims
Second category 
victims
 
Figure 7.6 Demands of victims of different categories 
7.3.1.2 Rebalancing solution with integration of design, planning and management  
 
Integration strategy of design, planning and management is adopted in the transportation 
system to create an optimal rebalancing solution.  
 
(1) Management. Two categories of input resources are considered in the management 
strategy: one category for design of new lanes and one category for contraflow 
implementation. The total amounts of two categories are limited. The configuration of 
two input resources is coupled with design and planning. 
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(2) Design. Re-constructing new lanes into the infrastructure is considered in the design 
strategy. We consider the re-construction of roads as restricted by the following 
conditions: (1) only limited lanes can be added into a remaining damaged transportation 
network and each new lane need a fixed amount of resource, (2) each new lane i->j falls 
into the edge domain of the original transportation network, (3) the travel time of the new 
lane i->j is the same as the original travel time tij of the lane i->j in the original 
transportation network, and (4) the capacity of each new lane is a constant. 
 
(3) Planning. There are two tasks in the planning. One task is to determine the flow 
pattern of the network. The other task is to determine the amount of flows of different 
categories over each edges. The definition and expression of flow pattern has been given 
in Section 6.4. To meet the demand to transport the different categories of victims, we 
need to plan the flow pattern first for the victims of the first category, and then for the 
victims of the second category, and so on. If there are Q categories of victims, the 
planning of the flow pattern will be divided into Q periods. During the kth period, the kth 
category has the highest priority to use the transportation network; furthermore, the other 
categories will be evacuated concurrently when there is extra transportation capacity. In 
this case, there will be Q flow patterns of the transportation network during the 
evacuation process, as shown in Fig. 7.7. Usually, the best flow patterns for the victims of 
different categories are different, so the flow pattern planning is dynamic. The flow 
pattern for the kth category of victims in the kth period should not be changed during the 
time that the victims of the kth category are being evacuated. To make use of the 
transportation network adequately, during the kth period of the evacuation process, 
164 
 
besides evacuating the kth category victims, the victims whose priorities are less than the 
kth category are also evacuated whenever possible. Furthermore, the setup time and 
required resource for implementation are considered in contraflow. It is supposed that the 
resource required to implement contraflow on one road is fixed. Thus, the total number of 
roads with contraflow is limited due the constraint of input resource. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Dynamic flow patterns during the whole evacuation process 
7.3.1.3 Objectives of the problem  
 
The general goal of the problem is to find the optimal rebalancing solution, namely to 
minimize the total evacuation time (TET). Section 6.4.3 has given definition of total 
evacuation time. However, the setup time for contraflow has not been considered in the 
evacuation model in Section 6.4.3. The reason is that it is difficult to estimate the setup 
time in practice. In this problem, flow patterns change with respect to different categories 
of victims during the whole evacuation process. This implies that setup time changes 
from one flow pattern to another. Therefore, this problem has two specific objectives: (1) 
to minimize the total evacuation time, and (2) to minimize the setup time for flow 
patterns. It is noted that the two objectives have a conflict, as the first objective 
essentially requires changing the flow pattern, which thus increases setup time, while the 
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second objective is in favor of no change of the flow pattern. Therefore, this problem is a 
multiple objective optimization problem.  
 
7.3.2 Mathematical Model 
 
Similar with expression in Section 6.4.3, the flow pattern of road connecting place i and 
place j during the k-th period can be expressed by  ,k kij jix x ; in particular the four states of 
the road are represented by  ,k kij jix x  as shown in Fig. 7.8. The flow pattern of the roads 
associated with source place and destination places are also predefined as in Section 6.4.3 
(Fig. 6.8). It should be noted that when the flow pattern for the victims of the first 
category is planned, only the destinations of the first category are regarded as the 
destinations, and the destinations for the victims of the other categories are regarded as 
the common places. 
  
 ,k kij jix x
 
 
Figure 7.8 Domain of the variable of the flow patterns on a single road 
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The individual evacuation time of one evacuee (ETi , where i stands for this evacuee) is 
defined the same as that in Section 6.4.3. The total evacuation time of the kth category 
victims (TETk) is defined as a period of time from the moment when the first evacuee of 
the first category leaves from a source node to the moment when the last evacuee of the 
kth category arrives at a destination node. Based on these definitions, a horizontal 
coordinate is added to Fig. 7.7, resulting in Fig. 7.9. 
 
 
Figure 7.9 Dynamic flow patterns with horizontal coordinate 
The first objective function is to minimize the total evacuation time. Fig. 7.9 shows that 
the total evacuation time of all the victims is the total evacuation of category Q, namely 
TETQ.  
 
The second objective function is to minimize the setup time of contraflow. It is noted that 
setup time is proportional to the number of lanes that need to be reversed. Therefore, 
minimization of setup time equals minimization of the total number of lanes to be 
reversed. The second objective function can thus be expressed by  
1
( , )
, 1, ,k kij ij
i j A
x x k Q
 
                                       (7.14) 
where   denotes ‘XOR’ operation; that is, 1k kij ijx x   means lane ijx needs to be reversed 
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for the kth category. 
 
7.3.2.1 Variable definition  
 
The variables are defined in Table 7.2. The decision variables of the model are:  ijk tf , 
 ,k kij jix x  and kijz . 
 
Table 7.2 Variable definition in resilience improvement model for transportation system 
 ,G N A  : directed network with N set of nodes and A set of arcs (static network); 
m N  : number of elements in set N ; 
n A  : number of elements in set A; 
ijc  : capacity of arc  ,i j ; 
ij  : travel time of arc    , , ,i j i j A  ; 
ia  : node capacity (the maximum number of evacuees who can stay in node i); 
s : source node; 
Q : initial number of evacuees in node s; 
kq  : the initial number of evacuees of kth category in node s, 1, ,k Q  ; 
 pred i  :   | ,j j i A  , predecessors of node i; 
 succ i  :   | ,j i j A  , successors of node i; 
Dk : the set of destinations that receive the evacuees of kth category, 
1,2, ,k Q  ; 
D : the set of destinations, , 1,2, ,kD D k Q   ; 
T : required total evacuation time;  ,T T TG N A  : the time expansion of  ,G N A  over a time horizon T; 
TN  :   | ; 0,1, ,i t i N t T    ; 
TA  : set of arcs over a time horizon T; 
d : the super destination node; 
 ijk tf  : flow (number of evacuees) of kth category that leave node i at time t and reach node j at time ijt  , , , 1, ,i j N k Q    ; 
( 1)iy t   : ( ), ( 1),1 , , 0, ,
Q
i t i t k
k
f i N t T
     , represents the number of evacuees 
who prefer to stay in the node i at time t for at least one unit time; 
k
ijx  : the state of flow from i to j on the arc (i,j) during the kth period, 
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1, ,k Q  ; 
 ,k kij jix x  : flow pattern between the node i and j during the kth period, 1, ,k Q  ; 
k
ijz  : add one lane i->j, which capacity is cn, to arc (i,j) during the kth period,  ,i j A , 1, ,k Q  ; 
dr  :  required amount resource for adding one lane; 
dR  : total amount of input resources for design; 
pr  : required amount of resource for implementation of contraflow in one 
road;  
pR  : total amount of input resources for flow pattern planning; 
cn : the capacity of a new lane. 
 
 
7.3.2.2 Objective functions and constraints 
 
The objective functions and constraints are given below. 
 
min 1 QF TET  (7.15) 
min 
1
( , )
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  0 0,  ,iy i N i s     (7.28) 
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  1, 0, 1, ,, ,k ksi isx x k Qs i A      (7.32) 
   , 1, ,1, 0, ,k kij ji k k Qx x i j D       (7.33) 
  0 1, ,ij Ax i j    (7.34) 
 
In the above, Eq. (7.15) represents the first objective that is to minimize the total 
evacuation time. Eq. (7.16) represents the second objective to minimize the total number 
of lanes that need the contraflow operation. Eq. (7.17) represents that TETk is the total 
evacuation time of the kth category victims. Eq. (7.18) represents the evacuation 
priorities of victims of different categories. Eq. (7.19) re                               
presents that kijx  is a 0-1 variable. Eq. (7.20) represents that kijx  is the opposite of kijx . Eq. 
(7.21) represents the design variable kijz  is a 0-1 variable. Eq. (7.22) represents that kijz  is 
the opposite of kijz . Eq. (7.23) represents the constraint of input resources for design. Eq. 
(7.24) represents the constraint of input resources for contraflow. Eq. (7.25) represents 
the numbers of different categories of victims that are needed to be evacuated from the 
source node. Eq. (7.26) represents that the victims of kth category are all evacuated to the 
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destination nodes in kD . Eq. (7.27) is to calculate how many victims of different 
categories stay in node i at time t. Eq. (7.28) represents that there are no victims in the 
nodes, except the source node. Eq. (7.29) represents that there are no victims in the 
destination nodes, which is because of the use of super destination node. Eq. (7.30) 
represents the constraint of the node capacity. Eq. (7.31) represents the constraint of the 
arc capacity during the kth period. Eq. (7.32) represents the flow pattern of the roads 
associated with the source node s. Eq. (7.33) represents the flow pattern of the roads 
associated with the sink nodes during the kth period. Eq. (7.34) represents the initial flow 
patterns. 
 
7.3.3 Solving the Model 
 
7.3.3.1 Analysis of the mathematical model 
 
The model has several features. First, the model is a multi-period optimization model. For 
a situation with Q categories of victims, the model is a Q-period optimization model. In 
each period, there are two objective functions. The first objective function is to minimize 
the total evacuation time, and the second objective function is to minimize the difference 
between a flow pattern and the last flow pattern. Second, the decision variables in the 
model are  ijk tf ,  ,k kij jix x  and kijz , which are determined through three optimization 
layers: (1) one layer for kijz , (2) one layer for  ,k kij jix x , and (3) one layer for  ijk tf . Third, 
it is obvious that in each evacuation period, the first objective function relates to the 
number of different categories of victims and the flow patterns, and the second objective 
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function relates to the (k-1)th and kth flow patterns. The study in Section 6.4 
demonstrated that there is more than one flow pattern that achieves the minimum total 
evacuation time. Therefore, among all the flow patterns that optimize the first objective 
function, there must be one that has the minimum value of 2 ( )F k . Such a solution is the 
Pareto optimal solution according to the definition of the Pareto optimal solution. This 
observation leads to the algorithm for this two-objective model, which is presented in 
details in the following sections.  
 
7.3.3.2 Sketch of the proposed method 
 
The proposed method to solve the model (i.e., Eqs. (7.15)-(7.34)) is an algorithm with 
three layers (upper layer algorithm, middle layer algorithm and lower layer algorithm) 
which are further coupled, as shown in Fig. 7.10. In each round of iteration, the upper 
layer algorithm will need to call the middle layer algorithm, and the middle layer 
algorithm will need to call the lower layer algorithm. The lower layer algorithm, called 
priority-based minimum cost multicommodity flow (P-MCMF) algorithm, is to seek the 
minimum flow time for multicommodities given a flow pattern. The middle layer 
algorithm called three-pattern particle swarm optimization (TPSO) is a novel discrete 
version of PSO for multi-objective optimization which is to find a Pareto optimal flow 
pattern in a given designed transportation network. The upper layer algorithm is to find 
the best design result for the imbalanced transportation network, and it takes an iterative 
algorithm (IA), for the solution space is limited due to the constraint of resources for 
design. The three layer algorithm will be discussed in detail in the following. 
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Upper Layer: IA
Middle Layer: TPSO
Call TPSO Return flow pattern
Lower Layer: P-MCMF
Call P-MCMF Return evacuation time
 
Figure 7.10 Sketch of the three layer algorithm 
7.3.3.3 Lower layer algorithm 
 
The lower layer algorithm is designed to solve the evacuation time optimization problem 
in the model, which is, in essence, a problem of a minimum cost multicommodity flow 
with priorities. This problem has been studied in the operations research area, and there 
are many algorithms developed [Wang 2003], for example, basis partitioning method 
[Farvolden  et al 1993], resource-directive method [Geoffrion 1970], price-directive 
method [Barahona and Anbil 2000], primal-dual method [Polak 1992], approximation 
method [Fleischer 2000], interior-point method [Goffin et al. 1992], convex 
programming method [Nagamochi et al. 1990], and heuristics [Barnhart 1993]. However, 
two issues remain if these algorithms are used for our model: (1) the existing 
multicommodity minimum cost flow algorithm is designed for static network with no 
restriction of the node capacity; and (2) the existing minimum cost multicommodity flow 
algorithm is designed without consideration of priorities. 
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The first issue can be easily resolved by converting the original traffic network into a 
time expanded network (TEN). For the second issue, because there are different priorities 
in different categories of victims and the flow pattern can not be changed during one 
period, the flow pattern optimization has to be taken as a multi-period problem. During 
one period, the optimization of the evacuation time is similar with the minimum cost flow 
problem. Nevertheless, we still cannot use any existing minimum cost flow algorithm 
directly as the lower layer algorithm, for the following reasons: (1) more than one 
category of victims may need to be evacuated to some safe destinations; and (2) The 
victims of different categories have different priorities. Therefore, a priority-based 
minimum cost multicommodity flow (P- MCMF) algorithm is designed as the lower layer 
algorithm.  
 
The main ideas of the P-MCMF algorithm are: (1) during the kth period of the evacuation 
process, all the kth category victims are evacuated as soon as possible, which has the 
same function as any existing minimum cost flow algorithm, (2) at the same time the 'k th 
'( 1, , )k k Q    categories are evacuated as much as possible. This second idea further 
means that the transportation network may have an ability to evacuate 'k th 
'( 1, , )k k Q    categories of victims when evacuating kth category victim. The detail of 
the P-MCMF algorithm is expressed in Fig. 7.11. 
 
From the lower layer algorithm we can get 'kTET and '
' '( 1, , )
k
q k k Q   . Here ''kq  refers 
to the number of 'k th category '( 1, , )k k Q    victims that have not been evacuated 
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after the kth period. It is obvious that 'kq  is not larger than kq , and 
'
kTET  can be 
expressed by Eq. (7.34). 
 
'
1k k kTET TET TET                                                                    (7.34) 
The block “Update TEN” has two operations: updating the capacity matrix and updating 
the destination nodes. It should be noted that MCF-I and MCF-II are different. MCF-I is 
an existing classic minimum cost flow algorithm, for example the dual ascent algorithm, 
which is used to evacuate kth category victims whose number is 'kq  and get the total 
evacuation time TET. MCF-II is to calculate the numbers of victims of 'k th category 
'( 1, , )k k Q    that can be evacuated during the kth period. The differences between 
MCF-I and MCF-II are: (1) there is a vector in MCF-II, labelled as existf , to record the 
flows that have been on the transportation network, which means the capacity of the 
edges decrease; (2) the maximum time in MCF-II, namely the number of time unit of the 
time expanded network (TEN), is fixed which equals to TET got by MCF-I, and MCF-II 
is to calculate the numbers of victims of 'k th category '( 1, , )k k Q    that can be 
evacuated within the maximum time. 
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Dynamic Network
Time Expanded Network 
(TEN)
index=k
Call MCF-I
index++
Update TENindex>Q?
return '' ' '( 1, , ), kkq k k Q TET  
Call MCF-II
N
Y
'
' ', , , ( , , )kij kT k x q k k Q 
 
Figure 7.11 Flow chart of P-MCMF algorithm  
7.3.3.4 Middle layer algorithm 
 
The middle layer algorithm, namely three-pattern particle swarm optimization (TPSO) 
algorithm, is used to solve the flow pattern planning problem in the model, which is the 
key part in the whole method. The TPSO is designed by adding different particle flying 
patterns and novel fitness evaluation method into the standard PSO, which fits the 
multiple-objective optimization of our model.  
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As discussed above, the flow pattern problem is much different from the traditional 
discrete optimization problem. It is a discrete variable multiple-objective optimization 
problem; in particular, the first objective has higher priority than the second objective. 
We design a discrete version three-pattern PSO algorithm by adding the following four 
measures into the standard PSO: (1) three flying patterns: every particle has three 
different flying patterns, namely standard pattern, dimension-decreasing pattern and 
dimension-increasing pattern, respectively; (2) memory of multi-objective information: 
when flying, the particles consider the two different objectives at the same time, instead 
of only one objective in the standard PSO, and each particle decides its flying patterns in 
each iteration according to the two fitness values; (3) synchronous procedure for fitness 
evaluation: in each iteration, a particle is evaluated immediately after it has been updated, 
instead of after the whole swarm has been updated; (4) self-adaptive control mechanism 
for time horizon T: time horizon T, namely the required total evacuation time, as the 
upper bound of total travel time, is updated by the latest TET got by far, which has 
important effect on the running time of the algorithm. 
 
The key point of the TPSO is the three particle flying patterns. The standard pattern 
enables the particles with the exploration ability, i.e. the global searching ability; the 
dimension-decreasing pattern and dimension-increasing pattern, which in essence are two 
local searching methods, enable the particles with an exploitation ability. With suitable 
parameters, the TPSO algorithm will has a good balance between exploration and 
exploitation. 
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A problem in the optimization of this model is that the evaluation of the first kind of 
objective function is a complicated process which needs much more running time than 
traditional fitness evaluation. The measures (3) and (4) mentioned above, namely the 
synchronous procedure for fitness evaluation and self-adaptive control mechanism for 
time horizon T, are adapted to solve this problem. The average running time of the 
algorithm is reduced to a relative low level.  
 
There are four key steps for the implementation of the TPSO and they are:  encoding, 
fitness evaluation, update of the particle swarm, and stop criterion. The encoding step is 
the same with that in Section 6.4.4.2. The other three steps along with the whole 
procedure of the TPSO are given as follows. 
 
(1) Fitness evaluation  
 
A. Memory of multi-objective information. 
In standard PSO, the best position and the corresponding best fitness value of a particle 
and those of the whole swam should be recorded, and whether the position the particle is 
the best is evaluated by only one objective function. But in TPSO, each particle must be 
evaluated by two objective functions. Among the particles that achieve the minimum 
value of the first objective function, the one that gets minimum value of the second 
objective function will be regarded as the best particle of the swarm and represented by 
symbol g. The same rule is taken to decide the best previous position of ith particle, 
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which is also recorded as 1( , , , , )i i id iDp p p  p , and the corresponding value of the two 
objective functions are recorded as 1bestf  and 2bestf .  
 
B. Synchronous procedure for fitness evaluation. 
In standard PSO, the evaluation procedure is as follows. All the particles in the swarm are 
updated first, and after that all the particles are evaluated. During the evaluation, the best 
particle so far is indicated with symbol g. It is obvious that the best position of swarm get 
so far will be kept the same during the update process of the whole swarm. This kind of 
fitness evaluation can be called as asynchronous procedure, because all the particles are 
updated under the same global best position. But there is a problem here, which is during 
the update process when a particle, say particle i, get better position than pg, the particle 
will not be labelled as g, for evaluation is not performed. As a result, the new best global 
position will not affect the update of the particle i+1 to particle m in this iteration. For a 
normal optimization problem, there is not much difference here. But for our problem, it is 
different. The evaluation of the first objective should be as less as possible, because the 
evaluation of the first objective is an optimization process which will cost much more 
time than the computation of a regular function. So it will be better that the new best 
global position affects the update of the other particles immediately after it is obtained.  
 
Based on the reason above, the synchronous evaluation procedure is designed as follows. 
In each iteration, particle i will be evaluated right after it has been updated, and it will be 
labelled as g if it get better position than Pg.  
 
179 
 
C. Self-adaptive control mechanism for time horizon T.  
The time horizon T, namely required total evacuation time, is used as the bound of total 
travel time and transferred to P-MCMF by TPSO to get total evacuation time. T is used to 
establish the time expanded network. In our problem, the dynamic network with X nodes 
will result in a static network with X(T+1)+1 nodes. Since the running time of P-MCMF 
is the increasing function of the size of network, the value of T is very important for the 
running time of the whole method. Obviously T is much larger than the total evacuation 
time of higher priorities of victims, which will result in a relative long running time. To 
solve this problem, we designed a self-adaptive control mechanism for time horizon T, 
which is as follows. In each iteration, T is updated by the 1bestf  of the global best position 
Pg. 1bestf  is the minimum total evacuation time so far, with which we can get the smallest 
size of the time expanded network.  
 
(2) Update of the particle swarm 
 
Update of the particle swarm, namely the flying patterns of the particles in the searching 
space, is the key of the TPSO algorithm. Here we will introduce the detail of three 
particle flying patterns. 
 
A. Standard pattern 
The standard pattern implements the basic idea of PSO algorithm  and is the same with 
that in Section 6.4.4.2, which enables a particle with the potential ability to searching the 
whole solution space. 
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B. Dimension-decreasing pattern 
The dimension-decreasing pattern comes from the following idea. For the particles who 
have got the best fitness value of the first objective, namely 1bestf , whether the 
components of the position vectors resulting in the change of flow pattern are necessary. 
If not, which means that the number of dimensions of the position vector different with 
the position corresponding with the latest flow pattern decrease, then the second objective 
function will get less value. So the dimension-decreasing update pattern is a local 
searching method, whose purpose is to find the better value of the second objective 
function based on the current optimal value of the first objective function. 
 
Suppose the position vector related to the flow pattern in last period is represented as 
Xlast, then particle i will perform the dimension-decreasing pattern as the procedure in Fig. 
7.12. 
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Figure 7.12 Flow chart of dimension-decreasing pattern   
The symbol D in Fig. 7.12 represents the number of dimensions of the searching space, 
namely the component number of the position vector of a particle. It should be noted that, 
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since the dimension-decreasing pattern is to find better value of the second objective 
function for the particles that have got the 1bestf , the other particles without 1bestf  will not 
perform this flying pattern and just stay in its latest position. The purpose of this 
regulation is to avoid useless fitness evaluations which result in extra running time of the 
algorithm. 
 
Two parameters, ‘dim_de_out’ and ‘dim_de_in’, are preset to control the start and the end 
of the dimension-decreasing pattern. When 1bestf  keeps stable for ‘dim_de_out’ iterations, 
the swarm will update with the dimension-decreasing pattern. After the swarm flying 
with the dimension-decreasing pattern, when 2bestf , namely the corresponding second 
fitness value of the current optimal position vector, keeps stable for ‘dim_de_in’ 
iterations, the swarm will end the dimension-decreasing flying pattern and re-enter the 
standard flying pattern. 
 
C. Dimension-increasing pattern 
The dimension-increasing pattern is the opposite way of the dimension-decreasing. The 
purpose of dimension-increasing pattern is to find better value of the first objective 
basing the optimal position so far, through the way of changing the components of the 
position vector of the current optimal particle which are the same as those of Xlast, which 
means that the number of dimensions of the position vector different from Xlast increases 
and as a result, the second objective function will get a larger value. The dimension-
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increasing update pattern is another local searching method. The way of changing the 
components of the position vector of the current optimal particle also follows the 
updating formula for the standard pattern. 
 
Our experience from the experiments shows that comparing with the dimension-
decreasing method, it is relative more difficult for a particle to find a better 1bestf  with the 
dimension-increasing pattern than with the dimension-increasing pattern. So in this 
pattern, all the particles in the swarm will move to the optimal position and perform the 
dimension-increasing update pattern, which is different from the dimension-decreasing 
pattern. 
 
Suppose the position vector related to the flow pattern in the last period is represented as 
Xlast, and the optimal position vector so far is kgp . Then particle i will perform the 
dimension-increasing pattern as shown in Fig. 7.13. 
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Figure 7.13 Flow chart of dimension-increasing pattern   
 
It is obvious that the particle swarm considers entering the dimension-increasing pattern 
only after it finishes the dimension-decreasing pattern and has obtained the minimum 
second fitness value of the current 1bestf . So three parameters, ‘dim_in_out’, ‘dim_in_in’ 
and ‘flag’, are used to control the start and the end of the dimension-increasing pattern. 
‘flag’ is a Boolean variable, which memorizes whether the swarm has experienced the 
dimension-decreasing pattern under the current 1bestf . ‘dim_in_out’ and ‘dim_in_in’ are 
preset, which perform the similar function with ‘dim_de_out’, ‘dim_de_in’. When ‘flag’ 
is true and 1bestf  keeps stable for ‘dim_in_out’ iterations, the swarm will enter the 
dimension-decreasing pattern. After the swarm flying with the dimension-increasing 
185 
 
pattern, when 2bestf  keeps stable for ‘dim_in_in’ iterations, the swarm will end the 
dimension-increasing flying pattern and re-enter the standard flying pattern. 
 
(3) Stop criterion 
 
A positive integer NG is taken as the maximum iteration number. If the iteration number 
k is greater than NG, the algorithm is stopped. NG is set based on the trial-and-error for a 
particular problem. 
 
(4) Procedure of TPSO 
 
The entire procedure of the algorithm has the following steps. 
 
Step 1: Set NG, 0c , 1c , 2c , dim_de_out, dim_de_in, dim_in_out and dim_in_in. Initialize 
a swarm including m particles with random positions inside the encoding space. *x  is the 
best position. 1bestf  is the best first fitness value and 2bestf  is the corresponding second 
fitness value. Let Counter1=0, Counter2=0, Counter3=0, Counter4=0, flag=false, Iter=0. 
 
Step 2: Call P-MCMF algorithm to evaluate the first fitness of each particle. That the 
index of the one gets the best first fitness is set as g. The position and fitness values of the 
particle g are used to update *x , 1bestf  and 2bestf .  
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Step 3: If iter>NG, the algorithm ends; else if flag=false, then go to Step 4; if flag=true, 
then go to Step 8. 
 
Step 4: If Counter1< dim_de_out, then update the swarm with the standard pattern and 
evaluate the swarm in the synchronous procedure; else go to Step 6. 
 
Step 5: If 1 1( )g bestf x f , then let * 1 1 2 2, ( ), ( )g best g best gx x f f x f f x    and go to Step 3; 
else counter1++ and go to Step 3. 
 
Step 6: If Counter2<dim_de_in, then update the swarm with the dimension-decreasing 
pattern, and go to Step 7; else let flag=true, Counter1=0, Counter2=0, and go to Step 3. 
 
Step 7:If 1 1( )g bestf x f , then let * 1 1 2 2, ( ), ( )g best g best gx x f f x f f x   , Counter1=0, and go 
to Step 3; if 1 1( )g bestf x f  and 2 2( )g bestf x f , then let * 2 2, ( )g best gx x f f x   and go to 
Step 3; else counter2++ and go to Step 3. 
 
Step 8: If Counter3< dim_in_out, then update the swarm with the standard pattern and 
evaluate the swarm in the synchronous procedure; else go to Step 10. 
 
Step 9: If 1 1( )g bestf x f , then let * 1 1 2 2, ( ), ( )g best g best gx x f f x f f x    and go to Step 3; 
else counter3++ and go to Step 3.  
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Step 10: If Counter4<dim_in_in, then update the swarm with the dimension-increasing 
pattern, and go to Step 11; else let flag=false, Counter3=0, Counter4=0, and go to Step 3. 
 
Step 11: If 1 1( )g bestf x f and 2p best pr f R , then let * 1 1 2 2, ( ), ( )g best g best gx x f f x f f x   , 
Counter3=0, and go to Step 3; else counter4++ and go to Step 3. 
 
7.3.3.5 Upper layer algorithm  
 
The upper layer algorithm is to find the best design result by adding new lanes to some 
edge in the damaged transportation network. Due to the constraint of input resources for 
design, usually very limited new lanes can be designed. Therefore, the solution space is 
limited, and an iterative enumeration algorithm can be taken as the upper layer algorithm, 
which is illustrated in Fig. 7.14. At the beginning, TETk are set as the required total 
evacuation time T. The block “Update and TETk” is according to the Eq. (7.34). 
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Figure 7.14 Iterative algorithm 
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7.3.4 Experiment 
 
7.3.4.1 Experimental setting  
 
Fig. 7.15 illustrates an original transportation system which has seven places. The 
capacity of each place is represented by a bracket “{}”; for example, the capacity of Place 
1 is 120 (Fig. 7.15). Further in Fig. 13, the “-” in the bracket adjacent to Place 6 and Place 
7 means that Place 6 and 7 are the shelters (i.e., their capacities are unlimited). The road 
and edge are expressed by connection between places (Fig. 7.15). Both capacity and 
travel time of the edge are indicted on the arc by a parenthesis “( )”; for example, Edge 1-
>2 has travel time 2 and capacity 1, and Edge 2->1 has travel time 2 and capacity 2 (Fig. 
7.15). The time unit in the example is minute which is omitted in the following 
paragraphs. 
 
1
3
2
5
4
7
6
(1,2)
(1,2)
(4,1)
(4,3)
(1,2)
(1,3)
(1,2)
(1,5)
(1,1) (1,2)
(1,1)
(1,2)
(2,2)
(2,1)
(1,1) (1,2)
{15} {10}
{10}{15}
{-}
{-}
{120} (3,2) (3,2)
(travel time, arc capacity)
{node capacity}
 
 Figure 7.15 The original transportation system 
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The transportation system is in an imbalanced situation as follows; (1) one edge (4->5) is 
damaged, and (2) some victims need to be evacuated from a dangerous place to two safe 
places.  As shown in Fig. 7.16, Place 1 is the source node, and Place 6 and 7 are two sink 
nodes. Place 1 has two categories of victims, the number of the victims in the first 
category is 15 and the number in the second category is 93. The first category must be 
evacuated to Place 6 and the second category must be evacuated to Place 7.  
 
 
Figure 7.16 Damaged transportation system  
(the source node is 1; the destination node for 1st category is 6 and for 2nd category is 7 ) 
There are two categories of input resources are managed for design and flow pattern 
planning. These resources are further subject to the following constraints.  
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(1) The resource for design is only enough to add one new lane on the system during one 
time period and the resource is reusable. The new lane falls into the edge domain of the 
original transportation system. The travel time of the new lane i->j is the same as the 
original travel time tij of the edge i->j in the original transportation network. The capacity 
of the new lane is 2.  
 
(2) The resource for flow pattern planning is enough to setup contraflow on 8 roads and 
the resource is reusable.  
 
Regarding flow pattern planning, according to the constraint equations (7.32) and (7.33), 
we have already known that the flow patterns for edge (1,2), (1,3), (4,6), (6,7) during the 
first evacuation period should be ones as shown in Fig. 7.17, and the flow patterns for 
edge (1,2), (1,3), (5,7), (6,7) during the second evacuation period should be ones as 
shown in Fig. 7.18. This implies that these edges are no longer a decision variable. 
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Figure 7.17 Predefined transportation network for category 1 
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Figure 7.18 Predefined transportation network for category 2 
In the experiment, we consider four different rebalancing solutions: (1) damaged 
transportation network without any reconfiguration strategy, as shown in Fig. 7.16; (2) 
predefined networks in which the flow patterns of those edges connecting from the 
source node to the destination nodes are set as those in Fig. 7.17 and Fig. 7.18; (3) 
transportation network with planning strategy; (4) transportation network with integrated 
reconfiguration strategy. 
 
In our method to solve this problem, we have the following settings: the swarm size in 
TPSO, m=5; the maximum iteration number in TPSO, NG=10, the inertia weight in PSO, 
  decreases linearly from 0.8 to 0.2. The whole method is programmed with java and the 
experiment is performed on a computer with a dual-1.66GHz CPU and a 1.5GB memory. 
The algorithm runs 50 times. 
 
193 
 
7.3.4.2 Results and discussion  
 
The performance of the 4 rebalancing solutions settings is listed in Table 7.3. The optimal 
solution with planning strategy for the victims of the 1st category and the 2nd category are 
shown, respectively, in Fig. 7.19 and Fig. 7.20. With the optimal planning strategy, the 
total evacuation time of 1st category is 7, and the total evacuation time of 2nd category is 
25. Therefore, for both categories of victims, their evacuation performances are much 
better than those of the damaged network and predefined network. 
 
Table 7.3 Results of different rebalancing solutions 
 1st Category 2nd Category 
 TET1 TET2 
Damaged network 11 58 
Predefined network 9 43 
Flow pattern planning 7 25 
Integrated strategy 6 21 
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Figure 7.19 The optimal solution with flow pattern planning for the 1st category victim 
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Figure 7.20 The optimal solution with flow pattern planning for the 2nd category victim  
For the integrated reconfiguration strategy, during the 1st period the optimal design is 
found to add a new lane 2->4. The optimal flow pattern under this design is shown in Fig. 
7.19. During the 2nd period, the optimal design is found to add a new lane 1->3. The 
optimal flow pattern under this design is shown in Fig. 7.20. We can see that under this 
integrated reconfiguration strategy, the total evacuation time of 1st category is 6, and the 
total evacuation time of 2nd category is 21. Comparing with the results obtained from the 
damaged network, predefined flow pattern network and network with planning strategy, 
the rebalancing solution with integrated reconfiguration strategy can reduce the total 
evacuation time by 60.34%, 46.51%, and 16%, respectively. It should be noted that in an 
emergency situation the first category victims may be serious ill people and the saving of 
time means the increasing of the surviving probability. 
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Figure 7.21 The optimal solution with integration strategy for the 1st category victim. 
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Figure 7.22 The optimal solution with integration strategy for the 2nd category victim. 
 
It is noted that the in the three layer method, the upper layer algorithm and the lower 
layer algorithm are deterministic algorithms, and the middle layer algorithm, TPSO, is a 
random searching algorithm, which means that to test the stability and success rate of the 
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method, we only need to test the TPSO algorithm. The best parameters of the TPSO 
algorithm is as stated in Section 7.3.4.2, under which settings the success rate that PSO 
achieves the global optimum in the given example is 100%. The running time of the 
whole method to get design and planning results is about 30 seconds. 
 
To test the scalability issue of the method, we apply the method to the following 
networks: (i) 11 nodes and 15 two-way arcs; and (ii) 19 nodes and 30 two-way arcs. 
These two networks are the appropriate size in the real-world application. We test 
different parameters of TPSO. The algorithm runs 50 times for each case. The parameters 
of TPSO are much related with the algorithm performance and running time. For 
example, when the parameters of TPSO for the network with 11 nodes and 15 two-way 
arcs are set the same as those of network with 7 nodes and 9 arcs, the success rate is 50%. 
If we increase the swarm size m to 10 and maximum iteration number NG to 20, the 
success rate will increase to 100%. But the good performance results in the running time 
increasing up to four times the running time with the original parameter setting. The 
detail results of the TPSO performance with different parameters are listed in Table 7.4. . 
It should be noted that the average run time of the algorithm is also related to the number 
of evacuees. The large number of evacuees results in the large size of the time expanded 
static network for the same dynamic network. For example, there are about 10 time units 
in the first period of example system in Fig. 7.15, which means that the time expanded 
network in the first period has about 78 nodes; there are about 30 time units in the second 
period of case 2, which means that the time expanded network in the second period has 
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about 218 nodes. The difference of the sizes of the two time expanded networks results in 
significant difference of the average run times. 
 
Table 7.4 Performance of TPSO with different parameters 
Example network Parameters Success rate Running time(s) 
m=5,NG=10 50% 48.36 
m=5,NG=20 70% 94.83 
m=10,NG=10 70% 92.67 11 nodes, 15 arcs 
m=10,NG=20 100% 183.57 
m=20,NG=5 30% 151.826 
m=20,NG=10 30% 293.894 
m=20,NG=20 80% 571.182 
m=30,NG=5 50% 213.256 
m=30,NG=10 70% 427.938 
19 nodes, 30 arcs 
m=30,NG=20 90% 864.57 
 
 
7.3.5 Conclusion 
 
This section uses an example of transportation system to validate the approach of 
resilience improvement. The result showed that rebalancing solution with integration of 
design, planning and management can significantly increase the evacuation ability of a 
transportation system. At the computational aspect, our research concludes that the three 
layer method is effective for the integrated resource reconfiguration strategy. The upper 
layer algorithm is to find an optimal design for a damaged transportation system; the 
TPSO algorithm is to find an optimal flow pattern for the given transportation system; 
and the lower layer algorithm, P-MCMF algorithm, is to find an optimal flow 
reconfiguration solution for victims of different categories. The lower-layer algorithm 
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provides an easy but effective solution for a special minimum cost multi-commodity flow 
(MCMF) problem. 
 
There are some limitations in the rebalancing solution expressed in the model. First, the 
management strategy in this model considers configuring two categories of resources for 
design and planning; particularly, the resource for design is used to construct a new lane 
and the resource for planning is used to setup flow pattern. However, the resources, such 
as emergency vehicles, which is helpful for planning substance flow has not been 
considered. In a real evacuation situation, emergency vehicles will also occupy the 
transportation infrastructure, and consequently, there are two streams of flows on an 
infrastructure, i.e., a flow of empty vehicles and a flow of victim-loaded vehicles. Second, 
the upper layer algorithm is designed only for a transportation system; furthermore, it is 
not suitable for larger amount of resource for design. For a transportation system, the new 
lanes can be added one by one to the system, which limit the solution space of design 
problem. For large amount of resource for design, the upper layer algorithm will be very 
time-consuming.   
  
7.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter proposed a methodology for improving resilience of a service system by 
integration of three resource reconfiguration strategies, namely design, planning and 
management. The framework and mathematical model of the integration strategy are 
discussed, followed by a validation case of transportation system. The results of the 
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example showed that the integration strategy is an effective resource reconfiguration 
approach to create rebalancing solutions for an imbalanced service system. 
 
An important assumption of the proposed methodology is that the imbalanced situation 
faced by the service system has been given. That is to say, the methodology for resilience 
improvement does not consider uncertainties, which follows the axiom 1 of resilience 
measurement presented in Chapter 6. This point makes the methodology of resilience 
improvement is quite different from robustness improvement, as the latter has to consider 
uncertainties. 
 
The integration of design, planning and management is not only an effective strategy of 
resilience improvement for a service system; it could be viewed as a general strategy to 
improve different properties of different systems, as it is a general framework for 
configuration of different resources. For example, the strategy may be used to improve 
the entire performance of a manufacturing system by configuring different resources in 
its different subsystems; the strategy may also be used to improve other safety related 
properties of a service system, such as reliability and robustness. 
 
200 
 
CHPATER 8 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
8.1 Overview and Conclusion 
 
This thesis aimed to advance our understanding on service along with service system and 
its resilience property and/or behaviour. In the current literature, ‘service’ and ‘resilience’ 
are two buzzwords. However, the concepts of them lacked clarity, which negatively 
affected their development and application. To have a more thorough understanding of 
the two and formulate a more sound theory for them was the main motivation of the study 
presented in this thesis.  
 
The following works have been completed and they were presented in this thesis: 
 Review and analysis of service system and resilience engineering; 
 Development of  the definition of service and service system and of the domain 
model for service systems; 
 Development of the definition of resilience and of the  framework for analysis of 
the resilience of service systems; 
 Clarification of the relationships among reliability, robustness and resilience; 
 Development the measure and measurement method for the resilience of service 
systems; and 
 Development of the theory and methodology for enhancing the resilience of 
service systems. 
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The following conclusions can be drawn from the research results obtained:  
(1) The new definition of service and service system enables to distinguish a service 
system from other systems, e.g., manufacturing systems, etc. That further implies 
that service system has its unique identity.  
(2) The essence of the resilience of a service system is rebalancing between supply and 
demand. 
(3) The measurement of the resilience of a service system makes sense for a particular 
service system only. 
(4) The resilience of a service system is measured by the rebalancing ability from the 
aspects of time and resource. 
(5) The resilience of a service system can be enhanced or improved by not only the 
service flow planning but also the service infrastructure design and construction. 
 
8.2 Contributions 
 
The contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows: 
 
Scientifically, this thesis has improved our understanding of service systems and their 
resilience property or behaviour; furthermore, this thesis has advanced the state of 
knowledge of safety science in particular having successfully responded to two questions: 
is a service system safe? how can a service system be made safer?  
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Technologically and methodologically, the thesis has advanced the state of knowledge for 
modeling and optimization of complex systems. Generally speaking, this thesis takes a 
system perspective to view and study the property (resilience) of service systems. Two 
ideas in this thesis can be generalized and applied to other properties of other systems, 
namely the integration strategy for the resource configuration and multiple layer 
optimization models along with the algorithm to solve the model. It is noted that any 
system relies on its inner and outer resources and configuration of these resources 
determines a system’s overall performance. Thus, the integration strategy for resource 
configuration is a general strategy for any kind of systems. The computational model for 
this integration strategy is a multiple layer optimization model. Thus, the multiple layer 
optimization technique is necessary for a resilient service system. 
 
8.3 Limitations and Future Work 
 
Some limitations remain in this thesis, and they are discussed below. 
 
First, the work reported in this thesis only focused on the resilience of one service 
system. However, the example of the India power system failure in July 2012 has shown 
that there are complicated interdependences among different service systems. Therefore, 
understanding of interdependency among a group of service systems should be improved 
in future. This may need first of all a model of such a complex system, and then 
simulation of the model may generate insights on the resilience property or behaviour of 
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the system. A modeling approach based on the function-behaviour-structure framework 
and agent technology may be suitable to this modeling task. 
 
Second, the proposed approach to enhancing resilience only focused on the technology 
aspect. The resilience of a system depends on its potential ability to respond to 
unbalancing situations, and this response ability further depends on reconfiguration of 
different resources. Obviously, enough resources are important for resilience. However, 
every resource has a cost, and a system needs to achieve a balance between the resilience 
and cost. Therefore, it is worthwhile to study the economics of a resilient system. The 
cost may cover both development cost and operation management cost. 
 
Third, data of large scale practical service systems need to be employed to test the 
proposed methodologies, especially the proposed algorithms. That is to say, the 
scalability issue has not been well discussed and should be studied in future. Along with 
the scalability issue, the efficiency of algorithms needs to be studied in future as well. A 
so-called approximate algorithm may be useful to such complex systems, compensated 
by feedback regulation, to achieve an acceptable level of accuracy in management of the 
resilience of a service system or a group of interdependent service systems. 
 
Fourth, the model of a service system for example transportation system has not captured 
flow of tools (e.g., vehicles to evacuate victims), which compromises the validity of the 
model. This is so because the tools also occupy the infrastructure resource. Including 
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both substances (tools and goods) in the model is important to the application of the 
theoretical developments in this thesis or in future. 
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Appendix A: FCBPSS Framework  
It is first noted that the information of FCBPSS framework below is adopted from 
[Lin and Zhang 2004, Zhang et al. 2005]. 
 
The FCBPSS framework contains a set of core concepts, including: (1) structure, (2) 
state, (3) behaviour, (4) principle, (5) function, (6) context, (7) relationship among 
concepts (1)–(6), and (8) system decomposition. These concepts are further illustrated 
here. (1) Structure and state. A system has a structure that is a set of entities which are 
connected in a meaningful way. Entities are represented by a set of properties, and these 
properties are called the states. The states are given a name. The name of the state is the 
state variable. (2) Behaviour. The behaviour is the causal relationship or structure among 
a set of related state variables. (3) Principle. The principle governs or accounts for the 
behaviour in such a way that the causal relationship is derived from the principle. (4) 
Function and Context. The function is defined as a purpose in the mind of human users 
and can be realized by the system (structure) owing to certain behaviours existed in the 
structure. (5) System Decomposition. A system can be decomposed into subsystems and 
components within the system domain. The system structure, the behavior, the principle, 
the states, and the function concepts follow system decomposition. This means that it 
makes sense to speak of the behavior and states of a system (or subsystem, component). 
These concepts are related to each other. In particular, the structure concept is located at 
the bottom, followed by the state, the behavior, and the function concepts. The principle 
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concept is situated between the state concept and behavior concept in order to give 
rationale for constraint equations such that given a set of values of the active state 
variables, the passive states are found through the evaluation of the constraint equations. 
The context concept is situated between the behavior and the function, which gives the 
rationale from the behavior to the function. 
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